घरेलु हिंसा से महिलाओं का सरंक्षण अधिनियम-2005
(Written by)
Vandana Singh Katiyar Vijay Kumar Katiyar)
Advocate & Researcher Sr. Civil Judge
प्रस्तावना-
भारत नें वियना समझौता ,1994 व कार्यवाही के लिए बीजिंग घोषणा और मंच,1995 को अभिस्वीकृति प्रदान की है। भारतीय संविधान में भी महिलाओं के सरंक्षण के लिए विस्तृत प्रावधान किये गए है। भारत में सामाजिक, आर्थिक व राजनैतिक परिदृश्य में बदलाव के कारण तथा अंतर्राष्ट्रीय अभिसमयों व भारतीय संविधान के आलोक में महिलाओं को प्रदत्त अधिकारों को प्रभावी तरीके के प्रवर्तित कराया जा सके तथा इन अधिकारों की प्रभावी गारंटी सुनिश्चित हो सके इसलिए भारतीय संसद नें सन-2005 में उक्त अधिनियम पारित किया। भारतीय परिवेश में ऐसा कोई कानून विद्यमान नहीं था जो महिलाओं को घरेलू हिंसा से व्यापक तौर पर संरक्षण प्रदान कर सके। यद्यपि कि भारत में धारा- 498A ,304B भारतीय दंड संहिता जैसे प्रावधान प्रवर्तित हैं लेकिन महिलाओ का घरेलू हिंसा से पर्याप्त संरक्षण नहीं हो पा रहा था, इस वजह से उक्त अधिनियम पारित किया गया और जिसमे दीवानी व फौजदारी विधि का सुन्दर समन्यवय किया गया है , जिससे प्रक्रियात्मक बाध्यताओं के कारण महिलाएं अधिकारों से वंचित न हो सकें तथा हिंसा से उन्हें अविलम्ब संरक्षण प्रदान किया जा सके। इसी वजह से इस अधिनियम में घरेलू हिंसा को वृहद अर्थों में परभाषित किया गया है तथा हिंसा के प्रत्येक आयाम को समाहित किया गया है। इतना ही नहीं सम्बंधित न्यायालय, संरक्षण अधिकारी व सुविधा प्रदाता एजेंसी को वृहद शक्तियां प्रदान की गयीं हैं। उक्त अधिनियम को यदि समग्रता से देखा जाय तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि मूलरूप से चार हितधारी इसकी परिधि में आते हैं - पीड़ित,प्रत्यर्थी,समाज व विहित प्राधिकारी। इस आलेख का आशय यह भी है कि विधि की वृत्ति करने वाले यथा-न्यायाधीशों ,अधिवक्ताओं, कानून के विद्यार्थियों,प्रशासनिक अधिकारियों तथा समाज के सदस्यों के मध्य महिलाओं के सम्बन्ध में एक संचेतना व संवेदनशीलता उत्पन्न हो सके। साथ ही समस्त हितधारकों को अपने दायित्वों का बोध हो सके। इतना ही नहीं पीड़ित(victim) के सफर को उत्तरजीवी(survivor) तक तथा स्टेकहोल्डर का सफर ड्यूटीहोल्डर तक संपरिवर्तित करना होगा तभी समाज की आधी आबादी का कल्याण सुनिश्चित हो सकेगा और इससे संपूर्ण भारत का विकास भी संभव हो सकेगा।
27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.
इस धारा का विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि प्रथम वर्ग न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट अथवा मेट्रोपोलिटन मजिस्ट्रेट को इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रस्तुत याचिका के विचारण का क्षेत्राधिकार प्राप्त होगा। यहाँ यह ध्यान रहे कि न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट शब्दावली में अपर मुख्य न्यायायिक, मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट सम्मलित हैं अथवा ACCM व CMM सम्मलित होते हैं। याचिका प्रस्तुत किये जाने के तीन प्रमुख आधार हैं यथा - पीड़िता , प्रत्यर्थी व वाद-हेतुक। जहां तक पीड़िता का प्रश्न है तो इस सम्बन्ध में उक्त धारा यह स्पष्ट उल्लेख करती है कि जहाँ पीड़िता स्थाई अथवा अस्थाई रूप से निवास कर रही हो अथवा कारबार संचालित कर रही हो अथवा किसी नियोजन में नियुक्त हो। दूसरी तरफ प्रत्यर्थी के आलोक में यह प्रावधान किया गया कि जहाँ प्रत्यर्थी निवास कर रहा हो अथवा कारबार संचालित कर रहा हो अथवा किसी नियोजन में नियुक्त है। तीसरी स्थिति यह है कि जहाँ पर वाद-हेतुक उत्पन्न हुआ हो। यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा की उपर्युक्त वर्णित तीनों आधार वैकल्पिक हैं। इसका अभिप्राय यह की उपर्युक्त वर्णित आधारों में से किसी भी आधार पर पीड़िता इस अधिनियम के तहत याचिका प्रस्तुत कर सकती है। धारा-27 में वर्णित संकल्पना को माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Shyam Lal Devda and others vs Parimala , AIR 2020 SC 762 मान्यता प्रदान की है । यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि यदि घरेलू घटना रिपोर्ट किसी अन्य जनपद के संरक्षण अधिकारी द्वारा प्रस्तुत की गयी है और धारा-12 के अधीन याचिका किसी अन्य जनपद के मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट के समक्ष धारा-27 में वर्णित आधारों पर प्रस्तुत की गयी तो ऐसी याचिका क्षेत्राधिकार के विरुद नहीं कही जाएगी और मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट का न्यायालय सक्षम न्यायालय होगा। माननीय इलाहबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने Manish Shukla vs State of Uttar pradesh ,2012 (76) ACC 445 All.- प्रकरण में यह प्रतिपादित किया है - In my opinion, the question of jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend upon the domestic violence report of the Protection Officer. The said question is to be decided according to the provisions of section 27 of the Act, according to which, the court of Magistrate, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, has jurisdiction in the matter. The court where the respondent resides, carries on business or is employed has also jurisdiction. The court within whose local jurisdiction, the cause of action wholly or partly arises, has also jurisdiction. It is open to the aggrieved person to choose any of the said courts for filing the complaint and she can not be compelled to file the complaint according to the choice of the respondents. In the present matter, the respondent no.2, who lives in district Basti, chose to file complaint in the court of CJM Basti, therefore, her complaint can not be said to be not maintainable in the said court only on the ground that the domestic violence report was obtained from the Protection Officer of the district Gonda. The question of jurisdiction was not to be decided on the basis of the office of Protection Officer or his report, rather it was to be decided only in the terms of the provisions of section 27 of the Act. The learned CJM as well as the Sessions Judge have considered the question of jurisdiction according to the parameters provided in of the Act after looking into the allegations made in the complaint and have passed proper orders, therefore, the matter requires no interference.
यहाँ यह भी विचारणीय बिंदु है कि धारा-27 में प्राधिकृत मजिस्ट्रेट के साथ-साथ कुटुंब न्यायालय, सिविल न्यायालय तथा कोई आपराधिक न्यायालय भी इस अधिनियम की धारा-18,19,20 ,21 व 22 के अधीन अनुतोष प्रदान कर सकता है। इस अधिनियम की धारा-26 इस हेतु प्रावधान करती है । माननीय दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने Savitri Devi vs Manoj Kumar ,(2013) DSC 689 Del में उक्त तथ्य की मान्यता प्रदान करते हुए अभिकथित किया है -
23. The last contention of the learned counsel for defendant No. 2 is that the present suit is barred under Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act. Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act reads as follows:-
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.-(1) Any relief available under 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court, or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. A bare perusal of the above Section shows that there is no bar on the jurisdiction of a civil court to try the present matter. On the contrary, permits a civil court, family court, or criminal court to give relief as available in section-18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Domestic Violence Act. Hence, there is no merit in the said contention of the defendant.
यहाँ यह भी उल्लेखनीय है पीड़िता के ऊपर यह दायित्व अधिरोपित किया गया है कि यदि किसी अन्य न्यायालय के द्वारा कोई अनुतोष पीड़िता को प्रदान किया गया है तो वह न्यायालय को इस बात की जानकारी देगी और इस अधिनियम द्वारा पारित प्रतिकार अथवा भरणपोषण के आदेश के अधीन नियत धनराशि को मुजरा किया जायेगा।
4. Learned Counsel for the applicants submitted orally, although it is not mentioned in the application, that notice under sections 12 and 13 has been issued by the Magistrate. I have already held in the case of Azimuddin alias Kunta and Others v. State of U.P. & Anr. decided on 12.02.2008 that No. 482 Cr.P.C. application lies even against mere issuance of a notice, as no cognizance has been taken by the Court. This is also the view taken by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Lal Yadava v. State of U.P. & Ors. 1989 (26) ACC 181. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that proceedings under the Act are essentially civil in nature and it is only for the purpose of cutting down procedural delays that powers have been conferred on a Magistrate under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. for enforcement of the rights under the Act and for this reason also an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. should not ordinarily lie against an order under the Act.
5. In this view of the matter, at this pre-cognizance stage, the application is not maintainable and it is rejected.
यहाँ यह तथ्य अपने मस्तिष्क में रखना होगा कि धारा- 18 से लगायत 22 तक के अधीन कोई आदेश पारित करने तक की प्रकृति दीवानी रहती है। जब संरक्षण आदेश का उल्लंघन कर किया जाता अथवा धारा-19 लगायत 23 के अधीन पारित आदेशों का प्रवर्तन कराना होता है तो उक्त अधिनियम की प्रकृति दाण्डिक हो जाती है। उक्त अधिनियम की धारा-28 तथा नियमावली के नियम-12 (2 ) (C) व (D) को समेकित रूप से पढ़े तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि उक्त अधिनियम में दीवानी व फौजदारी विधि का सुन्दर समन्वय किया गया है। अगर मोटे तौर पर कहा जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि उक्त अधिनियम की प्रकृति अर्ध दीवानी है। लेकिन जहाँ तक धारा-31 व 32 का प्रश्न है तो संरक्षण आदेश का उल्लंघन एक संज्ञेय व अजमानतीय अपराध है , इस आलोक में यह ध्यान रखना होगा की अपराध का विचारण दाण्डिक विधि के आधार पर करना होगा। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा की धारा-31 के अपराध के साथ-साथ अन्य विधियों के तहत गठित अपराधों के बावत भी आरोपों की विरचना की जा सकती है।
जैसा कि विदित है की इस धारा के अधीन याचिका यथासंभव नियमावली-2006 में वर्णित प्रारूप के अनरूप होगी। लेकिन यदि याचिका निर्धारित प्रारूप में नहीं है तो मात्र इसी आधार पर याचिका ख़ारिज नहीं की जानी चाहिए वरन पश्चातवर्ती अनुक्रम में उस याचिका को दुरुश्त करने की अनुज्ञा न्यायालय को प्रदान करनी चाहिए।इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि परिवाद/याचिका में संशोधन की अनुज्ञा भी प्रदान की जानी चाहिए। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji vs Kunapareddy Swarana Kumari ,AIR 2016 SC 2519. में इस तथ्य की मान्यता प्रदान की है इस अधिनियम के अधीन संस्थित याचिका में संशोधन की अनुज्ञा प्रदान की जा सकती है।
याचिका प्रस्तुत किये जानें के पूर्व की सावधानियां -
हमारे विद्वान न्यायाधीशों तथा विद्वान अधिवक्ताओं को इस अधिनियम के तहत याचिका प्रस्तुत किये जानें से पूर्व कुछ सावधानियां रखनीं होगी। न्यायविदों के लिए यह आवश्यक है कि वह यह सुनिश्चित करलें कि उनके पास यह जानकारी हो कि आपकी तैनाती वाले जनपद में राज्य सरकार ने किस प्राधिकारी को सरंक्षण अधिकारी नियुक्त किया है तथा कौन-कौन सी सुविधा प्रदाता एजेंसिया मान्यता प्राप्त है तथा किन-किन एजेंसियों के पास काउंसिलिंग के विशेषज्ञ हैं और कौन-कौन से संरक्षण गृह उस जनपद में कार्यरत हैं। उक्त तथ्यों की जानकारी यदि न्यायिक अधिकारी के पास रहेगी तो अधिनियम की मंशा के अनुसार वह पीड़ित की सम्यक सहायता कर सकेंगे। इसके लिए अधिकारिता प्राप्त न्यायालय के प्रत्येक अधिकारी को यह चाहिए कि कार्यभार गृहण करने के उपरांत जिलाधिकारी से उपर्युक्त सूचना एक औपचारिक पत्र प्रेषित कर प्राप्त करलें। दूसरी तरफ अधिवक्ताओं को भी उपर्युक्त वर्णित तथ्यों कि जानकारी होनी चाहिए साथ ही अधिवक्ताओं को यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि घरेलू हिंसा से सम्बंधित नियमावली-2006 की जानकारी उन्हें रहनी चाहिए तथा इस अधिनियम के तहत आवेदन निर्धारित प्रारूप में होना चाहिए इसके लिए नियमावली-2006 का ज्ञान अधिवक्ताओं को होना चाहिए।क्षेत्राधिकार -
किस न्यायालय को इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रस्तुत याचिका के विचारण की अधिकारिता होगी इस तथ्य की जानकारी न्यायधीशों व अधिवक्ताओं दोनों को होनी चाहिए। आइये सबसे पहले यह जानते हैं कि इस सम्बन्ध में विधिक प्रावधान क्या हैं ? इस हेतु इस अधिनियम की धारा-27 का उल्लेख आवश्यक है जो इस प्रकार है -27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.
इस धारा का विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि प्रथम वर्ग न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट अथवा मेट्रोपोलिटन मजिस्ट्रेट को इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रस्तुत याचिका के विचारण का क्षेत्राधिकार प्राप्त होगा। यहाँ यह ध्यान रहे कि न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट शब्दावली में अपर मुख्य न्यायायिक, मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट सम्मलित हैं अथवा ACCM व CMM सम्मलित होते हैं। याचिका प्रस्तुत किये जाने के तीन प्रमुख आधार हैं यथा - पीड़िता , प्रत्यर्थी व वाद-हेतुक। जहां तक पीड़िता का प्रश्न है तो इस सम्बन्ध में उक्त धारा यह स्पष्ट उल्लेख करती है कि जहाँ पीड़िता स्थाई अथवा अस्थाई रूप से निवास कर रही हो अथवा कारबार संचालित कर रही हो अथवा किसी नियोजन में नियुक्त हो। दूसरी तरफ प्रत्यर्थी के आलोक में यह प्रावधान किया गया कि जहाँ प्रत्यर्थी निवास कर रहा हो अथवा कारबार संचालित कर रहा हो अथवा किसी नियोजन में नियुक्त है। तीसरी स्थिति यह है कि जहाँ पर वाद-हेतुक उत्पन्न हुआ हो। यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा की उपर्युक्त वर्णित तीनों आधार वैकल्पिक हैं। इसका अभिप्राय यह की उपर्युक्त वर्णित आधारों में से किसी भी आधार पर पीड़िता इस अधिनियम के तहत याचिका प्रस्तुत कर सकती है। धारा-27 में वर्णित संकल्पना को माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Shyam Lal Devda and others vs Parimala , AIR 2020 SC 762 मान्यता प्रदान की है । यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि यदि घरेलू घटना रिपोर्ट किसी अन्य जनपद के संरक्षण अधिकारी द्वारा प्रस्तुत की गयी है और धारा-12 के अधीन याचिका किसी अन्य जनपद के मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट के समक्ष धारा-27 में वर्णित आधारों पर प्रस्तुत की गयी तो ऐसी याचिका क्षेत्राधिकार के विरुद नहीं कही जाएगी और मुख्य न्यायायिक मजिस्ट्रेट का न्यायालय सक्षम न्यायालय होगा। माननीय इलाहबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने Manish Shukla vs State of Uttar pradesh ,2012 (76) ACC 445 All.- प्रकरण में यह प्रतिपादित किया है - In my opinion, the question of jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend upon the domestic violence report of the Protection Officer. The said question is to be decided according to the provisions of section 27 of the Act, according to which, the court of Magistrate, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, has jurisdiction in the matter. The court where the respondent resides, carries on business or is employed has also jurisdiction. The court within whose local jurisdiction, the cause of action wholly or partly arises, has also jurisdiction. It is open to the aggrieved person to choose any of the said courts for filing the complaint and she can not be compelled to file the complaint according to the choice of the respondents. In the present matter, the respondent no.2, who lives in district Basti, chose to file complaint in the court of CJM Basti, therefore, her complaint can not be said to be not maintainable in the said court only on the ground that the domestic violence report was obtained from the Protection Officer of the district Gonda. The question of jurisdiction was not to be decided on the basis of the office of Protection Officer or his report, rather it was to be decided only in the terms of the provisions of section 27 of the Act. The learned CJM as well as the Sessions Judge have considered the question of jurisdiction according to the parameters provided in of the Act after looking into the allegations made in the complaint and have passed proper orders, therefore, the matter requires no interference.
यहाँ यह भी विचारणीय बिंदु है कि धारा-27 में प्राधिकृत मजिस्ट्रेट के साथ-साथ कुटुंब न्यायालय, सिविल न्यायालय तथा कोई आपराधिक न्यायालय भी इस अधिनियम की धारा-18,19,20 ,21 व 22 के अधीन अनुतोष प्रदान कर सकता है। इस अधिनियम की धारा-26 इस हेतु प्रावधान करती है । माननीय दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने Savitri Devi vs Manoj Kumar ,(2013) DSC 689 Del में उक्त तथ्य की मान्यता प्रदान करते हुए अभिकथित किया है -
23. The last contention of the learned counsel for defendant No. 2 is that the present suit is barred under Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act. Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act reads as follows:-
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.-(1) Any relief available under 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court, or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. A bare perusal of the above Section shows that there is no bar on the jurisdiction of a civil court to try the present matter. On the contrary, permits a civil court, family court, or criminal court to give relief as available in section-18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Domestic Violence Act. Hence, there is no merit in the said contention of the defendant.
यहाँ यह भी उल्लेखनीय है पीड़िता के ऊपर यह दायित्व अधिरोपित किया गया है कि यदि किसी अन्य न्यायालय के द्वारा कोई अनुतोष पीड़िता को प्रदान किया गया है तो वह न्यायालय को इस बात की जानकारी देगी और इस अधिनियम द्वारा पारित प्रतिकार अथवा भरणपोषण के आदेश के अधीन नियत धनराशि को मुजरा किया जायेगा।
इस अधिनियम के तहत कार्यवाही की प्रकृति -
इस अधिनियम की धारा- 12 के अधीन प्रस्तुत याचिका दीवानी प्रकृति की है। कार्यवाही त्वरित गति से संचालित हो सके इसलिए विचारण का क्षेत्राधिकार मजिस्ट्रेट को प्रदान किया गया है। इस लिए उक्त याचिका के आलोक में दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-482 के प्रावधान सामान्यतया लागू नहीं होते। माननीय उच्च न्यायालय इलाहबाद ने Dr. Vinod parasar vs State of UP ,2008 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 389 All में उक्त अवधारणा का समर्थन करते हुए कहा है कि -4. Learned Counsel for the applicants submitted orally, although it is not mentioned in the application, that notice under sections 12 and 13 has been issued by the Magistrate. I have already held in the case of Azimuddin alias Kunta and Others v. State of U.P. & Anr. decided on 12.02.2008 that No. 482 Cr.P.C. application lies even against mere issuance of a notice, as no cognizance has been taken by the Court. This is also the view taken by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Lal Yadava v. State of U.P. & Ors. 1989 (26) ACC 181. Furthermore, it may be pointed out that proceedings under the Act are essentially civil in nature and it is only for the purpose of cutting down procedural delays that powers have been conferred on a Magistrate under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. for enforcement of the rights under the Act and for this reason also an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. should not ordinarily lie against an order under the Act.
5. In this view of the matter, at this pre-cognizance stage, the application is not maintainable and it is rejected.
यहाँ यह तथ्य अपने मस्तिष्क में रखना होगा कि धारा- 18 से लगायत 22 तक के अधीन कोई आदेश पारित करने तक की प्रकृति दीवानी रहती है। जब संरक्षण आदेश का उल्लंघन कर किया जाता अथवा धारा-19 लगायत 23 के अधीन पारित आदेशों का प्रवर्तन कराना होता है तो उक्त अधिनियम की प्रकृति दाण्डिक हो जाती है। उक्त अधिनियम की धारा-28 तथा नियमावली के नियम-12 (2 ) (C) व (D) को समेकित रूप से पढ़े तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि उक्त अधिनियम में दीवानी व फौजदारी विधि का सुन्दर समन्वय किया गया है। अगर मोटे तौर पर कहा जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि उक्त अधिनियम की प्रकृति अर्ध दीवानी है। लेकिन जहाँ तक धारा-31 व 32 का प्रश्न है तो संरक्षण आदेश का उल्लंघन एक संज्ञेय व अजमानतीय अपराध है , इस आलोक में यह ध्यान रखना होगा की अपराध का विचारण दाण्डिक विधि के आधार पर करना होगा। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा की धारा-31 के अपराध के साथ-साथ अन्य विधियों के तहत गठित अपराधों के बावत भी आरोपों की विरचना की जा सकती है।
क्या याचिका में संशोधन किये जा सकते हैं -
जैसा कि विदित है की इस धारा के अधीन याचिका यथासंभव नियमावली-2006 में वर्णित प्रारूप के अनरूप होगी। लेकिन यदि याचिका निर्धारित प्रारूप में नहीं है तो मात्र इसी आधार पर याचिका ख़ारिज नहीं की जानी चाहिए वरन पश्चातवर्ती अनुक्रम में उस याचिका को दुरुश्त करने की अनुज्ञा न्यायालय को प्रदान करनी चाहिए।इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि परिवाद/याचिका में संशोधन की अनुज्ञा भी प्रदान की जानी चाहिए। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji vs Kunapareddy Swarana Kumari ,AIR 2016 SC 2519. में इस तथ्य की मान्यता प्रदान की है इस अधिनियम के अधीन संस्थित याचिका में संशोधन की अनुज्ञा प्रदान की जा सकती है।
याचिका कौन प्रस्तुत कर सकेगा तथा प्रस्तुतिकरण के पश्चात् की प्रक्रिया -
अब अगला विचारणीय प्रश्न यह है कि न्यायालय में याचिका इस अधिनियम के अधीन किसके द्वारा प्रस्तुत की जा सकती है तथा न्यायालय द्वारा याचिका प्रस्तुत किये जाने के उपरांत क्या प्रक्रिया अपनायी जाएगी। में इस सम्बन्ध में इस अधिनियम की धारा-12 , नियमावली के नियम-12 व धारा-28 का उल्लेख आवश्यक हो जाता है। जो इस प्रकार है -12. Application to Magistrate.-(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other the person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set-off.
Rule-12. Means of service of notices. — (1) The notices for appearance in respect of the proceedings under the Act shall contain the names of the person alleged to have committed domestic violence, the nature of domestic violence, and such other details which may facilitate the identification of the person concerned.
(2) The service of notices shall be made in the following manner, namely: —
(a) The notices in respect of the proceedings under the Act shall be served by the Protection Officer or any other person directed by him to serve the notice, on behalf of the Protection Officer, at the address where the respondent is stated to be ordinarily residing in India by the complainant or aggrieved person or where the respondent is stated to be gainfully employed by the complainant or aggrieved person, as the case may he.
(b) The notice shall be delivered to any person in charge of such place at the moment and in case of such delivery not being possible, it shall be posted at a conspicuous place on the premises,
(c) For serving the notices under section 13 or any other provision of the Act, the provisions under Order V of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the provisions under Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). as far as practicable may be adopted.
(d) Any order passed for such service of notices shall entail the same consequences, as an order passed under Order V of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 or Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal. The procedure, 1973 respectively, depending upon the procedure found efficacious for making an order for such service under section 13 or any other provision of the Act and in addition to the procedure prescribed under Order V or Chapter the court may direct any other steps necessary with a view to expediting the proceedings. to adhere to the time limit provided in the Act
(3) On a statement on the date fixed for appearance of the respondent, or a report of the person authorized to serve the notices under the Act, that service has been affected appropriate orders shall be passed by the court on any pending application for interim relief, after hearing the complainant or the respondent, or both.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall Endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.
28. Procedure.-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23.
उक्त प्रावधानों के विश्लेषण से यह स्पष्ट है कि पीड़ित व्यक्ति द्वारा अथवा संरक्षण अधिकारी या सेवा प्रदाता द्वारा अथवा पीड़ित व्यक्ति की ओर किसी व्यक्ति द्वारा संस्थित किया जा सकता है। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि याचिका सीधे मजिस्ट्रेट के समक्ष यदि प्रस्तुत कर दी जाती है तो यह किसी प्रकार की अनियमितता नहीं मानी जाएगी और ऐसा परिवाद या याचिका पोषणीय मानी जाएगी।माननीय उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद ने उक्त तथ्यों को स्थापित नजीर Milan Kumar vs State of Uttar pradesh ,2007 (5) A.L.J. 679 All.-में समर्थन करते हुए अभिकथित किया है कि 7. A plain reading of the Section shows that the aggrieved person can file complaint directly to the Magistrate concerned. This is the choice of the aggrieved person that instead of direct approaching the Magistrate, he or she can approach the Protection Officer and in case of emergency, the service provider and with their help to the Magistrate concerned. The word "or" used in Section 12 of the Act is material, which provides a choice of the aggrieved Oh to approach in the aforesaid manner. There is no error in direct approaching the Magistrate for taking cognizance in the matter. This is for the Magistrate concerned to take help of Protection Officer and service provider after receiving the complaint provided, he feels it necessary for final disposal of the dispute between the parties. If the parties concerned or Magistrate takes help of the Protection Officer, he, will submit a Domestic Incident Report to the Magistrate concerned
दूसरी तरफ परिवाद प्रस्तुत किये जाने के बाद मजिस्ट्रेट द्वारा कौन सी प्रक्रिया अपनायी जाएगी। उपर्युक्त सम्बन्ध में उपर्युक्त वर्णित तीनों प्रावधानों का विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि परिवाद प्रस्तुत किये जाने के उपरांत मजिस्ट्रेट अपने स्थानीय क्षेत्राधिकार को लेकर आश्वस्त है तो परिवाद को दर्ज करने का आदेश पारित करेगा तदुपरांत प्रत्यर्थी को नोटिस निर्गत करेगा। उक्त प्रावधानों के आलोक में यह कहा जा सकता है कि सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश-5 तथा दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता के अध्याय-6 के आलोक में प्रत्यर्थी के विरुद नोटिस निर्गत की जाएगी। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रहे की धारा-28 व नियम-12 मजिस्ट्रेट को अपनी प्रक्रिया,जो उसे उचित लगे, अपनाने से मना नहीं करता है। माननीय मणिपुर उच्च न्यायलाय Naoram shamungau singh vs Moirigthem Guni Devi AIR 2014 Mani 251 में यह प्रतिपादित किया है की दंड प्रक्रिया संहित में प्रावधानित प्रक्रिया से विचलन कार्यवाहियों को अविधिक नहीं बनाती है।
यदि नियम-12 व धारा-28 को साथ मिलकर पढ़ा जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि याचिका दाखिल होने के उपरांत प्रत्यर्थी को को नोटिस सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश-5 के तहत निर्गत करेंगे तथा तामीला को तदनुसार उपधारित करेंगे। तामीला मानने के बाद भी यदि प्रत्यर्थी उपसंजात नहीं होता है तो दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-126 तथा इस अधिनियम की धारा-23 (2 ) के आलोक में प्रत्यर्थी के विरुद एकपक्षीय कार्यवाही करते हुए एकपक्षीय आदेश निर्गत किया जायेगा। उक्त एकपक्षीय आदेश प्रत्यर्थी के आवेदन पर उचित कारण दर्शित करने पर विचारण न्यायालय द्वारा अपास्त भी किया जा सकता है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि इस स्तर तक कोई वारण्ट अथवा दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-82 व 83 की कार्यवाही नहीं की जानी चाहिए। अक्सर इस स्तर पर न्यायालयों में भ्रम की स्थिति रहती है। यहाँ आपको भ्रमित नहीं होना है क्योंकि इस स्तर तक कार्यवाही की प्रकृति सिविल है, इसलिए तामीला होने के उपरांत कार्यवाही एकपक्षीय अग्रसारित कर देंगे। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा की यदि न्यायालय द्वारा कोई अंतरिम भरणपोषण का आदेश पारित किया गया है तो उसकी वसूली के लिए दंड प्रक्रिया संहित की धारा-125 लगायत 129 तक में जो प्रक्रिया प्रावधानित की गयी है उसको उपयोग में लिया जा सकता है अर्थात वारंट ,रिकवरी वारंट निर्गत किये जा सकते है तथा कुर्की आदि का आदेश निर्गत किया जा सकता है। माननीय उत्तराखंड उच्च न्यायालय ने Nirmal jeet Kaur vs State of uttarakhand ,2013 (121) AIC 461 Utt.- प्रकरण में उक्त तथ्यों का समर्थन करते हुए कहा है -
(5) On the other hand, in reply to the above, learned respondent no.2 & 3 drew the attention of this Court to sub-Section (2), of Section 28 Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act 2005, which reads as under: Nothing in Sub-Section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under Section Sub Section (23).
(6) As to the procedure of the proceeding under Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act-2005 sub-Section (1) of sub-Section (28) provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act of proceeding under Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, & 23 and under Section 31 shall be governed by the provision of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
(7) The question, before Court, is that whether in the light of expression " its own procedure for proposal of an application", can the Magistrate recall its order passed under Section 23 or not. Certainly said expression does not give the Magistrate power to pass arbitrary orders or to pass such an order which is against the known basic principles of judicial procedure. In the opinion of this Court what aforesaid expression authorities the Magistrate is that he can pass such an order which are in consonance of the basic principles of judicial procedure. It is pertinent the mention here that proceeding based on an application under Section 12, the Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act-2005 is not the proceeding of the trial of an offence. Rather such proceedings are quasi civil in nature, like the one under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. If we look in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, we find that there is a provision under rule 7 of Order IX of the Code which empowers the Court to set aside the order directing to proceed ex-parte. Under rule 13 of Order IX of the code, trial courts have powers to set aside the ex-parte decree on sufficient cause being shown by the defendant. Similarly under the Code Criminal Procedure 1973, in respect of proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., there is a proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 126 which empowers the Magistrate to recall an ex-parte order. As such setting aside of ex-parte order by the Magistrate under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act-2005 cannot be said to be arbitrary or against the basic principles of judicial procedure, particularly when sub- Section (2) of sub-Section 28 of the Act, provides that nothing in sub-Section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or sub-Section (2) of Section 23.
क्या DIR पर विचार किया जाना आदेशात्मक है -
अगला विचारणीय बिंदु यह है कि घरेलू घटना रिपोर्ट(DIR) के सम्बन्ध में क्या स्थापित विधि है ? क्या DIR को विचार में लिया जाना आदेशात्मक है ? क्या DIR का मंगाया जाना आदेशात्मक है ? क्या प्रत्यर्थी को नोटिस निर्गत किये जाने से पूर्व DIR का विचार में लिया जाना आवश्यक है ? उक्त प्रश्नो के आलोक में यदि इस अधिनियम की धारा-12 का विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है जैसा कि उक्त धारा का परन्तुक स्वयं कहता है कि यदि कोई DIR उपलब्ध है तो धारा-12 के आवेदन के अधीन कोई आदेश निर्गत किये जाने से पूर्व DIR पर विचार किया जाना आदेशात्मक है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि यदि पत्रवली पर DIR उपलब्ध नहीं है तो उसका मंगाया जाना आदेशात्मक नहीं है अर्थात यह मजिस्ट्रेट का विवेकाधिकार है कि वह DIR मंगवाए अथवा नहीं। दूसरी तरफ यह भी स्थापित विधि है के नोटिस निर्गत करते समय DIR का विचार में लिया जाना आदेशात्मक नहीं है। यह भी स्थापित विधि है की यदि DIR मंगवाने के वाबजूद कई बार अनुस्मारक निर्गत किये जाने की उपरांत भी संरक्षण अधिकारी द्वारा कोई DIR नहीं प्रेषित की जाती है और न्यायालय द्वारा याचिका के आलोक में आदेश निर्गत कर दिए जाते है तो ऐसे आदेश अवैधानिक नहीं मानें जायेंगे। उपर्युक्त तथ्यों के आलोक में स्थापित नजीरें इस प्रकार हैं -Manoj Harikisanji changani vs prema Srinivas Changani, 2013 (121) AIC 473 (Bom)
20. The provision of Section 12 of the Act, though employs the word shall, the imperativeness included in the word shall cannot and should not be allowed to defeat the scheme of the Act.
21. In the result, this Court holds that calling of Domestic Violence Report from a Protection Officer:-
[a] would advance the cause of justice; [b] is not a mandatory rule of law; [c] is discretionary and not mandatory;
Cri. Appln. No.564/2011 [d] The stage of calling the report would depend on the discretion of the Court, guided by the facts, pleadings, and material as may be brought on record.
Milan kumar vs state of UP ,2007 (5) A.L.J. 679 All-
7. A plain reading of the Section shows that the aggrieved person can file a complaint directly to the Magistrate concerned. This is the choice of the aggrieved person that instead of directly approaching the Magistrate, he or she can approach the Protection Officer and in case of emergency, the service provider and with their help to the Magistrate concerned. The word "or" used in Section 12 of the Act is material, which provides a choice of the aggrieved Oh to approach in an aforesaid manner. There is no error in direct approaching the Magistrate for taking cognizance in the matter. This is for the Magistrate concerned to take help of Protection Officer and service provider after receiving the complaint provided, he feels it necessary for final disposal of the dispute between the parties. If the parties concerned or Magistrate takes the help of the Protection Officer, he will submit a Domestic Incident Report to the Magistrate concerned.
Sambhu prasad singh vs manjari,2012 (4) R.C.R. 368 delhi-
14. The proviso to Section 12 obliges the court to, "before passing any order on such application.....take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider." The plenitude of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 12 is in no way affected by the proviso; all that it mandates is that before any order Crl. M.C. 3083/2011 Page 13 is made on an application (under Section 12) the magistrate "shall" take into consideration "any" report made by the Protection Officer. It is one thing to say that Parliamentary mandate to the court is to take into consideration, in every case, a protection Officers' report, as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction - as the petitioner contends- and entirely another to say that if "any" such report is available, it shall be considered. This clear-cut difference, in our opinion, was lost sight of by the Single Judge in Bhupender Singh Mehra‟s case. If Parliament had indeed mandated that in every case the Court was obliged to call for a Protection Officer's report, and thereafter proceed with the complaint, the structure of Section 12 would have been entirely different. Such intention would have been expressed in more definitive, or imperative terms. In this context, this Court is also unpersuaded by the Petitioner's argument that Rule 6 and the form appended to the Rules have to be read into Section 12, to discern the precondition urged. This Court sees no need to do so; it would result in artificially curtailing what is otherwise a wide power.
In Ajay Kant (supra) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held, turning down a contention identical to that of the respondent (in this case) that Crl. M.C. 3083/2011 Page 9 "On perusal of the aforementioned proviso appended to the provision, it appears that before passing any order on the application, it is obligatory on a Magistrate to take into consideration any report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider. Neither it is obligatory for a Magistrate to call such report nor it is necessary that before issuance of notice to the petitioners it was obligatory for a Magistrate to consider the report. The words before passing any order provide that any final order on the application and not merely issuance of notice to the respondent/the petitioners herein. The words any report also mention that a report, if any, received by a Magistrate shall be considered. Thus, at this stage, if the report has not been called or has not been considered, it cannot be a ground for quashing the proceeding."
A similar view was taken by the Jharkhand High Court in Rakesh Sachdeva (supra):
"12. It would thus appear that the proviso to Section 12 would impose that before passing any order on an application of the aggrieved person, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer. The order contemplated in the proviso relates to the final orders, which the Magistrate, may pass under Section 18 of the Act. The Protection orders, which the Magistrate may pass under Section 18 of the Act, are only on being prima facie satisfied that the domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place. The insistence to take into consideration the domestic incident report of the Protection Officer would, therefore, not apply at the stage of initiation of the inquiry under Section 12 of the Act. The contention of the petitioners that without considering the domestic incident report, the very initiation of the enquiry is bad, appears to be misconceived and therefore, not tenable."
Namita Mohanti vs Pankja Kumar Mohanti ,2014 (137) AIC 319 Udisa – Hon’ble High Court held that 4. After leading evidence from both sides, arguments were heard and the learned J.M.F.C., Jaipatna allowed the petition on the contest and prohibited the respondents from alienating any assets including the Stridhana of the aggrieved person. Respondent no.1 was directed to provide accommodation for the aggrieved person and her daughter or to pay a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/(Rupees one thousand) for the same. He was further directed to pay monthly maintenance of Rs.2,500/- (Rupees two thousand five hundred) for maintenance of the aggrieved person as well as her daughter. The Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were directed to pay Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) as compensation to the aggrieved person. 4 5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Jaipatna, the Respondents filed an appeal before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dharamgarh, which was numbered as Criminal Appeal No.02 of 2012. After hearing the parties and on examining the documents, the learned Sessions Judge has held that there has been a violation of a mandatory provision of Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for brevity, inasmuch as, the Magistrate without waiting for the Domestic Incident Report (In short “DIR”.) of the Protection Officer, issued notice to the respondents. Secondly, it is held that there has been a violation of Section 14 of the Act, in view of the fact that the Magistrate did No.make any effort to the counseling for the parties so that conciliation can be arrived at between the parties. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge held that the order impugned is no No.sustainable and therefore he set it aside.
6. The opposite parties, though were noticed did No.appear in this case. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in course of hearing, relied upon the case of Sambhu Prasad Singh v. Manjari, reported in 2013 (1) Crimes 414 (Del.), wherein a Division Bench of Delhi High Court held as follows: “14. The proviso to Section 12 obliges the Court to, “before passing any order on such application … take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.”
The plenitude of the jurisdiction conferred by section 12 is in no way affected by the proviso; all that it mandates is that before any order is made on an application (under Section
12) the Magistrate “shall”. take into consideration “any”. the report made by the Protection Officer. It is one thing to say that Parliamentary mandate to the Court is to take into consideration, in every case, a Protection Officers’ 5 reports, as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction – as the petitioner contends and entirely another to say that if “any”. such report is available, it shall be considered. This clear-cut difference, in our opinion, was lost sight of by the Single Judge in Bhupender Singh Mehra’s case. If Parliament had indeed mandated that in every case the Court was obliged to call for a Protection Officer’s report, and thereafter proceed with the complaint, the structure of Section 12 would have been entirely different. Such intention would have been expressed in more definitive, or imperative terms. In this context, this Court is also unpersuaded by the Petitioner’s argument that Rule 6 and the form appended to the rules have to be read into Section 12, to discern the precondition urged. This Court sees no need to do so; it would result in artificially curtailing what is otherwise a wide power”. Thereafter, in paragraph 19, the Division Bench has held as follows: “19. To conclude we answer the question referred to the Court in the negative a Magistrate when Petitioned under Section 12(1) is no No.obliged to call for and consider the DIR before issuing notice to the respondent. However, if the DIR has already been submitted, that should be considered, in view of the proviso to Section 12(1).”
7. Thus, it is apparent from the records that it is No.necessary to call for a domestic enquiry report, and thereafter the Magistrate can issue notice to the respondents. The expression that appears in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act is therefore quoted hereunder: “Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.”
It does No.say that it is necessary to call for a domestic enquiry report from the Protection Officer, but such an enquiry report if available, the Court must take the same into consideration. A similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Manoj .Harikisanji Changani and others v. Sau Prema Shrinivas Changani and 6 others, reported in 2013 (1) Crimes 435 (Bom.). In that view of the matter, the Court comes to the conclusion that it is No.necessary for the Magistrate to wait for the domestic enquiry report before issuing notice to the respondents.
8. The second contention that has been raised in violation of Section 14 of the Act, which provides that the Magistrate may at any stage of the proceedings under this Act, direct the respondent or the aggrieved person, either singly or jointly, to undergo counseling with any member of a service provider who possesses such qualifications and experience in counseling as may be prescribed. Sub-Section (2) provides that where the Magistrate has issued any direction under subsection (1), he shall fix the next date of hearing of the case within a period No.exceeding two months. From the expression “Magistrate may”. it appears that the counseling, in this case, is no No.compulsory, and only when the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the matter can be settled by conciliation, he may ask for counseling of the parties. Thus, the Addl. Sessions Judge has erred in holding that there has been an indefensible violation of Section 14 of the Act.
अंतरिम भरणपोषण का आदेश कैसे पारित करेंगे -
इस अधिनियम की धारा- 23 में अंतरिम भरणपोषण के प्रावधानों का प्रावधान किया गया है। इस धारा के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि इसमें न्यायालय को यह विवेकाधिकार प्रदान किया गया है की प्रत्यर्थी की आर्थिक हैसियत व प्रत्येक मामले के तथ्यों अवं परिस्थितियों की धयान में रखकर न्यायालय आदेश पारित करेगा, लेकिन अभी हाल ही में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने रजनीश बनाम नेहा दाण्डिक अपील संख्या-730 /2020 निर्णय दिनांकित 4 नवम्बर 2020 में या प्रतिपादित किया है की मजिस्ट्रेट न्यायालय जब भी अंतरिम भरणपोषण के आदेश पारित करे तो उक्त नजीर में संलग्न शपथपत्र प्राप्त करे तहत न्यायालय इस स्तर पर सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश-10 का प्रयोग भी कर सकते है। शपथपत्र के प्रारूप इस प्रकार है -
Enclosure I
Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities for Non-Agrarian Deponents I _________, d/o _______ or s/o , aged about ______years, resident of , do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as under:
A. Personal Information
1. Name:
2. Age/Sex:
3. Qualifications (Educational and Professional):
4. Whether the Applicant is staying in the matrimonial house / parental home / separate residence. Please provide the current residential address of the matrimonial home or place of residence and details of ownership of residence, if owned by another family member.
5. Date of marriage:
6. Date of separation:
7. General monthly expenses of the Applicant (rent, household expenses, medical bills, transportation, etc.):
B. Details of Legal Proceedings and Maintenance being paid
1. Particulars of any ongoing or past legal proceedings with respect to maintenance or child support between the Applicant and Non-Applicant.
2. Whether any maintenance has been awarded in any proceeding arising under the D.V.Act, Cr.P.C., HMA, HAMA, etc.? If yes, provide details of the quantum of maintenance awarded in the proceedings.
3. If so, provide particulars thereof, along with a copy of the Order/s passed.
4. Whether the Order of maintenance passed in earlier proceedings has been complied with. If not, arrears of maintenance.
5. Whether any voluntary contribution towards maintenance has been made/ will be made in the future? If yes, provide details of the same.
C. Details of dependant family members
1. Details of Dependant family members, if any.
a. Relationship with dependants:
b. Age and sex of dependant/s:
2. Disclose if any independent source/s of income of the dependants, including interest income, assets, pension, the tax liability on any such income, and any other relevant details.
3. The approximate expenses incurred on account of the dependant.
D. Medical details if any, of the Deponent and/or dependent family members
1. Whether either party or child /children is suffering from any physical/mental disability or any other serious ailment. If yes, produce medical records.
2. Whether any dependent family member has a serious disability, requiring continuous medical expenditure. If yes, produce a disability certificate and approximate medical expenditure incurred on such medical treatment.
3. Whether either party or child/children or any other dependent family member is suffering from life-threatening diseases, which would entail expensive and regular medical expenditure? If yes, provide details of the same along with a summary of previous details of hospitalization/medical expenses incurred.
E. Details of Children of the parties
1. Number of children from the existing marriage / marital relationship/ previous marriage
2. Name and age of children
3. Details of the parent who has custody of the children.
4. Expenditure for maintenance of dependent children.
a. Towards food, clothing, and medical expenses b. Towards expenses for education, and a summary of general expenses c. Towards expenses, if any, of any extra educational, vocational, or professional/educational course, specialized training, or special skills program of dependent children.
d. Details of any loan, mortgage, charge incurred, or installment plan (being paid or payable), if any, on account of any educational expenses of children.
5. Whether any voluntary contribution by either of the parties is being made towards these educational expenses. If yes, provide details of the same. Also, provide an estimate of any additional contribution that may be required.
6. Whether any financial support is being provided by a third party for the educational expenses of the children?
F. Details of Income of the Deponent
1. Name of employer:
2. Designation:
3. Monthly income:
4. If engaged in Government Service, furnish latest Salary Certificates or current Pay Slips or proof of deposit in a bank account, if being remitted directly by the employer.
5. If engaged in the private sector, furnish a certificate provided by the employer stating the designation and gross monthly income of such person, and Form 16 for the relevant period of current employment.
6. If any perquisites, benefits, house rent allowance, travel allowance, dearness allowance, or any other service benefit is being provided by the employer during the course of current employment.
7. Whether assessed to income tax?
If yes, submit copies of the Income Tax Returns for the periods given below :
(i) One year prior to marriage
(ii) One year prior to separation
(iii) At the time when the Application for maintenance is filed
8. Income from other sources, such as rent, interest, shares, dividends, capital gains, FDRs, Post office deposits, mutual funds, stocks, debentures, agriculture, or business, if any, along with TDS in respect of any such income.
9. Furnish copies of Bank Statement of all accounts for the last 3 years.
G. Assets (movable and immovable) owned by the Deponent
1. Self-acquired property, if any:
2. Properties jointly owned by the parties after marriage:
3. Share in any ancestral property:
4. Other joint properties of the parties (accounts/ investments/ FDR/ mutual funds, stocks, debentures etc.), their value and status of possession:
5. Status of possession of immovable property and details of rent, if leased:
6. Details of loans taken or given by the Deponent
7. Brief description of jewelry and ornaments of parties acquired during /after marriage
8. Details of transfer deeds or transactions of alienation of properties previously owned by the applicant, executed during the subsistence of the marriage. Also provide brief reasons for such sale or transaction, if any.
H. Details of Liabilities of the Deponent
1. Loans, liabilities, mortgage, or charge outstanding against the Deponent, if any.
2. Details of any EMIs being paid.
3. Date and purpose of taking a loan or incurring any such liability:
4. Actual amount borrowed if any, and the amount paid up to date of filing the Affidavit:
5. Any other information which would be relevant to describe the current liabilities of the Deponent.
I. Self-employed persons / Professionals / Business Persons / Entrepreneur
1. Brief description of nature of business/profession/vocation/self-employed/work activity.
2. Whether the business/profession/ self-employment is carried on as an individual, sole proprietorship concern, partnership concern, LLP, company or association of persons, HUF, joint family business, or any other form? Give particulars of Applicant’s share in the partnership/business/ professional association/self-employment. In the case of a partnership, specify the share in the profit/losses of the partnership.
3. Net Income from the business/profession/ partnership/self-employment.
4. Business/partnership/self-employment liabilities, if any, in case of such activity.
5. In the case of business of the company, provide brief details of the last audited balance sheet to indicate profit and loss of the company in which such party is in business in the company.
6. In the case of a partnership firm, provide details of the filings of the last Income Tax Return of partnership.
7. In the case of a self-employed individual, provide the filings of the last Income Tax Return from any such professional/business/vocational activity.
J. Information provided by the Deponent with respect to the income, assets, and liabilities of the other Spouse
1. Educational and professional qualifications of the other spouse:
2. Whether a spouse is earning? If so, give particulars of the occupation and income of the spouse.
3. If not, whether he/she is staying in his/her own accommodation, or in rented accommodation, or in accommodation provided by employer/business/partnership?
4. Particulars of assets and liabilities of a spouse as known to the deponent, along with any supporting documents.
K. Details of Applicant or the other Spouse, in case parties, are Non-Resident Indians, Overseas Citizens of India, Foreign Nationals or Persons living abroad outside India.
1. Details of Citizenship, Nationality, and current place of residence, if the Applicant or other spouse is residing abroad outside India, temporarily or permanently.
2. Details of current employment and latest income in foreign currency of such applicant/spouse, duly supported by relevant documentation of employment and income from such foreign employer or overseas institution by way of employment letter or testimonial from a foreign employer or overseas institution or latest relevant bank statement.
3. Details of household and other expenditure of such applicant/spouse in a foreign jurisdiction.
4. Details of tax liability of applicant/another spouse in a foreign jurisdiction.
5. Details of income of applicant/another spouse from other sources in India/foreign jurisdiction.
6. Details of expenses incurred or contribution made on account of spousal maintenance, child support or any other educational expenses, medical treatment of spouse or children.
7. Any other relevant detail of expenses or liabilities, not covered under any of the above headings and any other liabilities to any other dependant family members in India or abroad.
Declaration
1. I declare that I have made full and accurate disclosure of my income, expenditure, assets, and liabilities from all sources. I further declare that I have no assets, income, expenditure, and liabilities other than as stated in this affidavit.
2. I undertake to inform this Court immediately with respect to any material change in my employment, assets, income, expenses, or any other information included in this affidavit.
3. I understand that any false statement in this affidavit, apart from being contempt of Court, may also constitute an offence under Section 199 read with Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine, and Section 209 of Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to two years and fine. I have read and understood Sections 191, 193, 199, and 209 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
DEPONENT Verification Verified at ___on this _____day of _____ that the contents of the above affidavit are true to my personal knowledge, no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom, whereas the contents of the above affidavit relating to the assets, income, and expenditure of my spouse are based on information believed to be true on the basis of the record. I further verify that the copies of the documents filed along with the affidavit are the copies of the originals.
DEPONENT
Enclosure II Details for Affidavit for Agrarian Deponents (Krishi)
1. Total extent of the rural land/s owned, or the specific shareholding in the same land:
2. Jamabandis / Mutations to show ownership
3. Location of the land owned by the party.
4. Nature of land: whether wetland or dry land.
5. Whether such land is agricultural land or non-agricultural land:
6. Nature of agriculture/horticulture:
7. Nature of crops cultivated during the year :
8. If rural land is not cultivable, whether the same is being used for business, leasing, or other activity :
9. Income generated during the past 3 years from the land.
10. Whether any land is taken on lease /battai (or any other term used for a lease in the local area of the concerned jurisdiction where rural /agricultural land is located.)
11. (a) Whether the owner of any livestock, such as buffaloes, cows, goats, cattle, poultry, fishery, beekeeping, piggery, etc., the number thereof and Income generated therefrom?
(b) Whether engaged in dairy farming, poultry, fish farming, or any other livestock activity.
12. Loans, if any obtained against the land. Furnish details of such loans.
13. Any other sources of income :
14. Liabilities, if any
15. Any other relevant information :
Declaration
1. I declare that I have made full and accurate disclosure of my income, expenditure, assets, and liabilities from all sources. I further declare that I have no assets, income, expenditure, and liabilities other than as stated in this affidavit.
2. I undertake to inform this Court immediately with respect to any material change in my employment, assets, income, expenses, or any other information included in this affidavit.
3. I understand that any false statement in this affidavit, apart from being contempt of Court, may constitute an offence under Section 199 read with Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine, and Section 209 of Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to two years and fine. I have read and understood Sections 191, 193, 199, and 209 of the Indian Penal Code,1860.
DEPONENT Verification Verified at ___on this ___day of_____that the contents of the above affidavit are true to my personal knowledge, no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom. I further verify that the copies of the documents filed along with the affidavit are the copies of the originals.
DEPONENT
Enclosure III Affidavit for the State of Meghalaya
1. Whether the woman is the youngest daughter of the family.
2. Whether the woman is staying with her husband on her family property.
3. Whether she has any maternal uncle, who plays a very important role in their family matters, which includes settlement of matrimonial disputes. The woman should also disclose her clan and her lineage.
4. The woman should disclose if her children have adopted the surname of her mother, in as much as Khasi has been defined as “a person who adopts the surname of his or her mother”.
5. The woman should disclose if she gets any financial assistance from her clan or family member.
6. The woman should disclose if her parents are alive more specifically, her mother, and how many siblings she has.
7. In event of a woman not being the youngest daughter, she has to disclose who the youngest daughter is.
8. The woman should disclose if she has any movable or any immovable property, self-acquired or inherited from her clan.
9. The woman should disclose if she is married to tribal or non-tribal The above format may be modified or adapted by the concerned Court, as may be considered appropriate.
Declaration
1. I declare that I have made full and accurate disclosure of my income, expenditure, assets, and liabilities from all sources. I further declare that I have no assets, income, expenditure, and liabilities other than as stated in this affidavit.
2. I undertake to inform this Court immediately with respect to any material change in my employment, assets, income, expenses, or any other information included in this affidavit.
3. I understand that any false statement in this affidavit, apart from being contempt of Court, may also constitute an offence under Section 199 read with Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine, and Section 209 of Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment up to two years and fine. I have read and understood Sections 191, 193, 199, and 209 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
DEPONENT Verification Verified at ___on this _____day of _____ that the contents of the above affidavit are true to my personal knowledge, no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom, whereas the contents of the above affidavit relating to the assets, income, and expenditure of my spouse are based on information believed to be true on the basis of the record. I further verify that the copies of the documents filed along with the affidavit are the copies of the originals.
DEPONENT
इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व की उत्पत्ति के आधार :-
इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व की उत्पत्ति के लिए प्रथम आधार यह आवश्यक है कि पीड़िता इस अधिनियम की धारा 2(a) के आलोक में महिला होनी चाहिए। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि गे व लेस्बियन को उक्त अधिनियम के तहत परिवाद प्रस्तुत करने की अधिकारिता नहीं है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायलय ने इंद्रा शर्मा बनाम वी के वी शर्मा, 2014 ACC 290 SC में उक्त तथ्य का समर्थन किया है।दूसरा आवश्यक आधार यह है प्रत्यर्थी उक्त अधिनियम की धारा -2 (q) के आलोक में वयस्क पुरुष होना चाहिए जिसके विरुद पीड़िता ने कोई अनुतोष चाहा हो। इस सम्बन्ध में यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि ऐसे प्रत्यर्थी के नातेदार के विरुद भी परिवाद योजित किया जा सकता है। यद्यपि कि पहले इस बावत यह विवाद था कि प्रत्यर्थी के नातेदार के अंतर्गत पुरुष के साथ-साथ महिला भी शामिल है या नहीं। वर्तमान समय में यह विवाद समाप्त हो चुका और यह स्थापित हो चुका की प्रत्यर्थी के नातेदार में महिला भी सम्मलित है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि अब कोई भी व्यक्ति प्रत्यर्थी हो सकता है चाहे वह पुरुष हो या महिला या वयस्क हो हो अवयस्क लेकिन उसके ऊपर घरेलू हिंसा का आक्षेप होना चाहिए। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Sandhya Wankhede vs Manoj Wankhede,2011 Cr.L.J. 1687 SC प्रकरण में उक्त तथ्य को स्थापित करते हुए अभिकथित किया है कि - " Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are unable to sustain the decisions, both of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court, in relation to the interpretation of the expression "respondent" in Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
In the case of Heal P. Harsora and others vs Kusum Narottamdas and others, AIR 2016 SC 47 74 Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated that " the word Adult male as occurring in Sec-2(q) has been struck down, consequently the respondent can also be Female in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person."
For the sake of reference, Section 2(q) of the above-said Act is extracted herein below:-
"2(q). "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner."
From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.
It is true that the expression "female" has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "relative", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only."
तीसरा प्रमुख आधार इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व उत्पन्न करने का यह है कि दो व्यक्ति जो पीड़ित या प्रत्यर्थी है उनके लिए यह आवश्यक है कि इस अधिनियम की धारा-2 (f ) में परिभाषित घरेलू सम्बन्धों/नातेदारी की कोटि में आते हों। आइये सबसे पहले यह देखते उक्त अधिनियम की धारा- 2 (f ) क्या प्रावधान करती है।
(f) "Domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
उक्त धारा के अनुसार जब दो व्यक्ति समरक्तता ,विवाह , विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्ध , दत्तक तथा संयुक्त परिवार के सदस्य के चलते साझे की गृहस्थी में युक्ति-युक्ति समय तक साथ-साथ रह चुके हों अथवा रह रहे हों और कोई घरेलू हिंसा कारित की गयी हो या इसकी संभाव्यता है तो इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रत्यर्थी या उसके नातेदार के विरुद इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व उत्पन्न हो जाता है। धारा-2 (f ) में परिभाषित समरक्तता,विवाह ,दत्तक व संयुक्त परिवार के सदस्य को लेकर कोई विवाद नहीं है। लेकिन विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्ध में विवाद होना स्वाभाविक है क्योकि यह एक वृहद संकल्पना है। इसके सम्बन्ध में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने यह स्थापित किया है लिव-इन रिलेशनशिप इस कोटि में आती है , लेकिन उसके लिए अधोलिखित नजीरों में प्रतिपादित मानकों का उपस्थित रहना आवश्यक है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कुछ समय के लिए मात्र शारीरिक सुख के लिए स्थापित सम्बन्ध विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्धों की कोटि में नहीं आते है। लेकिन यदि साझे की गृहस्थी में एक स्त्री और पुरुष युक्ति-युक्ति समय तक साथ-साथ रहते है , दोनों विवाह करने के लिए सक्षम है , वित्तीय अथवा आर्थिक सम्बन्धों का प्रबंधन साथ-साथ किया जा रहा ,दोनों आपसी सहमति से सम्बन्ध यौन सम्बन्ध स्थापित कर रहे है तथा आमजन में यह विश्वास है की वह दोनों पति-पत्नी हैं तो यदि ऐसी महिला के साथ कोई घरेलू हिंसा कारित की गयी है या ऐसी सम्भावना है तो प्रत्यर्थी का दायित्व इस अधिनियम के अधीन उत्पन्न हो जाता है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने अधोलिखित नजीरों में उक्त संकल्पना को अधोलिखित शब्दों में अभिकथित किया है -
Indra Sharma vs v k v Sharma,2014(84) ACC 290 SC Hon’ble Supreme court held that 37. Reference to certain situations, in which the relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or would not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage, would be apposite. Following are some of the categories of cases that are only illustrative:
a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived together in a shared household, will fall under the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence, the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and the aggrieved person can always seek reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act.
b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult woman knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.
c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Situations may also arise where an adult married woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with an unmarried adult male, the question is whether such a relationship would fall within the expression relationship “in the nature of marriage”.
d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male: An unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and such a relationship may be a relationship in the “nature of marriage”, so far as the aggrieved person is concerned.
e) Domestic relationship between same-sex partners (Gay and Lesbians): DV Act does not recognize such a relationship and that relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marriage under the Act. Legislatures in some countries, like the Interpretation Act, 1984 (Western Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999 (New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (South Africa), the Domestic Violence, Crime, and Victims Act, 2004 (U.K.), have recognized the relationship between the same-sex couples and have brought these relationships into the definition of domestic relationship.
38. Section 2(f) of the DV Act though uses the expression “two persons”, the expression “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) takes in only “woman”, hence, the Act does not recognize the relationship of same-sex (gay or lesbian) and, hence, any act, omission, commission or conduct of any of the parties, would not lead to domestic violence, entitling any relief under the DV Act.
55. We may, on the basis of the above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight into such relationships.
1) Duration of period of relationship Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared household The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, needs no further elaboration.
(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, maybe a guiding factor.
(4) Domestic Arrangements Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or up keeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual Relationship Marriage like relationship refers to a sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for an emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring, etc. (6) Children Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialization in Public Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations, and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
(8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.
S Velusamy vs D Patchaiammal, AIR 2011 SC 479 -Hon’ble Supreme court held that 33. In our opinion, a `relationship in the nature of marriage is akin to a common-law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:-
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.(see `Common Law Marriage' in Wikipedia on Google) In our opinion, a `relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition, the parties must have lived together in a `shared household' as defined in Section 2(s)of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one-night stand would not make it a `domestic relationship'.
34. In our opinion, not all live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a `keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage'
35. No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who have had a live-in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament has used the expression `relationship in the nature of marriage' and not `live in relationship'. The Court in the grab of interpretation cannot change the language of the statute.
36. In feudal society sexual relationship between man and woman outside marriage was totally taboo and regarded with disgust and horror, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy's novel `Anna Karenina', Gustave Flaubert's novel `Madame Bovary' and the novels of the great Bengali writer Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyaya.
37. However, Indian society is changing, and this change has been reflected and recognized by Parliament by enacting The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
चौथा आधारभूत आधार यह है की पीड़िता व प्रत्यर्थी अथवा उसके नातेदार साझे की गृहस्थी में किसी समय बिंदु पर साथ-साथ रह चुके हों या रह रहें हों। इस सम्बन्ध में इस अधिनियम की धारा-2 (s ) का उल्लेख आवश्यक है जो इस प्रकार है -
(s) "Shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;
उक्त धारा का विश्लेषण करते हुए माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने S R Batra and others vs Smt Taruna Batra , AIR 2007 SC 118- के प्रकरण में कहा कि यदि पीड़ित या प्रत्यर्थी किसी घर के या तो दोनों संयुक्त रूप से स्वामी है अथवा उनमे से कोई एक स्वामी है अथवा दोनों की संयुक्त या पृथक किरायेदारी में है अथवा दोनों में से किसी पक्षकार के संयुक्त परिवार का है जिसमे उनका हिस्सा है ,जिसमे समय के किसी बिंदु में रहते है या रह चुके है तो ऐसे मकान को साझे की गृहस्थी कहा जायेगा। और ऐसे साझे की गृहस्थी में यदि कोई घरेलू हिंसा करित की जाती है तो वह इस अधिनियम की परिधि में आएगा।लेकिन यदि उक्त मकान सास या ससुर के निजी व तनहा स्वत्व में है तो ऐसा मकान इस धारा की परिधि में नहीं आता है।
"2(q). "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner."
From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.
It is true that the expression "female" has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "relative", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only."
तीसरा प्रमुख आधार इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व उत्पन्न करने का यह है कि दो व्यक्ति जो पीड़ित या प्रत्यर्थी है उनके लिए यह आवश्यक है कि इस अधिनियम की धारा-2 (f ) में परिभाषित घरेलू सम्बन्धों/नातेदारी की कोटि में आते हों। आइये सबसे पहले यह देखते उक्त अधिनियम की धारा- 2 (f ) क्या प्रावधान करती है।
(f) "Domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
उक्त धारा के अनुसार जब दो व्यक्ति समरक्तता ,विवाह , विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्ध , दत्तक तथा संयुक्त परिवार के सदस्य के चलते साझे की गृहस्थी में युक्ति-युक्ति समय तक साथ-साथ रह चुके हों अथवा रह रहे हों और कोई घरेलू हिंसा कारित की गयी हो या इसकी संभाव्यता है तो इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रत्यर्थी या उसके नातेदार के विरुद इस अधिनियम के तहत दायित्व उत्पन्न हो जाता है। धारा-2 (f ) में परिभाषित समरक्तता,विवाह ,दत्तक व संयुक्त परिवार के सदस्य को लेकर कोई विवाद नहीं है। लेकिन विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्ध में विवाद होना स्वाभाविक है क्योकि यह एक वृहद संकल्पना है। इसके सम्बन्ध में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने यह स्थापित किया है लिव-इन रिलेशनशिप इस कोटि में आती है , लेकिन उसके लिए अधोलिखित नजीरों में प्रतिपादित मानकों का उपस्थित रहना आवश्यक है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कुछ समय के लिए मात्र शारीरिक सुख के लिए स्थापित सम्बन्ध विवाह की प्रकृति के सम्बन्धों की कोटि में नहीं आते है। लेकिन यदि साझे की गृहस्थी में एक स्त्री और पुरुष युक्ति-युक्ति समय तक साथ-साथ रहते है , दोनों विवाह करने के लिए सक्षम है , वित्तीय अथवा आर्थिक सम्बन्धों का प्रबंधन साथ-साथ किया जा रहा ,दोनों आपसी सहमति से सम्बन्ध यौन सम्बन्ध स्थापित कर रहे है तथा आमजन में यह विश्वास है की वह दोनों पति-पत्नी हैं तो यदि ऐसी महिला के साथ कोई घरेलू हिंसा कारित की गयी है या ऐसी सम्भावना है तो प्रत्यर्थी का दायित्व इस अधिनियम के अधीन उत्पन्न हो जाता है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने अधोलिखित नजीरों में उक्त संकल्पना को अधोलिखित शब्दों में अभिकथित किया है -
Indra Sharma vs v k v Sharma,2014(84) ACC 290 SC Hon’ble Supreme court held that 37. Reference to certain situations, in which the relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or would not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage, would be apposite. Following are some of the categories of cases that are only illustrative:
a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived together in a shared household, will fall under the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence, the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and the aggrieved person can always seek reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act.
b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult woman knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.
c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Situations may also arise where an adult married woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with an unmarried adult male, the question is whether such a relationship would fall within the expression relationship “in the nature of marriage”.
d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male: An unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and such a relationship may be a relationship in the “nature of marriage”, so far as the aggrieved person is concerned.
e) Domestic relationship between same-sex partners (Gay and Lesbians): DV Act does not recognize such a relationship and that relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marriage under the Act. Legislatures in some countries, like the Interpretation Act, 1984 (Western Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999 (New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (South Africa), the Domestic Violence, Crime, and Victims Act, 2004 (U.K.), have recognized the relationship between the same-sex couples and have brought these relationships into the definition of domestic relationship.
38. Section 2(f) of the DV Act though uses the expression “two persons”, the expression “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) takes in only “woman”, hence, the Act does not recognize the relationship of same-sex (gay or lesbian) and, hence, any act, omission, commission or conduct of any of the parties, would not lead to domestic violence, entitling any relief under the DV Act.
55. We may, on the basis of the above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight into such relationships.
1) Duration of period of relationship Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared household The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, needs no further elaboration.
(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, maybe a guiding factor.
(4) Domestic Arrangements Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or up keeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual Relationship Marriage like relationship refers to a sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for an emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring, etc. (6) Children Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialization in Public Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations, and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
(8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.
S Velusamy vs D Patchaiammal, AIR 2011 SC 479 -Hon’ble Supreme court held that 33. In our opinion, a `relationship in the nature of marriage is akin to a common-law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:-
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.(see `Common Law Marriage' in Wikipedia on Google) In our opinion, a `relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition, the parties must have lived together in a `shared household' as defined in Section 2(s)of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one-night stand would not make it a `domestic relationship'.
34. In our opinion, not all live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a `keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage'
35. No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who have had a live-in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament has used the expression `relationship in the nature of marriage' and not `live in relationship'. The Court in the grab of interpretation cannot change the language of the statute.
36. In feudal society sexual relationship between man and woman outside marriage was totally taboo and regarded with disgust and horror, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy's novel `Anna Karenina', Gustave Flaubert's novel `Madame Bovary' and the novels of the great Bengali writer Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyaya.
37. However, Indian society is changing, and this change has been reflected and recognized by Parliament by enacting The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
चौथा आधारभूत आधार यह है की पीड़िता व प्रत्यर्थी अथवा उसके नातेदार साझे की गृहस्थी में किसी समय बिंदु पर साथ-साथ रह चुके हों या रह रहें हों। इस सम्बन्ध में इस अधिनियम की धारा-2 (s ) का उल्लेख आवश्यक है जो इस प्रकार है -
(s) "Shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;
उक्त धारा का विश्लेषण करते हुए माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने S R Batra and others vs Smt Taruna Batra , AIR 2007 SC 118- के प्रकरण में कहा कि यदि पीड़ित या प्रत्यर्थी किसी घर के या तो दोनों संयुक्त रूप से स्वामी है अथवा उनमे से कोई एक स्वामी है अथवा दोनों की संयुक्त या पृथक किरायेदारी में है अथवा दोनों में से किसी पक्षकार के संयुक्त परिवार का है जिसमे उनका हिस्सा है ,जिसमे समय के किसी बिंदु में रहते है या रह चुके है तो ऐसे मकान को साझे की गृहस्थी कहा जायेगा। और ऐसे साझे की गृहस्थी में यदि कोई घरेलू हिंसा करित की जाती है तो वह इस अधिनियम की परिधि में आएगा।लेकिन यदि उक्त मकान सास या ससुर के निजी व तनहा स्वत्व में है तो ऐसा मकान इस धारा की परिधि में नहीं आता है।
सन 2020 में माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने अधो लिखित वाद में उक्त अवधारणा को उलट दिया जिसमे यह प्रतिपादित स्थायी रूप से रहने के आशय से पीड़िता किसी भी मकान में रहती है या रह चुकी है तो ऐसा मकान साझे की गृहस्थी माना जायेगा और इस दौरान यदि कोई हिंसा पीड़िता के साथ करित की गयी है तो वह घरेलू हिंसा की परिधि में आएगा। यह नजीर इस प्रकार है -
Satish Chandra Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja, Civil appeal No-2483/2020 out of SLP 1048/2020 Judgment dated 15/10/2020.
64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of the shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one that belongs to or is taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In the event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of the shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of the shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of a shared household is the clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act were to grant a right to an aggrieved person, a woman of residence in a shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of the definition of the shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not a correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.
In the case of S Vanitha vs Deputy Commissioner Bengaluru Urban District and others, 2021 (151) RD 116 SC के प्रकरण में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने सतीश चंद्र आहूजा वाले प्रकरण की पुनः पुष्टि करते हुए कहा है कि " 23 Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the provisions of sub- Section (2) of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the appellant‟s simple plea is that the suit premises constitute her „shared household‟ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series of transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of the appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the marriage but subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered sale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of the appellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the appellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourth respondent. Parallel to this, the appellant had instituted proceedings of dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse; and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The appellant had also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth respondent and the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events, that the Second and Third respondents instituted an application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a consequence of destitution, ignorance, or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that recourse to the summary PART F procedure contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the appellant in respect of a shared household. A shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the appellant had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent) is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act
माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने अभी हाल ही में प्रभा त्यागी बनाम कमलेश देवी, आपराधिक अपील नंबर 511 / 2022 निर्णय दिनांकित 12 मई 2022 में यह अभिकथित किया है कि रह रही है या रह चुकी है के अंतर्गत रहने के अधिकार भी समाहित है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की यदि विवाह के उपरांत एक दिन भी पत्नी साझे की गृहस्थी में नहीं रही है और यदि वह रहने का अधिकार धारण करती है तब भी उसका धारा -12 का आवेदन पोषणीय होगा।
उपर्युक्त समस्त आधारों का समेकित रूप से विश्लेषित किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि जब कोई पीड़िता व प्रत्यर्थी अथवा उसका नातेदार घरेलू संबंधों की परिधि में आते हुए साझे की गृहस्थी में रहते है या रह चुके हैं अथवा पीड़िता साझे की गृहस्थी में रहने का अधिकार धारण करती है और पीड़िता के साथ इस अधिनियम की धारा-3 में परिभाषित घरेलू हिंसा का कोई कृत्य किया जाता है तो प्रत्यर्थी व उसका नातेदार इस अधिनियम के तहत दायी होंगे।
यदि विपक्षी न्यायलय में उपस्थित आता है और उसके द्वारा आवेदन के प्रतिउत्तर में जवाब दाखिल किया जाता है।अंतरिम आदेशों को निर्गत करने के उपरांत बारी-बारी से पत्रावली आवेदक व प्रत्यर्थी के साक्ष्य में नियत की जायेगी।साक्ष्य सामान्यतया शपथपत्र पर लिए जायेंगे तथा सामान्य अनुक्रम में प्रतिपरीक्षा की आवश्यकता नहीं होती है, लेकिन यदि न्यायालय द्वारा पक्षकारों के निवेदन पर प्रतिपरीक्षा का अवसर प्रधान किया गया है तो इसमें कोई अवैधानिकता नहीं है।यहां यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस अधिनियम के तहत सबूत का भार बहुत कठोर नहीं है बल्कि दो मुख्य आधारों पर टिका है जिसमें प्रथम आधार यह है कि पक्षकारों को सुनवाई का युक्ति संगत अवसर प्रदान किया गया हो और दूसरा घरेलु हिंसा कारित होना अथवा इसकी संभावना का प्रथम दृष्टया स्थापित होना पर्याप्त है। माननीय मध्य प्रदेश उच्च न्यायलय ने Madhusudan Bhardwaj vs Mamta Bhardwaj, 2010 (1) East Cr.C. 515 MP में उक्त तथ्यों को मान्यता प्रदान करते हुए यह अभिकथित किया है कि :-
To conclude the controversy between the parties perusal of relevant part of the provisions of Sections 18 and 28 of the Act and Rule 6 (4) and (5) of the Rules along with the relevant part of the provisions of Section 126 of Cr. P. C. is required. (As provided by Rule 6 (5) of the Rules, the procedure prescribed for disposal of an application under section 125 of Cr. P. C. shall be applied for disposing of an application under Section 12 of the Act. On perusal of Section 125 of cr. P. C., it provides the provision for maintenance of wives, children, and parents, but the procedure for disposal of such application has been given in Section 126 of Cr. P. C. Hence, instead of Section 125 of Cr. P. C., a perusal of the procedure as prescribed in section 126 of Cr. P. C., for disposal of an application under Section 125 of Cr. P. C. is required.). The same has been reproduced herein below:-Section 18. Protection Orders.- The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from- (a) to (g). . . . . Section 28. Procedure.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 19741. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23. Rule 6. Application to the Magistrate.-
(1) Every application of the aggrieved person under section 12 shall be in Form II or as nearly as possible thereto. (2) and (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) The affidavit to be filed under sub-section (2) of section 23 shall be filed in Form HI. (5) The applications under section 12 shall be dealt with and the orders enforced in the same manner laid down under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 1974).
Section 126 Cr. P. C. Procedure.-
(1). . . . . (2) All evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for summons-cases: provided that and (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
उपर्युक्त विश्लेषण से यह स्पष्ट है कि यह अधिनियम एक कल्याणकारी विधान है जिसमें सबूत के भार को बहुत कठिन नहीं रखा गया है। सरंक्षण आदेश पारित किये जाने के स्तर तक अपनायी गयी प्रक्रिया का कलेवर अर्ध दीवानी प्रकृति का होता है अतः आवेदक के साबित करने का भार साक्ष्य की अधिसम्भावनाओं की प्रबलता(preponderance of probability) के सिद्धांत पर आधारित होता है। लेकिन यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा की सरक्षण आदेश के उल्लंघन पर इस अधिनियम की धारा- 31 व 32 के तहत जिस आपराधिक प्रकरण का विचारण किया जाता है उसकी प्रकृति दाण्डिक होती है ऐसे में पीड़िता के ऊपर साबित करने का भार युक्ति-युक्ति संदेह के परे की संकल्पना पर आधारित होगा जो कि दंड विधि का आधारभूत सिद्धांत है।
इस अधिनियम के तहत कोई आदेश पारित करने के पूर्व प्रथम सावधनी यह रखनी है कि न्यायालय की प्रक्रिया का दुरपयोग न होने पाए।इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि प्रत्यर्थी के दूरवर्ती नातेदारों को पक्षकारो के रूप में संयोजित करने के समय न्यायलाय को सावधनी बरतनी चाहिए क्योंकि अधिकतम मामलों में प्रत्यर्थी के पारिवारिक सदस्यों को जो काफी समय से अलग रह रहे होते हैं उन्हें बिना किसी पर्याप्त आधार के प्रत्यर्थी के रूप में संयोजित कर दिया जाता है।माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने उक्त अवधारणा का समर्थन Shyam Lal Devda and others vs Parimala , AIR 2020 SC 762 में करते हुए यह अभिकथित किया है when act of domestic violence is alleged , before issuing notice , the court has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of domestic violence . It is also held that if the relatives of the husband are residing an other places , there is no specific allegation against them , then they are not persecuted .
दूसरी महत्वपूर्ण सावधानी यह बरतनी है कि निवास का आदेश केवल पति के विरुद ही पारित किया जायेगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की पति के नातेदारों के खिलाफ निवास का आदेश पारित नहीं किया जा सकता। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा की यदि सास व ससुर ने कोई मकान अपनी स्वार्जित संपत्ति से बनाया है तो उसके बावत निवास का कोई आदेश पीड़िता के पक्ष में निर्गत नहीं किया जा सकता है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय नें S R Batra and others vs Smt Taruna Batra , AIR 2007 SC 118- प्रकरण में उक्त तथ्यों का समर्थन करते हुए कहा है कि As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a `shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a `shared household'.
उपर्युक्त समस्त आधारों का समेकित रूप से विश्लेषित किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि जब कोई पीड़िता व प्रत्यर्थी अथवा उसका नातेदार घरेलू संबंधों की परिधि में आते हुए साझे की गृहस्थी में रहते है या रह चुके हैं अथवा पीड़िता साझे की गृहस्थी में रहने का अधिकार धारण करती है और पीड़िता के साथ इस अधिनियम की धारा-3 में परिभाषित घरेलू हिंसा का कोई कृत्य किया जाता है तो प्रत्यर्थी व उसका नातेदार इस अधिनियम के तहत दायी होंगे।
साक्ष्य की प्रक्रिया व विश्लेषण -
यदि नोटिस की तामीली के पश्चात् प्रत्यर्थी उपस्थित नहीं आता है तो परिवादिनी व उसके साक्षियों की परीक्षा के उपरांत यदि प्रथम दृष्टया यह स्थापित कर दिया जाता है की पीड़िता के साथ कोई घरेलू हिंसा कारित की जा चुकी है अथवा कारित की जा रही है अथवा कारित किये जाने की कोई सम्भावना है तो धारा-2 (a), (f) , (s) ,(q) तथा धारा-3 के अधीन रहते हुए उक्त अधिनियम की धारा-18 लगायत 22 तक में प्रावधानित अनुतोष प्रदान किये जा सकते हैं। यहां यह ध्यान रहे की साक्ष्य शपथपत्र पर भी लिए जा सकते है चूँकि इस स्तर पर धारा- 28 के अलोक में न्यायालय अपनी खुद की प्रक्रिया को अमल में ला सकता है।यदि विपक्षी न्यायलय में उपस्थित आता है और उसके द्वारा आवेदन के प्रतिउत्तर में जवाब दाखिल किया जाता है।अंतरिम आदेशों को निर्गत करने के उपरांत बारी-बारी से पत्रावली आवेदक व प्रत्यर्थी के साक्ष्य में नियत की जायेगी।साक्ष्य सामान्यतया शपथपत्र पर लिए जायेंगे तथा सामान्य अनुक्रम में प्रतिपरीक्षा की आवश्यकता नहीं होती है, लेकिन यदि न्यायालय द्वारा पक्षकारों के निवेदन पर प्रतिपरीक्षा का अवसर प्रधान किया गया है तो इसमें कोई अवैधानिकता नहीं है।यहां यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस अधिनियम के तहत सबूत का भार बहुत कठोर नहीं है बल्कि दो मुख्य आधारों पर टिका है जिसमें प्रथम आधार यह है कि पक्षकारों को सुनवाई का युक्ति संगत अवसर प्रदान किया गया हो और दूसरा घरेलु हिंसा कारित होना अथवा इसकी संभावना का प्रथम दृष्टया स्थापित होना पर्याप्त है। माननीय मध्य प्रदेश उच्च न्यायलय ने Madhusudan Bhardwaj vs Mamta Bhardwaj, 2010 (1) East Cr.C. 515 MP में उक्त तथ्यों को मान्यता प्रदान करते हुए यह अभिकथित किया है कि :-
To conclude the controversy between the parties perusal of relevant part of the provisions of Sections 18 and 28 of the Act and Rule 6 (4) and (5) of the Rules along with the relevant part of the provisions of Section 126 of Cr. P. C. is required. (As provided by Rule 6 (5) of the Rules, the procedure prescribed for disposal of an application under section 125 of Cr. P. C. shall be applied for disposing of an application under Section 12 of the Act. On perusal of Section 125 of cr. P. C., it provides the provision for maintenance of wives, children, and parents, but the procedure for disposal of such application has been given in Section 126 of Cr. P. C. Hence, instead of Section 125 of Cr. P. C., a perusal of the procedure as prescribed in section 126 of Cr. P. C., for disposal of an application under Section 125 of Cr. P. C. is required.). The same has been reproduced herein below:-Section 18. Protection Orders.- The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from- (a) to (g). . . . . Section 28. Procedure.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 19741. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12 or under sub-section (2) of section 23. Rule 6. Application to the Magistrate.-
(1) Every application of the aggrieved person under section 12 shall be in Form II or as nearly as possible thereto. (2) and (3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) The affidavit to be filed under sub-section (2) of section 23 shall be filed in Form HI. (5) The applications under section 12 shall be dealt with and the orders enforced in the same manner laid down under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 1974).
Section 126 Cr. P. C. Procedure.-
(1). . . . . (2) All evidence to such proceedings shall be taken in the presence of the the person against whom an order for payment of maintenance is proposed to be made, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed for summons-cases: provided that and (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
उपर्युक्त विश्लेषण से यह स्पष्ट है कि यह अधिनियम एक कल्याणकारी विधान है जिसमें सबूत के भार को बहुत कठिन नहीं रखा गया है। सरंक्षण आदेश पारित किये जाने के स्तर तक अपनायी गयी प्रक्रिया का कलेवर अर्ध दीवानी प्रकृति का होता है अतः आवेदक के साबित करने का भार साक्ष्य की अधिसम्भावनाओं की प्रबलता(preponderance of probability) के सिद्धांत पर आधारित होता है। लेकिन यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा की सरक्षण आदेश के उल्लंघन पर इस अधिनियम की धारा- 31 व 32 के तहत जिस आपराधिक प्रकरण का विचारण किया जाता है उसकी प्रकृति दाण्डिक होती है ऐसे में पीड़िता के ऊपर साबित करने का भार युक्ति-युक्ति संदेह के परे की संकल्पना पर आधारित होगा जो कि दंड विधि का आधारभूत सिद्धांत है।
आदेश पारित करते समय विचार योग्य सावधानियाँ -
इस अधिनियम के तहत कोई आदेश पारित करने के पूर्व प्रथम सावधनी यह रखनी है कि न्यायालय की प्रक्रिया का दुरपयोग न होने पाए।इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि प्रत्यर्थी के दूरवर्ती नातेदारों को पक्षकारो के रूप में संयोजित करने के समय न्यायलाय को सावधनी बरतनी चाहिए क्योंकि अधिकतम मामलों में प्रत्यर्थी के पारिवारिक सदस्यों को जो काफी समय से अलग रह रहे होते हैं उन्हें बिना किसी पर्याप्त आधार के प्रत्यर्थी के रूप में संयोजित कर दिया जाता है।माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने उक्त अवधारणा का समर्थन Shyam Lal Devda and others vs Parimala , AIR 2020 SC 762 में करते हुए यह अभिकथित किया है when act of domestic violence is alleged , before issuing notice , the court has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of domestic violence . It is also held that if the relatives of the husband are residing an other places , there is no specific allegation against them , then they are not persecuted .
दूसरी महत्वपूर्ण सावधानी यह बरतनी है कि निवास का आदेश केवल पति के विरुद ही पारित किया जायेगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की पति के नातेदारों के खिलाफ निवास का आदेश पारित नहीं किया जा सकता। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा की यदि सास व ससुर ने कोई मकान अपनी स्वार्जित संपत्ति से बनाया है तो उसके बावत निवास का कोई आदेश पीड़िता के पक्ष में निर्गत नहीं किया जा सकता है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय नें S R Batra and others vs Smt Taruna Batra , AIR 2007 SC 118- प्रकरण में उक्त तथ्यों का समर्थन करते हुए कहा है कि As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a `shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a `shared household'.
S R Batra and others vs Smt Taruna Batra प्रकरण में पारित अवधारणा को माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने अधोलिखित नजीर में उलट दिया जो इस प्रकार है -
Satish chandra Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja, civil appeal No-2483/2020 out of SLP 1048/2020 Judgment dated 15/10/2020.
64. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of the shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one that belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In the event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of the shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of the shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of a shared household is the clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act were to grant a right to an aggrieved person, a woman of residence in a shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of the definition of the shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not a correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.
तीसरी आवश्यक सावधानी यह बरतनी है कि यदि घरेलू हिंसा का कृत्य अनवरत किस्म का है और पक्षकारो के पूर्ववर्ती आचरण चाहे ऐसे आचरण उक्त अधिनियम लागू होने के पूर्व के ही क्यों न हो विचार में लिए जा सकेंगे। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने Sarswathy vs Babu, Criminal appeal no-1999/2013 judgement dated 25/11/2013- प्रकरण में उक्त अवधारणा का प्रतिपादन करते हुए कहा है कि "The other issue that whether the conduct of the parties even prior to the commencement of the PWD Act, 2005 could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 fell for consideration before this Court in V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183. In the said case, this Court held as follows: “12. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that in looking into a complaint under Section 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the PWD Act, could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Section 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of the PWD Act, 2005,”
15. We are of the view that the act of the respondent-husband squarely comes within the ambit of Section 3 of the PWD Act, 2005, which defines “domestic violence” in the wide terms. The High Court made an apparent error in holding that the conduct of the parties prior to the coming into force PWD Act, 2005 cannot be taken into consideration while passing an order. This is a case where the respondent-husband has not complied with the order and direction passed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. He also misleads the Court by giving the wrong statement before the High Court in the contempt petition filed by the appellant-wife. The appellant-wife having being harassed since 2000 is entitled to protection orders and residence orders under Section 18 and 19 of the PWD, Act, 2005 along with the maintenance as allowed by the Trial Court under Section 20 (d) of the PWD, Act, 2005. Apart from these reliefs, she is also entitled to compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent-husband. Therefore, in addition to the reliefs granted by the courts below, we are of the view that the appellant-wife should be compensated by the respondent-husband. Hence, the respondent is hereby directed to pay compensation and damages to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- in favour of the appellant's wife. "
इस अधिनियम के तहत कोई आदेश पारित करने से पूर्व चौथी सावधानी यह बरतनी है कि यद्यपि कि धारा-12 के तहत आवेदन प्रस्तुत करने की कोई परिसीमा प्रावधानित नहीं की गयी है लेकिन यदि विलम्ब से आवेदन प्रस्तुत किया जाता है तो प्रत्येक मामले के तथ्यों परस्थितियों को ध्यान में रखते हुए सावधानी से आदेश पारित करना चाहिए जिससे न्यायालय की प्रक्रिया का दुरूपयोग न हो। माननीय बॉम्बे उच्च न्यायालय ने रितेश रतिलाल जैन बनाम संध्या ,2014 सी सी सी 117 में उक्त संकल्पना का समर्थन किया है। लेकिन यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस अधिनियम की धारा-31 व 32 के अधीन अपराध का संज्ञान लेने के समय दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-468 व 473 में प्रावधानित परिसीमा को संज्ञान में लिया जायेगा।
Limitation for filing appeal-
1. Against the order passed under sec-12 of DV Act- The bare provision of this Act itself provides the limitation of for filing appeal these areas below
Sec-29. Appeal.—There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later.
The order passed under section would be appealable see the case law as given below-
Ranvijay Singh vs State of UP, AIR 2016 (NOC) 91All.
As you, know the petition under sec 12 and order which has been passed under the mandate of said section are the quasi civil nature hence if there is any delay to prefer an appeal then the benefit of the section-4 to 24 Limitation act may be given.
2. Against the Judgment under Sec-31 DV Act-
But in case of trial in respect of sec-31 has been taken place then the provisions of Cr.P.c. for filing an appeal in respect of limitation would be applicable.
Whether delay condonation is permissible for filing the appeal:-
12. It is clear from sub-Section (2) of Section 29 of the above that the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply insofar as to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Therefore, in the absence of any specific provision in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the application of sub-Section (2) of Section 29, therefore, cannot be prevented. In other words, the provisions to Sections 4 to 24 will also apply, as the said provisions have not been expressly excluded by the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 1. K.M.Revanasiddeshwara Vs. Smt.K.M.Shylaja, reported in 2013(2) Crimes 59. Karnataka 2. Rajendran vs Meenakshi, Criminal Revision-333/2011, DOJ 27 June 2018 Madras
पांचवीं महत्वपूर्ण सावधनी यह बरती जानी चाहिए कि मजिस्ट्रेट को सुलह-समझौता व काउंसिलिंग का पर्याप्त प्रयास करना चहिये जिससे एक पारिवारिक जीवन को टूटने के बचाया का सके। यद्यपि कि ADR से सम्बंधित प्रावधन आदेशात्मक किस्म के नहीं लेकिन बहुत ही महत्वपूर्ण है।यहाँ पर इस अधिनियम की धारा-14 तथा सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-89 के मेण्डेट को ध्यान में रखें होगा और परामर्श व मेडिएशन की प्रक्रिया कार्यवाही के किसी भी प्रक्रम पर की जा सकती है न्यायालय सेवा प्रदाता एजेंसियों तथा बाल कल्याण विशेषज्ञ की सहायता भी ले सकते हैं।
अंतिम सावधनी लेखक के विचार से यह अपनानी चाहिए पीड़िता के पुनर्वास को गंभीरता के लेना चाहिए तथा याचिका का निस्तारण यथासंभव अधिनियम में विहित परिसीमा के अंदर करना चाहिए तथा अधिवक्ता साथियों को इस पावन कार्य में न्यायालय को सहयोग प्रदान करना चाहिए।
अंतिम सावधनी लेखक के विचार से यह अपनानी चाहिए पीड़िता के पुनर्वास को गंभीरता के लेना चाहिए तथा याचिका का निस्तारण यथासंभव अधिनियम में विहित परिसीमा के अंदर करना चाहिए तथा अधिवक्ता साथियों को इस पावन कार्य में न्यायालय को सहयोग प्रदान करना चाहिए।
संरक्षण आदेश के उल्लंघन का परिणाम -
यहाँ पर सर्वप्रथम इस तथ्य को स्पष्ट करना आवश्यक है की सरंक्षण आदेश का उलंघन कब माना जायेगा ? इस अधिनियम की धारा-15 में संरक्षण आदेशों व अंतरिम संरक्षण आदेश के उल्लंघन के पश्चात् की प्रकारिया का उल्लेख किया गया है जो इस प्रकार है -15 - Breach of Protection Orders.—
(1) An aggrieved person may report a breach of a protection order or interim protection order to the Protection Officer.
(2) Every report referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be in writing by the informant and duly signed by her.
(3) The Protection Officer shall forward a copy of such complaint with a copy of the protection order of which a breach is alleged to have taken place to the concerned Magistrate for appropriate orders.
(4) The aggrieved person may, if she so desires, make a complaint of breach of protection order or interim protection order directly to the Magistrate or the Police if she so chooses.
(5) If at any time after a protection order has been breached, the aggrieved person seeks his assistance, the protection officer shall immediately rescue her by seeking help from the local police station and assist the aggrieved person to lodge a report to the local police authorities in appropriate cases.
(6) When charges are framed under section 31 or in respect of offences under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or any other offence not summarily triable, the Court may separate the proceedings for such offences to be tried in the manner prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and proceed to summarily try the offence of the breach of Protection Order under section 31, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(7) Any resistance to the enforcement of the orders of the Court under the Act by the respondent or any other person purportedly acting on his behalf shall be deemed to be a breach of a protection order or an interim protection order covered under the Act.
(8) A breach of a protection order or an interim protection order shall immediately be reported to the local police station having territorial jurisdiction and shall be dealt with as a cognizable offence as provided under sections 31 and 32.
(9) While enlarging the person on bail arrested under the Act, the Court may, by order, impose the following conditions to protect the aggrieved person and to ensure the presence of the accused before the court, which may include—
(a) an order restraining the accused from threatening to commit or committing an act of domestic violence;
(b) an order preventing the accused from harassing, telephoning, or making any contact with the aggrieved person;
(c) an order directing the accused to vacate and stay away from the residence of the aggrieved person or any place she is likely to visit;
(d) an order prohibiting the possession or use of a firearm or any other dangerous weapon;
(e) an order prohibiting the consumption of alcohol or other drugs;
(f) any other order required for protection, safety, and adequate relief to the aggrieved person.
जैसा की विदित है कि धारा-18 के अधीन सरंक्षण आदेश न्यायालय द्वारा पारित किया जाता है, ऐसे संरक्षण आदेश अंतरिम भी हो सकता है।यदि प्रत्यर्थी द्वारा उक्त आदेश का उल्लंघन किया जाता है तो इस अधिनियम की धारा-31 व 32 के अधीन अपराध गठित हो जाता है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की धारा-19,20,21,22 व 23 के अधीन जो आदेश पारित किये जाते है उससे धारा-31 व 32 के अधीन अपराध का गठन नहीं होता है और ऐसे अपराध का विचारण संक्षिप्त प्रक्रिया द्वारा किया जायेगा लेकिन यदि न्यायालय द्वारा धारा-31 के साथ-साथ अन्य किसी अपराध का भी आरोप विरचित किया गया है तो न्यायालय चाहे तो दोनों का विचारण पृथक-पृथक भी कर सकता है। माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने मनोज आनंद बनाम उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य ,AIR 2012 (NOC) 287 प्रकरण में यह प्रतिपादित किया है की भरणपोषण की धनराशि अदा करने में असफल रहने पर इस अधिनियम की धारा-31 के अधीन दायित्व उत्पन्न नहीं होता है।
जैसा की यह स्पष्ट है कि धारा-31 के अधीन कारित अपराध संज्ञेय व अजमानतीय किस्म का है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की पीड़िता चाहे तो दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-154 के तहत सीधे थाने में प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट पंजीकृत करा सकती है अथवा न्यायालय में परिवाद संस्थित कर सकती है। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रहे कि मजिस्ट्रेट धारा-156 (3 ) के तहत भी अन्वेषण का आदेश पारित कर सकता है। धारा-31 के तहत प्रकरण का विचारण दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता में प्रावधानित संक्षिप्त प्रक्रिया के माध्यम से किया जायेगा। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस धारा के तहत आरोप विरचित किये जाते समय मजिस्ट्रेट धारा-498A तथा इस अधिनियम के तहत अन्य अपराध अथवा दहेज़ प्रतिषेध अधिनियम के तहत करीत अपराध जो पस्तुत परिवाद से परिलक्षित होता हो के बावत भी इसी परिवाद में आरोप विरचित किये जा सकेंगे। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि व्यथित व्यक्ति के एकमात्र परिसाक्ष्य के आधार पर न्यायालय यह निष्कर्ष निकल सकेगा की धारा-31 के अधीन अभियुक्त ने अपराध कारित किया है। इस हेतु धारा-31 व 32 के प्रावधान देंखे।
जैसा की यह स्पष्ट है कि धारा-31 के अधीन कारित अपराध संज्ञेय व अजमानतीय किस्म का है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की पीड़िता चाहे तो दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-154 के तहत सीधे थाने में प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट पंजीकृत करा सकती है अथवा न्यायालय में परिवाद संस्थित कर सकती है। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रहे कि मजिस्ट्रेट धारा-156 (3 ) के तहत भी अन्वेषण का आदेश पारित कर सकता है। धारा-31 के तहत प्रकरण का विचारण दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता में प्रावधानित संक्षिप्त प्रक्रिया के माध्यम से किया जायेगा। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस धारा के तहत आरोप विरचित किये जाते समय मजिस्ट्रेट धारा-498A तथा इस अधिनियम के तहत अन्य अपराध अथवा दहेज़ प्रतिषेध अधिनियम के तहत करीत अपराध जो पस्तुत परिवाद से परिलक्षित होता हो के बावत भी इसी परिवाद में आरोप विरचित किये जा सकेंगे। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि व्यथित व्यक्ति के एकमात्र परिसाक्ष्य के आधार पर न्यायालय यह निष्कर्ष निकल सकेगा की धारा-31 के अधीन अभियुक्त ने अपराध कारित किया है। इस हेतु धारा-31 व 32 के प्रावधान देंखे।
धारा- 19 लगायत 23 के अधीन पारित आदेशों का निष्पादन कैसे कराया जाय -
घरेलू हिंसा से संरक्षण नियमावली-2006 के नियम-6 (5 ) यह प्रावधानित करता है कि की आवेदन इस अधिनियम की धारा-12 के अधीन निपटाए जायेंगे और आदेशों का प्रवर्तन उसी रीति में होगा जो दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-125 इस अधिनियम की धारा-20 के अधीन अभिकथित है। आदेशों का प्रवर्तन किस प्रकार हो इस बावत दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा- 125 (3 ) (4 ) & (5 ) का उल्लेख आवश्यक है जो इस प्रकार है -
125. Order for maintenance of wives, children, and parents.
(1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain-
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or
(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance until she attains her majority if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter,-
(a) " minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875 ); is deemed not to have attained his majority;
(b) " wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.
(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance.
(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowances remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless the application is made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due:
Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation.- If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him.
(4) No Wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.
(5) On proof that any wife in whose favor an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.
20. Monetary reliefs.—
(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include but is not limited to—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage, or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable, and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties to the application and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under sub‑section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub‑section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.
धारा-125 जा0 फौ0 व धारा-20 के अवलोकन से स्पस्ष्ट है कि इस अधिनियम के तहत पारित किसी भरणपोषण, चिकत्सा व्यय, आर्थिक प्रतिकार आदि की वसूली जुर्मानें की वसूली की भांति की जाएगी अर्थात वर्णित धनराशि के बावत एक रिकवरी वारण्ट निर्गत किया जायेगा, साथ ही प्रत्यर्थी को एक बार में एक माह तक कारावास में रखा जा सकता है यदि धनराशि इसके पूर्व अदा कर देता है तो इसे पहले ही मुक्त कर दिया जायेगा। इस हेतु प्रत्यर्थी को आदेश की प्रति भेजी जाएगी और निश्चित समय में ऐसी धनराशि अदा करने का आदेश किया जायेगा साथ ही यदि प्रत्यर्थी किसी नियोजन में है तो नयोक्ता को भी आदेश किया जा सकता है की धनराशि न्यायालय में अदा करे। निवास आदि के आदेशों के प्रवर्तन के लिए मजिस्ट्रेट संरक्षण अधिकारी व पुलिस की सहायता ले सकता है और उचित आदेश पारित कर सकता है। यदि पीड़िता को संरक्षण गृह की आवश्यकता है तो व संरक्षण अधिकारी, सुविधा प्रदाता की मदद ले सकती है तथा ऐसी पीड़िता मजिस्ट्रेट से भी सीधे निवेदन कर सकती है और मजिस्ट्रेट उचित आदेश निर्गत कर सकता है तथा इस बावत मजिस्ट्रेट संरक्षण अधिकारी व सुविधा प्रदाता व राजकीय संरक्षण गृह आदि को भी सुसंगत आदेश निर्गत कर सकता है।
अभी हाल ही में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने रजनीश बनाम नेहा दाण्डिक अपील संख्या-730 /2020 निर्णय दिनांकित 4 नवम्बर 2020 में या प्रतिपादित किया है कि भरणपोषण का आदेश आवेदनपत्र की तारीख से किया जायेगा तथा भरणपोषण आदि की वसूली का प्रवर्तन धन की डिक्री के निष्पादन की भांति भी कराया जा सकेगा -
VI Final Directions In view of the foregoing discussion as contained in Part B – I to V of this judgment, we deem it appropriate to pass the following directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India :
(a) Issue of overlapping jurisdiction To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, it has become necessary to issue directions in this regard, so that there is uniformity in the practice followed by the Family Courts/District Courts/Magistrate Courts throughout the country. We direct that:
(i) where successive claims for maintenance are made by a party under different statutes, the Court would consider an adjustment or set- off, of the amount awarded in the previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceeding;
(ii) it is made mandatory for the applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding;
(iii) if the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.
(b) Payment of Interim Maintenance The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed as Enclosures I, II, and III of this judgment, as may be applicable, shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrates Court, as the case may be, throughout the country.
(c) Criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance For determining the quantum of maintenance payable to an applicant, the Court shall take into account the criteria enumerated in Part B – III of the judgment.
The aforesaid factors are however not exhaustive, and the concerned Court may exercise its discretion to consider any other factor/s which may be necessary or of relevance in the facts and circumstances of a case.
(d) Date from which maintenance is to be awarded We make it clear that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance, as held in Part B – IV above.
(e) Enforcement / Execution of orders of maintenance For enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, it is directed that order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Section 20(6) of the D.V. Act; and Section 128 of Cr.P.C., as may be applicable. The order of maintenance may be enforced as a money decree of a civil court as per the provisions of the CPC, more particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 r.w. Order XXI.
Before we part with this judgment, we note our appreciation of the valuable assistance provided by the Ld. Amici Curiae Ms. Anitha Shenoy and Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocates in this case.
A copy of this judgment is communicated by the Secretary-General of this Court, to the Registrars of all High Courts, who would, in turn, circulate it to all the District Courts in the States. It shall be displayed on the website of all District Courts / Family Courts / Courts of Judicial Magistrates for awareness and implementation.
यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि आदेशों के प्रवर्तन के लिए नियमावली के नियम-10 के आलोक में संरक्षण अधिकारी का सहयोग भी प्राप्त किया जा सकता है लेकिन इसके लिए यह आवश्यक है की मजिस्ट्रेट को इस बावत लिखित में आदेश पारित करना होगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की संरक्षण अधिकारी को मौखिक में आदेश इस नियम के तहत पारित नहीं किये जाने चाहिए।
अपील -
क्या एक तलाकशुदा महिला धारा-12 के अधीन याचिका प्रस्तुत कर सकती है तथा धारा-18 से 23 तक के उपचार प्राप्त कर सकती है ?
यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना है यदि घरेलु नातेदारी में रहते हुए कोई घरेलू हिंसा तलाक के पूर्व करित की गयी है तो तलाक के पश्चात् भी याचिका पोषणीय होगी और पीड़िता धारा-१८ से २३ तक के अनुतोषों की अधिकारिणी होगी। इस सम्बन्ध में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने अधोलिखित नजीर में समर्थन करते हुए कहा है कि -
Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs Atif Iqbal Mansoori, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2069 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP(CRL.) No.8056 of 2013) DOJ 18 September 2014.
So, now a legal question arises as to whether in view of divorce took place on 09/05/2008, the domestic relationship between the parties exist on the date of filing of this petition on 29/09/2009 ? and if there is no domestic relationship then whether the application is maintainable?
19. Even if it is presumed that the appellant has taken ‘Khula’(divorce) on 9th May 2008 and the 1st respondent is no more the husband, the question arises that in such case whether the erstwhile-wife can claim one or other relief as prescribed under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and interim relief under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 if domestic violence had taken place when the wife lived together in a shared household with her husband through a relationship in the nature of marriage.
दूसरी तरफ यदि घरेलू हिंसा का किया जाना तलाक के बाद आक्षेपित है तो ऐसे में याचिका पोषणीय नहीं होगी और इस अधिनियम के तहत पीड़िता किसी अनुतोष की अधिकारिणी नहीं होगी अधोलिखित नजीर में माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने इसका समर्थन करतें हुए कहा है कि -
Inderjit Singh Grewal vs State of Punjab(2011) 12 SCC 588.
25. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that permitting the Magistrate to proceed further with the complaint under the provisions of the Act 2005 is not compatible and in consonance with the decree of divorce which still subsists and thus, the process amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Undoubtedly, for quashing a complaint, the court has to take its contents at its face value and in case the same discloses an offene, the court generally does not interfere with the same. However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix of this case, permitting the court to proceed with the complaint would be a travesty of justice. Thus, the interest of justice warrants quashing of the same.
उपसंहार -
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