Saturday, December 12, 2020

Practice of warrant B and law relating to production warrant

By-

Vandana Singh Katiyar

Researcher & Advocate

Vijay Katiyar

Deputy Director

Judicial Training and Research

Institute, UP, Lucknow

Introduction-

Generally, the practice of Parcha talbi and warrant B is prevalent not only in the state of Uttar Pradesh but in the entire Country. Even though in the Code of Criminal Procedure there is a provision in respect of production warrant. Section-266 to 271 deals with the concept of the production warrant. It is pertinent to mention here that section-266 to 271 are not exhaustive in themselves but the provision of the Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act, 1955 and U.P. Prisoners Attendance in Courts Rules, 1956 are also very relevant for the proper discussion of the topic. The purpose of this article is to elaborate the consolidated concept of the production warrant and attendance of the prisoner before court.

Meaning of confined or detained and prison-

In the Code of Criminal procedure there is section-266 and section-2(a) of Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act, 1955 defined the terms confined or detained and prison as below-

266. Definitions.—In this Chapter,—

(a) “detained” includes detained under any law providing for preventive detention;

(b) “prison” includes,—

(i) any place which has been declared by the State Government, by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail;

(ii) any reformatory, Borstal institution, or institution of a like nature.

2. Definitions. – In this Act, –

(a) “Confinement in a prison” – references to confinement in a prison, by whatever form of words, include references to confinement or detention in a prison under any law providing for preventive detention,

(b) “Prison” includes –

(i) any place which has been declared by the State Government, by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail; or

(ii) any reformatory, borstal institution or other institution of a like nature;

A perusal of the different two sections it is quite clear that the term confined or detained includes any person detained under preventive detention also, it means that if any person detained in jail either under any offence or for prevention of any crime under any law in respect of preventive detention, comes within the purview of the definition of confined or detention. when we talk about confined or detained under any offence it means that such person either convicted for any offence or under trial for any offence.

After bare reading of the above-mentioned provisions in respect of jail, it includes -

1- Traditional jail which already running by the State or Central Government. or

2- Any place which has been declared by the State Government, by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail; or

3- Any reformatory, borstal institution or other institution of a like nature;

Which Court is empowered to require the attendance of prisoners and for what purpose -

Before going to the further discussion on the topic it is pertinent to describe here the Court who is empowered to issue requisition to the jail authority for the production of the person who is detained in jail under any law. Section-267 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section-3 of the Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act, 1955 deal about this. these provisions are as below-

267. Power to require the attendance of prisoners.—(1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, trial, or proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Criminal Court,—

(a) that a person confined or detained in a prison should be brought before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence, or for the purpose of any proceedings against him, or

(b) that it is necessary for the ends of justice to examine such person as a witness, the Court may make an order requiring the officer in charge of the prison to produce such person before the Court answering to the charge or for the purpose of such proceeding or, as the case may be, for giving evidence.

(2) Where an order under sub-section (1) is made by a Magistrate of the second class, it shall not be forwarded to or acted upon by, the officer in charge of the prison unless it is countersigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, to whom such Magistrate is subordinate.

(3) Every order submitted for countersigning under sub-section (2) shall be accompanied by a statement of the facts which, in the opinion of the Magistrate, render the order necessary, and the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom it is submitted may, after considering such statement, decline to countersign the order.

3. Power of Courts, to require the appearance of prisoners to give evidence or answer a charge. –

(1) Any civil or criminal court may if it thinks that the evidence of any person confined in any prison is material in any matter pending before it makes an order in the form set forth in the First Schedule, directed to the officer-in-charge of the prison:

Provided that no civil court shall make an order under this subsection, in respect of a person confined in a prison situated outside the State in which the court is held.

(2) Any criminal court may if a charge of an offence against a person confined in any prison is made or pending before it, make an order in the form set forth in the Second Schedule, directed to the officer-in-charge of the prison.

(3) No order made under this section by a civil court which is subordinate to a District Judge shall have effect unless it is countersigned by the District Judge, and no order made under this section by

1 This Act extends to the Union Territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu by Regulation 11 of 1963 [w.e.f. 1st February 1964] and Pondicherry by Act 26 of 1963 [w.e.f. 1st March 1969]. 2 This Act came into force on 1st January 1956, vide notification No. S.R.O. 3447 dated the 8th November 1955, Gazette of India, 1955, Pt. II, Sec. 3, p.2229. 3 Substituted by A.L.O. [No. 3], 1956 [w.e.f. 1st November 1956]. a Criminal Court which is inferior to the Court of a Magistrate of the first class shall have effect unless it is countersigned by the District Magistrate to whom that court is subordinate or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Court is situated.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a Court of Small Causes outside a Presidency-town or city of Hyderabad shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Court is situated. substitute respectively “Judicial Magistrate of the first class” and “Chief Judicial Magistrate”.

The plain reading of the section-267 of Cr.P.C. and section-3 of the Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act, 1955, it is clear that courts who has empowered to issue requisition to jail authority for production of person who is detained in the jail are Criminal courts, Civil courts, and JSCC Courts. It is also kept in mind that the Hon'ble Supreme court and High Courts also come within the purview of the definition of the courts. In the code of Criminal Procedure, only the Criminal court is empowered to send requisition for the production of a person who is detained in jail, But in the Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act, 1955 Civil courts and JSCC courts are empowered as well as criminal courts. with the conjoint reading of both provisions, it is clear that criminal court, civil court, and jscc court are empowered to issue requisition for production of the warrant against a person who is detained in jail.

Another question before us that for what purposes requisition of a production warrant can be issued? the plain reading of both provisions it is quite clear that for the three purposes requisition for production warrant may be issued these are as follows-

1- For answering any charge.

2- For purpose of any proceeding.

3- For the examination as a witness.

The criminal court can issue requisition to jail authority for the purpose of answering any charge or for purpose of any proceeding or for the examination as a witness. While Civil and JSCC Court may issue requisition to the jail authority for the purpose of any proceeding or for the purpose of examination as a witness.

If any such order has been passed by a Magistrate of the second class, it shall not be forwarded to or acted upon by, the Officer In-charge of the prison unless it is countersigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom such Magistrate is subordinate. It is pertinent to mention here before 1973 under Cr.P.C. The Judicial Magistrate was the subordinate of the District Magistrate, but after the amendment of 1973, the Judicial Magistrate will have subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Even though in section 3 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 authority for countersigned is used as District Magistrate in respect of Magistrate of second class. In 1973 the amendment has been inserted in Cr.P.C. Hence it is very clear that if the acquisition has been made by the second class Magistrate then it must be countersigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It means that if an acquisition for production warrant has been issued by a Magistrate who is holding the authority of the first-class Magistrate then there is no need for countersigning.

In the case of Civil or JSCC Court, if any requisition for production warrant for any prison has been issued then it must be countersigned by the District Judge concerned. But it must be kept in mind Civil Courts or JSCC Courts can not make an order in respect of a person confined in a prison situated outside the state.

It is very important to mention here that the production warrant should be issued according to the proforma attached in schedules I and II of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955.

The next question before us in what manner to obtain the countersignature of an order or requisition for a production warrant. The Section 267 Cr.P.C. and Section 3 Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 provides requirement about countersigning by the authority concerned. The procedure in this respect has been laid down in rule 3 UP Prisoners attendance in Courts Rules 1956, these are as follows:-

3- Procedure for obtaining countersignature of an order under Section 3.- Every order submitted to the District Magistrate or the District Judge for counter-signature under sub-section (3) of Section 3 shall be accompanied by a statement under the hand of the Presiding Officer of the subordinate court of the facts which in his opinion render the order necessary and the District Magistrate or the District Judge, as the case may be, may, after considering such statement, countersign the order or decline to countersign it.

It must be kept in the mind countersigning authority has the discretion to countersign or decline to countersign.

Power of State Government to exclude certain person from the operation of production Warrant.

The power under Section 267 of Cr.P.C. and Section 3 Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 is not absolute power of the Court but it is under certain restrictions. Section 268 of the CrPC and Section 4 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 empowered the state government to make general or special orders, direct that any person or class of persons shall not be removed from the prison in which he or they may be confined or detained and thereupon, so long as the order remains in force, no order made under section 267, whether before or after the order of the state government, shall have effect in respect of such person or class of persons. The state government can make an order on the basis of nature of offence, disturbance of public order, and public interest generally. The Provisions mentioned above are as follows:-

268. Power of State Government to exclude certain persons from the operation of section 267.—(1) The State Government may, at any time, having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (2), by general or special order, direct that any person or class of persons shall not be removed from the prison in which he or they may be confined or detained, and thereupon, so long as the order remains in force, no order made under section 267, whether before or after the order of the State Government, shall have effect in respect of such person or class of persons.

(2) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the State Government shall have regard to the following matters, namely:—

(a) the nature of the offence for which, or the grounds on which, the person or class of persons has been ordered to be confined or detained in prison;

(b) the likelihood of the disturbance of public order if the person or class of persons is allowed to be removed from the prison;

4. Power of State Government to exempt certain persons from the operation of Section 3. – (1)

The State Government may, having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (2), by general or special order, direct that any person or class of persons shall not be removed from the prison in which he or they may be confined, and thereupon so long as any such order remains in force, the provisions of Section 3 shall not apply to such person or class of persons.

(2) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the State Government shall have regard to the following matters, namely:

a) the nature of the offence for which or the grounds on which the confinement has been ordered in respect of the person or class of persons;

b) the likelihood of the disturbance of public order if the person or class of persons is allowed to be removed from the prison;

c) the public interest, generally.

It is quite clear for the perusal of the above provisions, the government has empowered to make orders for that person confined in prison unfit to be removed. On the basis of section 268 of CrPC and Section 4 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955, The UP State has framed UP Prisoners Attendance in Courts Rules, 1956 in which rule 4 has inserted and the authority of state government has been conferred to the District Magistrate in which local jurisdiction the prison has been situated. Rule 4 is as follows:-

4- How a declaration that a person confined in prison unfit to be removed is to be made.- Where the person named in any order made under Section 3 appears to be unfit to be removed for reasons given in Section 6, the Superintendent of Prison in which he is confined shall apply to the District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the prison is situated, and if such Magistrate by writing under his hand, declares himself to be of opinion that the person, named in the order is unfit to be removed for reason mentioned in Section 6, the Superintendent of the Prison may abstain from carrying out the order and shall send to the court from which the orders had been issued a statement of reasons for so abstaining.

Duty of the Jail Authority -

Section 269 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 5 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 deal with the duty of the Jail Authorities. These two sections describe when any requisition for production of prisoner received, what should we do by the Jail authority. Before going to detailed description it is necessary to quote the above provisions firstly

269. Officer in charge of prison to abstain from carrying out order in certain contingencies.—Where the person in respect of whom an order is made under section 267—

(a) is by reason of sickness or infirmity unfit to be removed from the prison; or

(b) is under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation; or

(c) is in custody for a period which would expire before the expiration of the time required for complying with the order and for taking him back to the prison in which he is confined or detained; or

(d) is a person to whom an order made by the State Government under section 268 applies, the officer in charge of the prison shall abstain from carrying out the Court's order and shall send to the Court a statement of reasons for so abstaining:

Provided that where the attendance of such person is required for giving evidence at a place not more than twenty-five kilometers distance from the prison, the officer in charge of the prison shall not so abstain for the reason mentioned in clause (b).

5. Prisoners to be brought up. – Upon delivery of any order made under Section 3 to the officer-in-charge of the prison in which the person named therein confined, that officer shall cause him to be taken to the Court in which his attendance is required, so as to be present in the Court at the time in such order mentioned, and shall cause him to be detained in custody in or near the Court until he has been examined or until the Judge or presidency officer of the Court authorizes him to be taken back to the prison in which he was confined.

A bare reading of both provisions it is clear that the jail superintendent generally after receiving the order of production warrant, would send the prisoner to the court concerned with proper security prescribed in up prisoners attendance in courts rules-1956. If the jail authority found that due to reasons mentioned in section 269 (a) to (d) the prisoner can not be produced before the court concerned then the statement of reasons would be sent to the respective court of law.

Whether mere issuance of production warrant is deemed to be judicial custody-

The answer is negative, it means that mere requisition for warrant B can not be equated with section-167 or 209 or 309. It is also to be kept in mind that mere issuance of requisition of production warrant of any prisoner does not mean that a particular prisoner is in the custody of the court. it means that the jail authorities are not always bound to produce the prisoner before court. If the jail authorities send the statement of reasons for not producing the prisoner and such statement based on section section-269 Cr.P.C. then the court can not compel the jail authority to produce a particular prisoner. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Mohd. Daud vs jail superintendent Moradabad, 1993 Cr.LJ 1358 Allahabad. held that

50. Taking up first the submission of the petitioner based on Section 267 of the Cr. P.C. that a warrant issued under the said section does not constitute a detention order authorizing detention in. prison of a person, it would be found that it is fully borne out from the provisions of Section 267 itself. The head-note, as well as the phraseology of the said section, indicates that the order envisaged therein is an order to produce a person confined or detained in a prison before a criminal court for answering to a charge or for the purpose of any proceedings against him. An order under this section does not partake the character of a detention order by the court seeking production qua the charge of the proceedings pending before it. This view finds support also from the principles laid down in Dharampal v. State of U.P. 1982 All WC 13 : (1982 All LJ 130) and Pramod Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (reported in Allahabad Band Nirnaya 108). In fact, before us, the learned counsel for the respondents has also not taken the stand of a warrant under Section 267 to be a warrant of detention. He, on the other hand, relies on what he claims to be an order of remand validly passed under Section 309 of the Cr. P.C. by the Special Judge, Moradabad and this brings us to one of the main questions in issue between the parties.

In the cases of below has retrieted the concept which has been pronounced in the case of Mohd Daud vs State of UP, these are as follows-

1- Pramod Kumar vs State of UP, 1991 Cr.LJ 1063 Allahabad.

2- Pawan Kumar Pandey vs State of UP,1997 Cr.LJ 2686 Allahabad.

3- Sudama Uraon vs State of UP, Criminal appeal No-1973/2019 judgment dated 06/12/2019.

What happened if the production warrant expired-

Another question before readers is if any person has been detained in jail in respect of some offence, in the same time warrant B has been issued by another court either inside the state or outside the state, the accused or detenu has not been produced in the court in the furtherance of such warrant B and the date for the production of the accused fixed in the production warrant has expired, the accused shall be released from the custody; The production warrant would not be treated as custody warrant within the ambit of section-167 Cr.P.C. It means that if such accused has been Bailout or acquitted by the former court and the date of the production warrant of the subsequent court has expired then such shall be released from the custody, if jail authority has not been released the same, then such custody would be illegal because mere issuance of production warrant, it can not be presumed judicial custody. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Nabbu vs State of UP, 2006 (3) ALJ 277 Allhabad. held in below paras-

14. In these circumstances, respondent no.2 is bound to comply with the order of courts A.C.J.M. Hapur (Ghaziabad) and G.J.M. Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) if the date of appearance of production has not been expired or the date has not been mentioned in the said 'B' warrant. In such circumstances, such order of production warrant shall comply, it is important to note here that it is the duty of Superintendent, District Jail to submit a report to the court concerned whereupon the said requisition comes to an end. However, the presence of the petitioner is still required by the said court, the requisite court will have to issue a fresh requisition under Section 3 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Court) Act, 1955 and Section 267 Cr.P.C. requiting the Officer-in-Charge of the prison to produce the prisoner before it on some other date to be nominated by it. The date mentioned in the requisition issued by the said court to produce a prisoner has expired. Thereafter, no other obligation remains upon the Officer-in-Charge of the prison to produce the prisoner before that court on any other date. In the circumstances in no case, a requisition issued by a criminal court under Section 3 of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) and Section 267(1) Cr.P.C. even be construed as authorizing the Officer-in-Charge of the prison to keep a person under detention after the date mentioned in the requisition has expired and he has made a report to the concerned court stating the reason for his omission to comply with the requisition.

15. In the present case no date in production warrant has been mentioned by the court of A.C.J.M. Hapur (Ghaziabad). Therefore, it is effective, and the same is to be complied with by respondent no.2. So far as the production warrant of the court of C.J.M. Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) is concerned wherein the date of production of the accused was mentioned and the same has already been expired. There is no material on record before us that any fresh production warrant has also been received from the said court by respondent No. 2. In absence of issuance of a fresh production warrant by the court of C.J.M Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh), the petitioner cannot be detained in the said previous production warrant whose date has already been expired.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has attracted my attention to the pronouncement of Dharam Pal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 1981 Allahabad Criminal Ruling 466, wherein it has been observed that:-

Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955, Sections 3(2), 6 Prisons Act, 1894, Section 55 Prisoners Act, 1900, Section 3 Criminal P.C., 1973, Sections 267, 269 Construction of-Petitioners detained in Jail at Meerut were directed to be released on bail-Bail order received by Jailor-No authority remains in him to keep them in custody-Requisition received from Criminal Courts at Haryana under Section 3 of 1955 Act and Section 267 Cr.P.C. cannot confer any valid authority to keep them under detention.

17. The above pronouncement of this Court is not applicable in the present case as the date of production warrant has expired only one production warrant which was issued by the C.J.M. Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh), but no time limit has been given in production warrant issued by the A.C.J.M. Hapur (Ghaziabad) regarding the above case. In such circumstances, respondent No. 2 is bound to comply with the order of the production warrant after releasing him from the cases of District Bulandshahar.

18. Thus, the writ petition is, hereby, disposed of accordingly.

Whether for the purpose of investigation warrant B can be issued-

the answer is affirmative because warrant B can be issued for the purpose of answering the charge or for the purpose of any proceeding or for the purpose of examination as a witness. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Caterina of judgments. see the case laws given below-

1- Ranjeet Singh vs State of UP, 1995 Cr.LJ 3305 Allahabad.

2- Bobby Alias Premveer And Anr. vs State Of U.P, 2000 Cri.LJ 4125 Allahabad.

Whether the time of custody during the issuance of warrant B and actual production of accused can be set off in the imprisonment awarded -

The next question before us that if an accused has been summoned through warrant B, the time during the issuance of warrant B and actual production of the accused can be set off in the imprisonment awarded by the court who has issued such warrant B. The answer is negative because the period above mentioned has not come within the ambit of judicial custody, hence such period can not be set off in the imprisonment which has been awarded by the court concerned. In the case of Sudama Uraon vs State of UP, judgment dated 06/12/2019 Hon'ble Allahabad High Court laid down the principle in para as given below-

22. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that mere issuing of production warrant by any Court to in charge of any prison u/s 267 of the Code, to produce any person before such Court, does not amount to detention or custody. The period of detention in another criminal case prior to the actual production of such person before the Court in compliance of production warrant issued u/s 267 of the Code, and the period during which such convicted person was transferred to another prison, in compliance of another production warrant issued by another Court, would be excluded from the counting of a period of sentence awarded to the convicted accused. Thus, in view of section 428 read with Section 427 of the Code, the period of detention in another criminal case in another prison shall not be treated as detention in the same case.

23. In view of the above discussion I am of the view that the period of detention of appellant, while he was detained in district jail, Sasaram, Bihar, District Jail, Gharhwa, Jharkhand in connection with the other criminal cases of those States, cannot be allowed to set off against the sentence awarded by the Trial Court in Special S.T. No. 553 of 2012 (State Vs. Sudama Uraon) u/s 3(1) of Act, P.S. Pannuganj, District Sonbhadra, wherein appellant has been sentenced for 3 years imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/-. The impugned judgment and order passed in the aforesaid cases are legal and justified. It requires no interference.

Whether Bail application is maintainable mere issuance of production warrant -

Now the question before us if any court has issued a production warrant but the accused actually not produced the same, whether in that case, the Bail application can be entertained or not, by the court who has issued such warrant B . Answer is negative because it is well established that mere issuance of warrant can not be deemed to be judicial custody of such court, for the maintainability of Bail application it is mandated that the accused must be in the judicial custody of that court in which particular Bail application is pending. It means that Bail application is not maintainable before such court.

Pramod Kumar vs State of UP, 1991 Cr.LJ 1063 Allahabad. In this case, Hon'ble Allahabad High Court recognized the above-mentioned fact, in this case even CMM Kanpur has taken a further step and given the first remand of the IO of Agra in the respect of JM Agra but the accused has not been produced before the court of Agra for the further remand. In this case, JM Agra even has been issued warrant B but accused not produced by the jail Authority of Kanpur. the JM Agra has rightly rejected the bail application on the ground that the accused is not in the judicial custody of that court. Hon'ble High court affirmed the order and enunciated as below-

11. Now it has to be seen as to what is the effect of remand taken by Agra police from the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar under Section 167 of the Code. Of course, under the said provision, a Magistrate having no jurisdiction could not grant successive remands. In compliance with of-the first remand order if the accused had been produced before the Magistrate having jurisdiction, then he could alone take the accused in custody in the criminal case of his jurisdiction and remand him to judicial custody. Only thereafter the accused could be said to be in the custody of the said Court. Prior to that, he could not be deemed to be in the custody of that Court.

12. Not only that even if the first remand order was made by the Court having no jurisdiction, the accused should have been produced before the competent Magistrate, but if he was not so produced, the first remand would become meaningless. In the instant case, if the applicant had been transferred to Agra in compliance of the requisition or the first remand order and the Agra Magistrate had remanded him to judicial custody in the Agra crime case, then alone the applicant could be said to be in the' custody of Agra case. Learned counsel for the complainant placed reliance in Dharampal v. State of U. P., (1982 (19) ACC Page 98) in which it has been observed:

"...........the requisition under Section 3(2) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 and Section 267(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be addressed to Superintendent of a District Jail who is already holding a prisoner under the authority of law. The requisition by itself does not authorize the detention of any person. It merely requires the Officer-in-Charge of the prison (1) to produce the detenu before the requisitioning Court on the date fixed by it and (2) after the purpose of requisition is over, to take him back and to keep him in custody in accordance with the writ or direction issued by the Court which had authorized his detention in jail."

13. In this case, a photocopy of the requisition issued by the Judicial Magistrate, III (L.C.C.) The court, Agra (Annexure 2 to the application) has been filed. No doubt, it has not been printed correctly but it is the same requisition as mentioned in Schedule II of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 and Form 36 of Schedule II prepared under Section 267 of the Code.

14. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in his order rejecting the application has rightly remarked that once a requisition for transfer of the applicant from Kanpur Jail to Agra was issued by the Court concerned, it was meaningless for the police of Agra to seek remand under Section 167 of the Code from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. Therefore, after careful consideration of the aforesaid legal position, there remains no doubt that the applicant was not in the custody of Crime NO. 166 of 1989 under Sections 147/148/149/307/302, I.P.C. of Police Station Etmadpur district Agra. As the applicant was not in the custody in that criminal case, the courts at Agra had no jurisdiction to release him on bail. The bail application was rightly held to be premature by the Additional Sessions Judge. The present bail application relating to the aforesaid crime case of Agra is also held to be premature and is accordingly rejected.

One more important thing also kept in the mind that suppose if any first remand has been done by a magistrate after requisition of production warrant, through video conferencing in respect of that person who is already detained in jail in the jurisdiction of another magistrate either outside the district or outside the state, then what will you do? Section-167 (2) proviso (b) provides that the first remand ( police or judicial remand) of the accused can not be granted by video conferencing but latter remand may be granted through video conferencing but in the period of COVID-19 there is no practical possibility to grant physical remand for the redressal of such circumstances the Government of up with help of Hon'ble High Court notified rules called "Rules for video conferencing for courts in the state of Uttar Pradesh, 2020". The rule-11 is closely concerned with this extraordinary situation and this rule provides that even the first remand in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing may be granted by video conferencing. these rules are as follows-

11. Judicial remand, framing of charge, examination of accused, and Proceedings under Section 164 of the CrPC

11.1 The Court may, at its discretion, authorize the detention of an accused, frame charges in a criminal trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 through video conferencing. However, ordinarily judicial remand in the first instance or police remand shall not be granted through video conferencing save and except in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing.

11.2 The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, for reasons to be recorded in writing, examine a witness or an accused under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or record the statement of the accused under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 through video conferencing, while observing all due precautions to ensure that the witness or the accused as the case may be, is free of any form of coercion, threat or undue influence. The Court shall ensure compliance with Section 26 of the Evidence Act.

What is the distinction between sec- 267 and 167, 209 and 309 Cr.P.C.-

It is well established that the requisition which has been made under section-267 is only a request to jail authority for the production of the accused. While under section-167, 209 & 309 if any order has been passed by the court such order would be in the nature of judicial custody. the order which has passed under section-267 may have resulted within the ambit of 167 or 209 or 309. If the accused is on bail in a particular offence in which respect the production warrant has issued then custody warrant would not be made but through parcha talbi means in each requisition should be an issue the same. If in that situation if accused is acquitted or bail out in other offence then the accused should be automatically released.

Relevant provisions in respect of production of warrant and handcuffing etc.-

CHAPTER XXII Cr.P.C.
ATTENDANCE OF PERSONS CONFINED OR DETAINED IN PRISONS-

266. Definitions.—In this Chapter,—

(a) “detained” includes detained under any law providing for preventive detention;

(b) “prison” includes,—

(i) any place which has been declared by the State Government, by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail;

(ii) any reformatory, Borstal institution, or institution of a like nature.

267. Power to require the attendance of prisoners.—(1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, trial, or

proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Criminal Court,—

(a) that a person confined or detained in a prison should be brought before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence, or for the purpose of any proceedings against him, or

(2) Where an order under sub-section (1) is made by a Magistrate of the second class, it shall not be forwarded

to or acted upon by, the officer in charge of the prison unless it is countersigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, to whom such Magistrate is subordinate.

(3) Every order submitted for countersigning under sub-section (2) shall be accompanied by a statement of the

facts which, in the opinion of the Magistrate, render the order necessary, and the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom it is submitted may, after considering such statement, decline to countersign the order.

268. Power of State Government to exclude certain persons from the operation of section 267.—(1) The State

The government may, at any time, having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (2), by general or special order, direct that any person or class of persons shall not be removed from the prison in which he or they may be confined or detained, and thereupon, so long as the order remains in force, no order made under section 267, whether before or after the order of the State Government, shall have effect in respect of such person or class of persons.

(2) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the State Government shall have regard to the following matters, namely:—

(a) the nature of the offence for which, or the grounds on which, the person or class of persons has been ordered to be confined or detained in prison;

(b) the likelihood of the disturbance of public order if the person or class of persons is allowed to be removed from the prison;

269. Officer in charge of prison to abstain from carrying out order in certain contingencies.—Where the person in respect of whom an order is made under section 267—

(a) is by reason of sickness or infirmity unfit to be removed from the prison; or

(b) is under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation; or

(c) is in custody for a period which would expire before the expiration of the time required for complying with the order and for taking him back to the prison in which he is confined or detained; or

Provided that where the attendance of such person is required for giving evidence at a place not more than twenty-five kilometres distance from the prison, the officer in charge of the prison shall not so abstain for the reason mentioned in clause (b).

270. Prisoner to be brought to Court in custody.—Subject to the provisions of section 269, the officer in charge of the prison shall, upon delivery of an order made under sub-section (1) of section 267 and duly countersigned, where necessary, under sub-section (2) thereof, cause the person named in the order to be taken to the Court in which his attendance is required, so as to be present there at the time mentioned in the order, and shall cause him to be kept in custody in or near the Court until he has been examined or until the Court authorizes him to be taken back to the prison in which he was confined or detained.

271. Power to issue commission for examination of witness in prison.—The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the power of the Court to issue, under section 284, a commission for the examination, as a witness, of any person confined or detained in a prison; and the provisions of Part B of Chapter XXIII shall apply in relation to the examination on commission of any such person in the prison as they apply in relation to the examination on commission of any other person.

Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act [1955]

An Act to provide for the attendance in courts of persons confined in prisons for obtaining their evidence or for answering criminal charge. [20th September 1955] Be it enacted by Parliament in the Sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:

1. Short title, extent, and commencement. – (1) This Act may be called the Prisoners [Attendance

in Courts] Act, 1955.

(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir1

(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

2. Definitions. – In this Act, –

(b) “Prison” includes –

(i) any place which has been declared by the State Government, by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail; or

(ii) any reformatory, borstal institution or other institution of a like nature;

3. Power of Courts, to require appearance of prisoners to give evidence or answer a charge. –

(1) Any civil or criminal court may, if it thinks that the evidence of any person confined in any prison is material in any matter pending before it make an order in the form set forth in the First Schedule, directed to the officer-in-charge of the prison:

Provided that no civil court shall make an order under this sub-section, in respect of a person confined in a prison situated outside the State in which the court is held.

(2) Any criminal court may, if a charge of an offence against a person confined in any prison is made or pending before it, make an order in the form set forth in the Second Schedule, directed to the officer-in-charge of the prison.

1 This Act extends to the Union Territories of Goa, Daman and Diu by Regulation 11 of 1963 [w.e.f. 1st February 1964] and Pondicherry by Act 26 of 1963 [w.e.f. 1st March, 1969]. 2 This Act came into force on 1st January, 1956, vide notification No. S.R.O. 3447 dated the 8th November, 1955, Gazette

of India, 1955, Pt. II, Sec. 3, p.2229. 3 Substituted by A.L.O. [No. 3], 1956 [w.e.f. 1st November 1956]. a Criminal Court which is inferior to the Court of a Magistrate of the first class shall have effect unless it is countersigned by the District Magistrate to whom that court is subordinate or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Court is situate.

(4) For the purposes of sub-section (3), a Court of Small Causes outside a Presidency-town or city of Hyderabad shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Court is situated. substitute respectively “Judicial Magistrate of the first class” and “Chief Judicial Magistrate”.4

4. Power of State Government to exempt certain persons from the operation of Section 3. – (1)

(2) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the State Government shall have regard to the following matters, namely:

a) the nature of the offence for which or the grounds on which the confinement has been ordered in respect of the person or class of persons;

b) the likelihood of the disturbance of public order if the person or class of persons is allowed to be removed from the prison;

c) the public interest, generally.

5. Prisoners to be brought up. – Upon delivery of any order made under Section 3 to the officer-in-charge of the prison in which the person named there in confined, that officer shall cause him to be taken to the Court in which his attendance is required, so as to be present in the Court at the time in such order mentioned, and shall cause him to be detained in custody in or near the Court until he has been examined or until the Judge or presidency officer of the Court authorizes him to be taken back to the prison in which he was confined.

6. Officer-in-charge of prison when to abstain from carrying out order. – Where the person in respect of whom an order is made under Section 3 –

(a) is, in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, declared to be unfit to be removed from the prison where he is confined by reason of sickness or another infirmity; or

(b) is under committal for trial; or

(d) is in custody for a period, which would expire before the expiration of the time required for removing him under this Act and for taking him back to the prison in which he is which he is confined, the officer-in-charge of the prison shall abstain from carrying out the order and shall send to the Court from which the order had been issued a statement of reasons for so abstaining:

Provided that such officer as aforesaid shall not so abstain where –

(i) the order has been made by a Criminal Court; and

(ii) the person named in the order is confined under committal for trial or under remand pending trial or pending a preliminary investigation and is not declared in accordance with the rules made in this behalf to be unfit to be removed from the prison where he is confined by reason of sickness or another infirmity; and

(iii) the place, where the evidence of the person named in the order is required, is not more than five miles distant from the prison in which he is confined.

7. Commissions for examination of prisoners. – In any of the following cases that are to say, –

(a) where it appears to any Civil Court that the evidence of a person confined in a prison is material in any matter pending before it and that the attendance of such person in Court cannot be secured by reason of the provisions of Section 6 or of an order under Section 4 of the District Judge declining under sub-section (3) of Section 3 to countersign an order for removal; or

(b) where it appears to any Civil Court as aforesaid that the evidence of a person confined in a prison, which is situated outside the State in which, or is more than fifty miles distant from the place at which, such court is held is material in any such matter, the Court may, if it thinks fit, issue a commission under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the examination of the person in the prison in which he is confined.

8. Certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure to apply. – Save as otherwise provided in this Act and any rules made thereunder, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the 5 [Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898] as the case may be, shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the examination on commission or otherwise of any person confined in a prison as they apply in relation to the examination on commission of any other person.

9. Power to make rules. – (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may provide for –

a) the procedure for obtaining the counter signature of an order made under Section 3;

b) the authority by whom and the manner in which a declaration that a person confined in prison is unfit to be removed therefrom may be made;

c) the conditions, including payment of costs and charges, subject to which an order made under Section 3 by a Civil Court may be executed;

d) the manner in which a process directed against any person confined in a prison-issued from any

the court may be served upon him;

e) the escort of persons confined in a prison to and from courts in which their attendance is required and for their custody during the period of such attendance;

5 Now the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 of 1974].

f) the amount to be allowed for the costs and charges of such enforcement of this Act;

g) the guidance of officers in all other matters connected with the enforcement of this Act.

10. Repeal. – (1) Part IX of the Prisoners Act, 1900 and the First and Second Schedules to the said Act are hereby repealed.

(2) If immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any part B State to which this Act extends any law corresponding to the provisions of this Act, that law shall, in so far as it relates to matter dealt with in this Act, stand repealed on such commencement: Provided that anything done or any action taken under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall continue to have effect accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act.

The First Schedule

[See sub-section [1] of Section 3]

Court of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To the officer-in-charge of the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [State name of prison]

You are hereby required to produce, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., now confined in . . . . . . . . . . . . . under

safe and sure conduct before the Court of . . . . . . . . . . . . . at . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., on the . . . . . . . . . . . . .

day of………………… next by . . . . . . . . . . . . . of the clock in the forenoon of the same day, there

to give evidence in a matter now pending before the said Court, and after the said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . has then and there given his evidence before the said Court or the said Court has

dispensed with his further attendance, cause him to be conveyed under safe and sure conduct back

to the prison.

The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.B.

[Countersigned] C.D.

The Second Schedule

[See sub-section (2) of Section 3]

Court of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To the officer-in-charge of the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [State name of prison]

You are hereby required to produce, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., now confined in . . . . . . . . . . . . . under

safe and sure conduct before the Court of . . . . . . . . . . . . . at . . . . . . . . . . . ., on the . . . . . . . . . . . day

of . . . . . . . . next by . . . . . . . . . . of the clock in the forenoon of the same day, there to answer a

charge now pending before the said court, and after such charge has been disposed of or the said

Court has dispensed with his further attendance, cause him to be conveyed under safe and sure

conduct back to the prison.

The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.B.

[Countersigned] C.D.

U.P. Prisoners Attendance in Courts Rules, 1956

Published vide Notification No. 4764/22-841-1955, dated 28th December 1955 up769

1-These rules may be called the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Rules, 1956, and shall come into force from January 1, 1956.

2-In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-

(i) the 'Act' means the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955;

(ii) the 'Superintendent of Prison' means the officer-in-charge of prison; and

(iii) the 'State Government' means the Government of Uttar Pradesh.

3- Procedure for obtaining counter signature of an order under Section 3.- Every order submitted to the District Magistrate or the District Judge for counter-signature under sub-section (3) of Section 3 shall be accompanied by a statement under the hand of the Presiding Officer of the subordinate court of the facts which in his opinion render the order necessary and the District Magistrate or the District Judge, as the case may be, may, after considering such statement, countersign the order or decline to countersign it.

4- How a declaration that a person confined in prison unfit to be removed is to be made.- Where the person named in any order made under Section 3 appears to be unfit to be removed for reasons given in Section 6, the Superintendent of Prison in which he is confined shall apply to the District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the prison is situate, and if such Magistrate by writing under his hand, declares himself to be of opinion that the person, named in the order is unfit to be removed for reason mentioned in Section 6, the Superintendent of the Prison may abstain from carrying out the order and shall send to the court from which the orders had been issued a statement of reasons for so abstaining.

5- How a process is to be served on a prisoner.- When any process directed to any person confined in any prison is issued from any criminal or civil court, it may be served by exhibiting to the Superintendent of Prison the original of the process and deposing with him a copy thereof.

6- Process served to be transmitted at the prisoner's request.- (1) Every Superintendent of Prison upon whom service is made under rules shall, as soon as may be, cause a copy of the process deposited with him to be shown and explained to the person to whom it is directed, and shall thereupon make an endorsement on the process and sign a certificate to the effect that such person as aforesaid is confined in the prison under his charge and that he has been shown and explained the contents of the process.

(2) Such certificate as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the service of the process, and if the person to whom the process is directed, requests that the copy shown and explained to him be sent to any other person and provides the cost of sending it by post, the Superintendent of Prison shall cause it to be so sent.

7- Procedure for regulating the escort of prisoners to and from courts in which their attendance is required and for their custody during the period of such attendance.- The duty of escorting prisoners to and from the court in which their attendance is required shall be performed by the Police.

8- The strength of the escort shall be as follows on ordinary occasions:

Strength

Number of Prisoners Head Constables Constables

1 to 3 prisoners ... ... ... 2

4 to 6 prisoners ... ... ... 3

7 to 10 prisoners ... ... 1 4

11 to 15 prisoners ... ... 2 5

16 to 25 prisoners ... ... 2 8

26 to 50 prisoners ... ... 3 10

Provided that when under trial prisoners are excused from wearing hand cuffs the strength of their escort shall be two constables for each under trial prisoner with head constables as in the scale above except for journeys made in police vans when the usual strength of escort may suffice :

Provided further that where an escort is required of a notorious criminal, a special guard as may be prescribed shall be supplied.

9- In escorting prisoners by road the escort commander shall -

(1) keep all prisoners under his charge together in one compact body;

(2) place all police under his charge in order at a distance of at least five paces from the prisoners on each flank and place himself and half the force in the rear;

(3) never travel at night unless absolutely necessary and previously authorized; and

(4) regulate marches so as, if possible, to locate prisoners at night in a lock-up or in the interior of a police station or other place of security.

10- The handcuffing and fettering of convicted prisoners and under-trial prisoners while traveling by rail or road shall be regulated as below :

A-Convicted Prisoners

(a) Handcuffs.-Handcuffs shall be imposed on convicted prisoners when traveling by rail or road as below :

(1) Male prisoners in the superior class, who have been sentenced to more than two years' rigorous imprisonment, shall be handcuffed.

(2) Other prisoners in the superior class shall not be handcuffed unless the Superintendent of Police for special reasons, to be recorded in writing orders otherwise.

(3) Male prisoners in the ordinary class shall ordinarily be handcuffed.

(4) Female prisoners shall not be handcuffed unless it is essential to prevent escape, violence, or suicide; where handcuffs are imposed on such prisoners, reasons therefor shall be recorded in writing by the Senior Police Officer at headquarters :

Provided that any general or special order issued by State Government from time to time in regard to the handcuffing of any particular prisoner or class of prisoners shall be followed.

(b) Fetters. - (1) Convicts in the superior class who have been sentenced to not more than two years rigorous imprisonment, shall, when traveling by rail or road, wear neither fetters nor cross-bars unless the Superintendent of Police for special reasons, to be recorded in writing, requires the imposition of the either-or the both. Such prisoners may be allowed to wear their own clothes in transit if they so desire.

(2) When travelling by rail or road other convicts when convicted of any of the offences specified below shall wear fetters and, if considered necessary either by the Superintendent of Jail or the Superintendent of Police, cross-bars also. Offences punishable under Sections 224, 225-B, 302, 303, 304, 307, 308, 392 to 402, Indian Penal Code.

(3) Female prisoners shall not wear fetters or cross-bars.

(4) The Superintendent of Jail in applying for the Police escort shall enter in the requisition from the name, offence, sentence, and classification of any convict whom he does not propose to fetter and who has been allowed to wear private clothes.

B-Undertrial Prisoners

(1) In the case of undertrial prisoners requisitioned by the police for attendance in court or before a Magistrate or under the authority of a competent Magistrate for any other purpose the responsibility for deciding as to which undertrial prisoners are to be handcuffed or fettered or both, and for seeing that the decision is carried out shall rest with police authorities :

Provided that undertrial prisoners charged with offences shown in the following Schedule shall not be handcuffed when in transit by rail or road or from or to courts there is reasonable ground for apprehending escape-violence or suicide and where possible, the orders of the Superintendent of Police or of any other Senior Police Officer at the headquarters have been taken with the reasons for imposing handcuffs :

Provided further that all undertrial prisoners charged with offences other than those specified below shall be handcuffed when in transit if there is reasonable ground for apprehension that handcuffs are necessary to prevent escape, violence, or suicide :

Provided further that any general or special orders issued by the State Government from time to time in regard to the handcuffing of any particular prisoner or class of prisoners shall be followed.

Indian Penal Code.-Chapters V-A, VI, and VIII, Sections 153-A to 160, Chapter IX except Sections 170 and 171, Chapters IX-A and X, Chapter XI except for Sections 216-A, 224, 225, 225-B and 226, Chapters XIII, XIV and XV, Sections 312 to 316,323, 334 to 338, 341 to 352, 355 to 358, 384 to 389, 403, 404,421 to 434, 447 and 448, Chapters XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI and XXII, all non-cognizable offences.

Code of Criminal Procedure.-Persons against whom proceedings under Section 108 are in progress.

Other Acts.-All non-cognizable offences.

(2) All undertrial prisoners handcuffed shall, as far as possible, be kept separate from those not handcuffed when escorted to and from jail.

(3) In court, handcuffs of undertrials shall invariably be taken off unless the presiding officer directs otherwise.

(4) In the case of undertrial prisoner charged with murder, fetters shall not. be imposed when in transit to courts at the headquarters of the District, unless the prisoner concerned is also charged with some other crime of violence, or is known to be a dangerous or hardened criminal.

(5) Fetters shall not be imposed on undertrial prisoners in transit, except in the case of those charged with murder or dacoity and unless there are special reasons for doing so, to be recorded in writing by the Senior Police Officer at headquarters.

(6) Female undertrial prisoners shall not be handcuffed unless it is essential to prevent escape, violence of suicide, where handcuffs are imposed, reasons therefor shall be recorded in writing by the Senior Police Officer at headquarters.

11- The public prosecutor shall arrange for the production of undertrial prisoners before courts on the proper dates, and for their safe escort to and from the courts. When the attendance of undertrial prisoners is required at courts he shall send to the Superintendent of Jail concerned a list of such prisoners and shall give clear directions on the list as to which prisoners are in his opinion to be handcuffed or fettered or both, and whether cross-bars are also necessary in any case. The public prosecutor shall also determine the strength of the escort with reference to the scale given in Rule 8 above and with due regard to the character of the prisoners and the number of courts in which they are to be produced. The public prosecutor shall apply to the reserve inspector for the necessary number of police. Where he considers that the escort should be wholly or partly armed with muskets, he shall obtain the orders of the Superintendent of Police, or in his absence, of the Senior Police Officer at headquarters.

12- The public prosecutor shall furnish the escort commander with two copies of the list of prisoners in the prescribed police form No. 278 or, if possible he shall also send one copy to the Superintendent of Jail on the evening preceding the day on which the prisoners are required. The escort commander after making the search of the prisoners and satisfying himself that the directions with regard to fetters, etc. have been carried out and also personally complying with the directions with regard to handcuffs, etc. shall sign one copy of the list which shall be retained by the jail authorities concerned.

13- From the time of the delivery of the prisoners the responsibility for their safe custody shall rest with the escort commander until their return to the jail and endorsement by the Jailor of a certificate on the list to the effect that the prisoners have returned in security to the jail or have not returned owing to good and sufficient cause. The Public Prosecutor shall make such additions and alterations as may be necessary for the list before the prisoners are returned to jail.

14- Prisoners whom it is necessary to handcuff shall be handcuffed before leaving the jail. The handcuffs shall not be removed except when the prisoners are before the court or confined in a place of security.

15- Convicted prisoners and undertrial prisoners in the court of a Magistrate in camp shall be kept at night in the lock-up of a police station if there is any such station within five miles. When they are kept at night elsewhere other than in a lock-up they shall be fastened to each other by chains which should be procured by the escort commander from the jail before departure. When prisoners in a weak state of health have to be provided with conveyance, a dolimay or ordinarily be provided for such prisoners.

The escort commander in charge of the prisoners shall be responsible subject to the orders of the Magistrate, for their protection from the weather and for their transport and food.

16- Prisoners shall be escorted to the courts and back again to the jail by the nearest route, but as far as possible, bazars and crowded thoroughfares should be avoided.

17- When female prisoners are produced in courts, they shall not be sent along with the ordinary havalat guard; separate guards shall be provided.

Where jails are situated at a distance from courts prisoners will ordinarily be conveyed to and from courts in Government vehicles, unless it is not possible to supply such a conveyance.

Any prisoner who wants to travel in a separate conveyance and is willing to pay for himself as well as for his escort may be permitted by the public prosecutor to do so provided a suitable arrangement can conveniently be made.

19- All prisoners whose cases have been disposed of and who have to be sent back to the jail shall, as far as may be possible, be sent there without being kept waiting for others.

20- The public prosecutor shall apply to the reserve inspector for an additional guard if the guard in attendance is not sufficient.

21- In the case of prisoners whose testimony is required in criminal trials the charges on account of the dieting of the prisoners during their retention in the custody of the police guard, or on account of any traveling expenses incurred by the guard for their own journey or for that of the prisoners to or from the court concerned will be defrayed by the Police Department. But it shall be in the competency of any court in criminal cases to decline to summon any prisoner if the court is satisfied that his evidence is not necessary for the interest of public justice, and if the complainant or defendant applying for the said prisoner's examination before the court fails to deposit the estimated cost of conveying the prisoner to and from the court. These costs shall be calculated on the scale hereinafter laid down in the case of civil suits; if on examination of the said prisoner the court is of the opinion that his evidence was not required in the interest of public justice, the deposited costs shall together with a certificate to the effect under the hand and seal of the court, be forwarded to the Superintendent of Police of the district in which the court is held, and the money shall be credited according to the instructions to be issued by the Inspector-General of Police with the sanction of the State Government.

22- Deposit of costs.- In civil suits the court shall require any party to the suit, who may apply for the summoning of any prisoner under the Act to deposit prior to the issue of the summons, an amount sufficient to defray the estimated cost of conveyance, diet, and escort of the prisoner whose testimony is required :

Provided that no costs shall be demanded from pauper judgment-debtors in jail who have applied to be declared insolvent under Section 6 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, and whose attendance is required by a civil court at its own instance for examination under Section 14 of the said Act, or when the court is satisfied that the parties to the suit are absolutely unable to pay.

Such costs shall be calculated as follows :

(a) Conveyance by rail or road ... Actual charges as in Rule 21.

(b) Diet ... 50 paise per day when escorting in the plains and 75 paise when escorting in the hill tracts.

Police Escort

Traveling and daily allowance ... According to Rules 23 and 27 of the Financial Handbook, Volume III.

Pay of escort ... According to paragraph 158 of the Office Manual in which the rates are as follows :

Inspectors Rs. 12 per day, Sub-Inspectors Rs. 8 per day, Head Constables Rs. 5 per day. Constables Rs. 3 per day.

The money thus deposited shall be paid over by the court to the Superintendent of Police as provided for in Rule 21.

23- The above rules shall, mutatis mutandis, be applicable in the cases of those prisoners also who are sent for to answer charges made against them, as well as in the cases of prisoners who are sent for to give evidence in criminal trials :

Provided that in both classes of cases aforesaid the Police Department shall bear the charges of dieting the prisoners and of conveying them to and from the courts, which require their presence.

Conclusion-

This is an consolidated attempt to discuss various provisions in respect of production of prisoner in a one roof . the all enactment and rules which is relevant for this regard has been the same by which the legal professional easily short out their problems through this article. it is also pertinent to note here the article is being updated from time to time if any new announcement or amendment in any enactment has taken place.

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Saturday, November 28, 2020

suit valuation and court fees act: a comprehensive approach

Suits valuation and court fees act: a comprehensive approach

Vandana Singh Katiyar and Vijay Kumar Katiyar

प्रस्तावना -

वादों के मूल्यांकन व न्याय शुल्क की अवधारणा एक व्यापक व जटिल अवधारणा है। चूँकि इससे सम्बंधित विधियों का संहिताकरण तो किया जा चुका किन्तु राज्यवार किये गए संशोधनों के कारण इससे सम्बंधित अधिनियमों के प्रावधान अत्यधिक जटिल हो गए है। न्यायाधीशों, अधिवक्ताओं के द्वारा कई वर्षों की प्रैक्टिस के बाद भी इस कानून के प्रावधान ठीक से समझ में नहीं आते है। जहाँ तक विधि के विद्यार्थियों का प्रश्न है तो उनके हिसाब से इस बावत अधिनियमों के जो प्रावधान उपलब्ध है व और भी जटिल हो जाते है क्योंकि उक्त विषय से सम्बंधित प्रवधान सिद्धांत के स्थान पर व्यवहार में ज्यादा समझने योग्य हैं। लेखकगण के विचार से विद्यार्थियों में व्यावहारिक ज्ञान की परिपक्वता का स्तर न्यायाधीशों व अधिवक्ताओं की तुलना में कमतर है। इस आलेख में लेखकगण के द्वारा यह प्रयास किया जा रहा की वाद के मूल्यांकन व न्यायशुल्क के बावत विधि की समस्त संकल्पनाओं को सरल से सरल शब्दों में समझाया जा सके। इसी वजह से इस आलेख में हिंदी भाषा का प्रयोग किया जा रहा है , लेकिन व्यावहारिक समझ परिक्वता को प्राप्त कर सके इस लिए माननीय उच्चत्तम व माननीय उच्च न्यायालयों के निर्णायों को यथा स्थान निर्णय की भाषा में ही उद्धृत किया गया है।

विधिक प्रावधान -

वाद मूल्यांकन एवं न्याय शुल्क से सम्बंधित संकल्पना को विस्तार से समझने के लिए अधोलिखित अधिनियमों की जानकारी पाठको को होना आवश्यक है जो इस प्रकार है :

1-The Court Fees Act,1870

2- Suits valuation Act, 1887

3- Uttar Pradesh Suits valuation Rules,1942

4- The Uttar Pradesh Court Fees (Remission) Act, 1950

5- The Uttar Pradesh Court Fees ( payment in cash) Act, 1975

संपत्ति का वर्गीकरण -

वाद के मूल्याङ्कन तथा न्यायशुल्क की अवधारणा को सही से समझने के लिए यह आवश्यक है कि संपत्ति की मोटी-मोटी संकल्पना व उसके वर्गीकरण को जानना आवश्यक है क्योंकि कोई भी वाद यदि धारा- 9 जा० दी० के परिप्रेक्ष्य में देखा जाय तो या तो किसी संपत्ति से सम्बंधित होता है या किसी पद से सम्बंधित होता है। चूँकि ज्यादातर वाद किसी न किसी संपत्ति से सम्बंधित होते हैं ऐसे में संपत्ति के कितने भेद हो सकते है यह तथ्य संज्ञान में रहना आवश्यक है। संपत्ति को यदि मोटे तौर पर विभाजित किया जाय तो मुख्यता दो भागों में विभाजित कर सकते हैं। चल संपत्ति अर्थात जंगम संपत्ति तथा अचल संपत्ति अर्थात स्थावर संपत्ति। चल अर्थात जंगम संपत्ति के मुख्य रूप से दो विभाजन किये जा सकते हैं, यथा-धन अर्थात मुद्रा तथा धन से इतर चल संपत्ति। इसी प्रकार अचल अर्थात स्थावर संपत्ति को भी दो उप विभागों में विभाजित किया जा सकता है क्रमशः- मूर्त अचल संपत्ति तथा अमूर्त अचल संपत्ति। मूर्त स्थावर संपत्ति के अंतर्गत भूमि, भवन तथा बाग आदि सम्मलित होते हैं। मूर्त अचल संपत्ति को आप देख सकते है तथा स्पर्श कर सकते हैं। दूसरी तरफ अमूर्त स्थावर संपत्ति में कॉपी राइट, पेटेंट तथा गुडविल सम्मलित होते है जिन्हें न तो आँखों से देखा जा सकता है और न ही स्पर्श किया जा सकता है। सुविधा के लिए इसे अधोलिखित रेखाचित्र के माध्यम से प्रदर्शित किया जा रहा है।

वादों के मूल्यांकन का उद्देश्य -

अगला प्रश्न यह है कि वाद के मूल्यांकन का उद्देश्य क्या है अर्थात वाद का मूल्याङ्कन किया जाना क्यों आवश्यक है ? जैसा की विदित है कि न्यायिक व्यवस्था में प्रत्येक न्यायालय अपने एक निश्चित सोपान पर स्थित होता है और यदि यह निश्चित सोपान न बनाया गया होता तो यह सुनिश्चित करना कठिन हो जाता कि कौन सा वाद किस न्यायालय में संस्थित किया जायेगा। इससे अनिश्चितता की स्थिति उत्पन्न हो जाती और इसी प्रकार हम यह भी तय नहीं कर पाते की किस वाद में कितना न्यायशुल्क अदा करना है। उपर्युक्त विश्लेषण से यह स्पष्ट है कि मुख्यता दो उद्देश्यों से वाद का मूल्यांकन किया जाता है। प्रथम यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए की वाद किस न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के अंतर्गत आएगा तथा एक विशिष्ट वाद में कितना न्यायशुल्क अदा करना है। साधरण शब्दों में यदि कहा जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है की आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार सुनिश्चित करने के लिए तथा न्यायशुल्क की गणना के लिए किया जाता है। सुविधा के लिए इसे अधोलिखित रेखाचित्र के माध्यम से प्रदर्शित किया जा रहा है।

क्या वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के प्रावधान माननीय उच्च न्यायालय पर लागू होंगे -

यह आवश्यक प्रश्न है की क्या माननीय उच्च न्यायालय पर वाद मूल्याङ्कन तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के प्रावधान लागू होंगे। इस सम्बन्ध में लेखक के विचार से उत्तर सकरात्मक है। अर्थात उक्त अधिनियमों के प्रावधान माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के समक्ष लंबित मामलों पर लागू होंगे। इस हेतु निम्न लिखित प्रावधानों तथा विधि व्यवस्था का उल्लेख आवश्यक है-

CHAPTER-VIII HIGH COURTS RULES -1952

40. Court fee to be paid in cases coming up before the Court :- Court fees shall be payable in cases coming before the Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from judgment passed by it in the exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction to the extent to, and the manner in which they are payable in similar classes of cases coming before it, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

CHAPTER-XI HIGH COURTS RULES -1952

3. Office report :- No memorandum of appeal or objections under Rule 22 or 26 of Order XLI of the Code and no application for revision shall be presented unless it bears an office report specifying--

(a)in the case of memorandum of appeal or objections, or an application for revision, that it is within time or, if beyond time, the period by which it is beyond time;

(b)whether the case is or is not such as may be heard by a Judge sitting alone;

(e)where court-fee is payable, whether the court-fee paid is sufficient and in case it is deficient, the extent of such deficiency; and

(f) whether it is drawn up in accordance with these Rules, or other law and, if not, in what manner it is defective. Where a report under clause (e) cannot be made without an examination of the record, the office shall state that a further report would be made on receipt of the record

4. Objection as to court-fee to be decided by Taxing Officer :- If the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, or his Advocate contests the office report as to court-fee, he shall, before presenting the application or memorandum of appeal or objections, take it to the Taxing Officer for the determination of his objection and the Taxing Officer shall determine it forthwith. If the Taxing Officer decides that there is a deficiency in the amount of court-fee paid, the appellant or the applicant as the case may be, shall make good such deficiency before presenting the memorandum or application in Court : Provided that if limitation is about to expire and the time is too short to enable the appellant to make good such deficiency, he may present the memorandum of appeal or application in Court and make good such deficiency within such time as may be allowed by the Court. If the Taxing Officer is unable to decide such objection forthwith and the limitation is about to expire, the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, may obtain from him an endorsement to that effect and may thereafter present such memorandum or application in Court.

5. Final report as to court-fees in First Appeal :- In every first Appeal the record shall be examined by the office as soon as may be after it has been received and a final report made as to the sufficiency of court-fees.

6. Procedure in case of insufficiently stamped documents :- (1) whenever on an examination of the record under the last preceding Rule, or otherwise, the Stamp Reporter or any other officer appointed in this behalf, finds that a document has been filed without being properly stamped, he shall make a report to that effect indicating the precise amount of deficiency and such report shall be shown to the Advocate of the party concerned. (2) Such Advocate shall at once initial the report and note thereon whether or not he contests the accuracy thereof. If he contests it, he shall within three weeks or such further time as the Taxing Officer may allow, file his grounds of objection. If no such note is made or no such objection is filed within time, he shall be deemed to have accepted the report. 5 9 (3) Where the deficiency relates to a document received in Court, the Taxing Officer shall decide such objection. (4) Where the deficiency relates to a document received in a lower Court, the report together with the objection shall after notice to the Standing Counsel be laid before the Court for orders. 7. Defective application .

Shyam Singh vs Meerut Mandal Vikas Nigam, AIR 1998 Allahabad 127

(7) FROM R. 40 Ch. 8 and the provisions contained in Rr. 4, 5 and 6 of Ch. XI of the Rules of Court it is clear that the Court-fee is paid on the documents filed in this Court under the provisions of the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 4 provides that no document of any of the kinds specified in the first or second Schedule to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fees, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original Civil Jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction; unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document. Section 4 further refers to various other jurisdictions exercised by this Court. Clause (e) of Article 1 of Schedule II of the Act prescribes the Court-fee for various documents which are presented before the High Court.

On the combined study of the Rule-40 of chapter-VIII, Rule-3,4,5&6 of chapter XI OF the High court rules and section- 2,3,4 & 5 court fee act and schedule-I &II of court fee act , It is well established that provisions of the above mentioned enactment is applicable upon proceedings of the High court-

वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम के सुसंगत प्रावधान -

वाद मूल्यांकन व न्यायशुल्क की अवधारणा को सही तरीके से विश्लेषित करने के लिए वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम के आवश्यक प्रावधानों का उल्लेख किया जाना यहाँ उचित प्रतीत होता है। यह प्रावधान इस प्रकार है -

Sec-4 Valuation of certain suits for the purposes of jurisdiction -

Suits mentioned in paragraphs IV(a), IVA, IVB, V, VA, VB, VI, VIA; VIII and X(d) of section 7 and Arts. 17, 18 and 19 of Sch. II of the Court-fees Act, 1870, as in force for the time being in the Uttar Pradesh, shall be valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, or at the amount involved in or affected by or the title to which is affected by the relief sought, and such value shall, in the case of land, be deemed to be the value as determinable in accordance with the rules framed under section 3.” [Vide U.P. Act 7 of 1939, sec.3 (w.e.f. 16-7-1939).]

न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-4 में उपर्युक्त वर्णित प्रावधान उत्तर प्रदेश संशोधन अधिनियम के माध्यम से जोड़े गए हैं। इस धारा के अंतर्गत यह उपबंधित किया गया है कि वादों की वह प्रकृति जो इस धारा में वर्णित है, के आलोक में वाद का मूल्याङ्कन कैसे किया जायेगा। स्वयं यह धारा प्रावधानित करती है की वादों का मूल्यांकन आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के बावत वाद की विषयवस्तु के बाजारी मूल्य पर किया जायेगा, यदि वाद की विषयवस्तु भूमि है तो वाद का मूल्यांकन इसी अधिनियम की धारा-3 के अधीन विरचित नियमों के अधीन किया जायेगा। धारा-3 यह भी प्रावधानित करती है कि आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के बावत किया गया वाद (धारा-4 की परिधि में आने वाले वादों ) का मूल्यांकन न्याय शुल्क अदा करने के बावत किये गए मूल्यांकन से कम नहीं होगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के बावत किया गया बाद का मूल्यांकन न्यायशुल्क के बावत किये गए मूल्यांकन से अधिक हो सकता है लेकिन कम नहीं हो सकता है। धारा- के आलोक में उत्तर प्रदेश वादों का मूल्यांकन नियमावली,1942 विरचित की जा चुकी ,जिसके नियम 3 लगायत 6 में भूमि,भवन तथा वन के बावत वादग्रस्त संपत्ति के मूल्यांकन न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के परिप्रेक्ष्य में किया गया है। जैसा की विदित है की न्याय शुल्क के बावत वादग्रस्त विषयवस्तु का मूल्याङ्कन किस प्रकार किया जाय इसका प्रावधान न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 में किया गया है। लेखक के विचार से यहाँ पर वादों के मूयांकन अधिनियम की धारा-3 तथा वादों के मूल्याङ्कन नियमावली, 1942 के नियम-3 लगायत 6 का उल्लेख आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है। जो इस प्रकार हैं -

3- Power for State Government to make rules determining value of land for jurisdictional purposes.—

(1)The [State Government] may make rules for determining the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction in the suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870),“as in force for the time being in United Provinces” section 7, paragraphs v and VA, VB.

“Provided that such rules shall provide that the value of land for the purposes of jurisdiction shall in no case be less than the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees.” [Vide Uttar Pradesh Act 7 of 1939, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 16-7-1939).]

(2)The rules may determine the value of any class of land, or of any interest in land, in the whole or any part of a local area, and may prescribe different values for different places within the same local area. state amendments

Uttar pradesh suits valuation rules, 1942-

3-Suits for possession of land, buildings and gardens. -

In suits for the possession of land, the value of the land for purposes of jurisdiction shall be determined as follows :

(a) where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government or forms part of such estate and such part is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue, and such revenue, is permanently settled-Fifty five times the annual revenue so payable;

(b) where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government or forms part of such estate and such part is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue, and such revenue is not permanently settled-thirty times the annual revenue so payable;

(c) where the land pays no annual revenue or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with a fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint-

(i) fifty-five or thirty times the nominal annual revenue when such revenue has been assessed according as the land is in a permanently or temporarily settled area ; or

(ii) where no such nominal revenue has been assessed, twenty times the annual average of such net profits ;

but where no such profits have arisen from the lands, twenty times the annual average net profits of similar land for the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint;

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and does not come under the clause (a), (b) or (c) of this rule -fifty-five or thirty times the annual revenue payable in respect of such a land according as the land is in a permanently or temporarily settled area ;

(e) where there are also buildings or a gardens on the land the aggregate of the value of the land as determined in accordance with these rules plus the market value of such buildings or gardens situated thereon.

4. Suits for possession of superior proprietary, under-proprietary and sub-proprietary rights in land. -

The value of the suits for the purposes of jurisdiction in suits for possession-

(a) of superior proprietary rights where under-proprietary or sub-proprietary rights exist in the land shall be twenty times the annual net profits of the superior proprietor;

(b) of under-proprietary land as such shall be twenty times the annual under-proprietary or sub-proprietary rent, as the case may be, recorded in the Collector's register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint.

If no such rent is recorded in the Collector's register, the value shall be determined by multiplying by twenty such rents for similar land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint.

5. Suits between rival tenants and by tenants against trespasser-

The value of suits for purposes of jurisdiction in suits for possession of land between rival tenants and by tenants against trespassers shall-

(a) where the land is the land of a permanent tenure-holder or a fixed rate tenant, be thirty times the annual rent recorded in the Collector's register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint;

(b) where the land is the land of an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenant or to a tenant holding on special terms in Oudh, be twelve times such rent;

(d) where the land is the land of any other tenant, be six times such rent.

If no such rent is recorded in the Collector's register, the value shall be determined by multiplying the annual average rent of similar land for three years next before the presentation of the plaint, by thirty, twelve, eight and six accordingly as the class of tenancy affected is governed by clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) of this rule.

6. Suits for possession of rent free grants. -

(1) The value of suits for the purposes of jurisdiction in suits for possession of a rent-free grant or a grant of land held at favourable rate of rent shall be thirty times, the annual average rent payable by occupancy tenants for similar land for the three years next before the presentation of the plaint.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, the value of land for purposes of jurisdiction shall in no case be less than the value as determined for computation of Court fees.

लेखक के विचार से यहाँ यह भी आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम, १८८७ की धारा ४ में वर्णित वादों का स्पष्ट रूप से उल्लेख किया जाना उचित होगा जिससे यह तथ्य संज्ञान में रहे की वे कौन-कौन से वाद है जो इस धारा की कोटि में आते है और इन वादों का मूल्यांकन क्षेत्राधिकार तथा न्याय शुल्क अदा करने की दृष्टि से किस प्रकार से किया जायेगा। इस धारा आने वाले वादों की कोटि निम्नवत है :-

Suits which is comes within the purview of the sec-4 suit valuation act - 1887 -

01- For declaratory decree with consequential relief - (IV)(a).
02- For cancellation or adjudging void instrument and decree- (IV-A).
03- For Easement, Injunction, Establish or set aside Adoption & set aside an award other than sec-8 of this act.- (IV-B)
04- For possession of Land, Building and Garden- (V)
05- For possession of superior proprietary and under proprietary land- (V-A)
06- Possessory suits between tenants- (V-B)
07- To enforce a right of pre-emption- (VI)
08- For partition- (VI-A)
09- To set aside or to restore an attachment- (VIII)
10- For specific performance of an award- (X)(d)
11- Suits or appeal to alter or set aside summary decision or order, to alter cancel an entry in a register of the name of the proprietors of revenue paying estates, to obtain declaratory decree without consequential relief, for relief u/s 14 of the religious Endowment act,1863,or u/s 91 & 92 CPC. For every other suits not otherwise provided for those act- ( Article-17 schedule-II)
12- Application u/s 14 or 20 of the Arbitration act, 1940 or an application to set aside an award under this act, other application under Arbitration act, 1940- ( Art-18 sch-II)
13- Agreement in writing stating a question for the opinion of the court under CPC- ( Art-19, sch-II)

Conclusion on sec- 4 of the suit valuation act-

1- It is well established that the suits which is mentioned in the sec-4 shall be valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at the market value of the property involved in or affected by the relief sought and such value in case of amount or movable property would be market value and in case of land would be determine rule framed under sec-3 of this act, It means that market value of the land would be determine according to the rule-3,4,5 & 6 of the Uttar Pradesh valuation rules,1942.

2- The valuation of the suits in respect of court fees would be determine on the basis of the sec-7 of the court fees act or on the basis of the II schedule of this act . It means that court Fees would be either fixed by the II schedule or by sec-7 of the court fees act.

3- The combined reading of the sec-3 & 4 it is very clear that the value of the land for the purpose of jurisdiction shall in no case be less than the value as determinable for the computation of court fees. It means that valuation in respect of jurisdiction may be increase or same .

8-Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits-

Where in suits other than those referred to in, section-4, court-fees are payable ad-valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), “as in force for the time being in the Uttar Pradesh”the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.

वादों का मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा ४ में उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य की ओर से संसोधन करते हुए यह जोड़ा गया की वह वाद जो इस अधिनियम की धारा-४ की कोटि में आते है उन वादों को छोड़कर कर शेष कोटि के वादों में न्यायशुल्क ad-valorem अदा करना होगा तथा न्यायलय के क्षेत्राधिकार तथा न्यायशुल्क अदा करने के बावत वाद का मूल्याङ्कन सामान होगा। इस अभिप्राय यह है की यदि इस अधिनियम की धारा-८ तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-७ को समेकित रूप से पढ़ा जाये तो स्पष्ट रूप से यह कहा जा सकता है कि जंगम संपत्ति, भवन व बाग के बावत विवादित संपत्ति का मूल्यांकन क्षेत्राधिकार व न्यायशुल्क अदा करने के बावत बाज़ारी मूल्य पर किया जायेगा जबकि भूमि के अलोक में वाद का दोनों आधारों पर मूल्यांकन न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-७ की उपधारा-V,VA,VB के आधार पर किया जायेगा तथा न्यायशुल्क इसी अधिनियम की अनुसूची - I के अनुसार ad-valorem अदा किया जायेगा।

यहाँ पर इस तथ्य का उल्लेख किया जाना भी आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि धारा-८ वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की कोटि में कौन-कौन से वाद आते है। इनका विवरण निम्नवत है :-

Suits comes within the purview of sec-8 of suit valuation act, 1887

01- For money- (I)

02- For maintenance and annuities- (ii-a)

03- For reduction and enhancement of maintenance and annuities (ii-b)

04- For restitution of conjugal rights - ( iv-C)(a)

05- For marital rights- ( iv-C)(b)

06- For guardianship- ( iv-C)(c)

07- To redeem in respect of mortgage property (ix)

08- To foreclose in respect of mortgage property- (IX-A)

09- Specific performance of a contract of sale, mortgage, lease- (X)(a),(b) & (c)

10- Between landlord and tenant – (XI)

11- Suit mentioned in Article- 1,2,2-A, 5, 5,11,12, of the schedule-I of the court fee act,1870

Conclusion on sec-8 of suit valuation act,1887

1- Plain reading of the sec -8 of the suit valuation act and sec-7 and schedule 1st of the court fees act it is clear that valuation of the suits in respect jurisdiction as well as computation of court fees would be the same.

2- Court fees in respect of sec-8 suit valuation act and suit mentioned in schedule-1st of the court fees act would be Ad valorem

3- Computation of the court would be determined on the basis of sec-7 , 1st schedule of the and table in respect of Ad valorem fees annexed with schedule 1st of the court fees act, 1870.

वादों के प्रकार :-

वादों का मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-४, ८ तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-७ तथा अनुसूची - I व II को समेकित रूप से विश्लेषित किया जाये तो न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार तथा न्यायशुल्क की गणना की दृष्टि से वादों को अधोलिखित भागों में विभाजित किया जा सकता है :-

१- वे वाद जिनमें निर्धारित (fixed) न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है।

२- वे वाद जिनमें Ad-valorem न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है।

3- मिश्रित प्रकृति के वाद।

१- वे वाद जिनमें निर्धारित (fixed) न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है-

वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-4 तथा न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 व अनुसूची-II का समेकित रूप से विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि प्रथम प्रकार के वाद वे होते हैं जिनमे निर्धारित न्याय शुल्क अदा करना होता है। मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-4 में इन वादों की कोटि का स्पष्ट उल्लेख किया गया है , जिसकी सूची आलेख के ऊपरी भाग में दी गयी है। जैसा की विदित है कि इस प्रकार के वादों में वादग्रस्त संपत्ति का मूल्यांकन न्यायालय के क्षेत्राधिकार व न्याय शुल्क की गणना को लेकर भिन्न-भिन्न हो सकता है, लेकिन यहाँ यह ध्यान रहे की वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-3 के परन्तुक के अनुसार इस कोटि के वादों का क्षेत्राधिकार के प्रकाश में किया गया वाद का मूल्यांकन न्याय शुल्क की गणना के बावत किये गए मूल्यांकन से कम नहीं हो सकता है लेकिन अधिक या सामान हो सकता है। न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की अनुसूची-II के अनुसार इस कोटि के वादों पर निर्धारित न्याय शुल्क देय है। वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-4 तथा न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 को साथ-साथ पढ़ने से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि यदि विवादित संपत्ति चल अथवा भवन व बाग है तो ऐसी संपत्ति का मूल्याङ्कन, चाहे आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार हो अथवा न्याय शुल्क की गणना दोनों की दृष्टि से बाजारी मूल्य पर किया जायेगा। लेकिन यदि संपत्ति भूमि है तो आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के बावत ऐसी संपत्ति का मूल्याङ्कन, उत्तर प्रदेश वाद मूल्याङ्कन नियमावली, १९४२ के नियम-3 लगायत 6 के अधीन किया जायेगा तथा न्यायशुल्क अदायगी के बावत न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-७ की उपधारा-V,VA & VB के आधार पर किया जायेगा। इस कोटि के वादों में न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 तथा अनुसूची-II के आधार पर की जाएगी। यह न्याय शुल्क निर्धारित अर्थात fixed होगा।

२- वे वाद जिनमें Ad-valorem न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है-

वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-8 तथा न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 व अनुसूची-I का समेकित रूप से विश्लेषण किया जाये तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि द्वितीय प्रकार के वाद वे होते हैं जिनमे Ad-valorem न्याय शुल्क अदा करना होता है। इस कोटि के वादों में आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार तथा न्याय शुल्क की गणना दोनों के बावत वादग्रस्त संपत्ति का मूल्यांकन सामान होता है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि यदि संपत्ति जंगमअर्थात चल अथवा भवन व बाग है तो संपत्ति का मूल्यांकन बाजारी मूल्य पर किया जाता है। लेकिन यदि संपत्ति भूमि है तो उसका मूल्यांकन न्याय शुल्क अधिनयम की धारा-7 की उपधारा-V,VA & VB के आधार पर किया जायेगा। जहाँ तक न्याय शुल्क अदा करने का प्रश्न है तो यह न्याय शुल्क अधिनियम की अनुसूची-I के अधीन किया जायेगा जो Ad-valorem होगा। जैसा कि अनुसूची-I के साथ एक ad-valorem न्याय शुल्क की तालिका दी गयी है जिसमें मु0-30,0000 रु तक का न्यायशुल्क इसी अनुसूची के अनुच्छेद-1 के अनुसार देय है और 30,0000 रु के ऊपर की धनराशि पर प्रत्येक 500 रु पर ३७.50 रु देय होगा। सुविधा के लिए तालिका निम्नवत है-

3- मिश्रित प्रकृति के वाद-

तीसरे कोटि के वाद वे होते है जो यद्यपि कि वादों के मूल्याङ्कन अधिनियम की धारा-४ में वर्णित है अर्थात निर्धारित न्याय शुल्क वाले वादों की कोटि में आते हैं लेकिन एक सीमा के पश्चात् उनकी प्रकृति ad-valorem न्यायशुल्क वाले वादों में परिवर्तित हो जाते है जैसे- डिक्री अथवा दस्तावेजों के निरस्तीकरण के वाद, विभाजन के वाद व घोषणात्मक वाद आदि।

न्यायशुल्क किन-किन दस्तावेजों पर देय है -

यह एक बहुत ही महत्वपूर्ण बिंदु की न्यायशुल्क किन-किन दस्तावेजों पर देय है। इसकी जानकारी यदि विधि का व्यवसाय करने वाले व्यक्तियों को रहेगी जो भ्रांतियां है वह हमेशा निवारित रहेंगी। यदि सम्पूर्ण न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के आधार पर यदि इसका विश्लेषण किया जाय तो यह कहा जा सकता है कि अधो लिखित दस्तावेज हैं जिनपर न्यायशुल्क देय है -

१- दस्तावेज

2- प्रार्थनापत्र/याचिकाएं

3- वाद

१- दस्तावेज -

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-4 व 6 यह प्रावधानित करती हैं कि कोई भी दस्तावेज माननीय उच्च न्यायालय तथा माननीय उच्च न्यायालय से इतर किसी न्यायालय अथवा लोक प्राधिकारी के समक्ष filed,exhibited or recorded बिना किसी न्यायशुल्क के नहीं किया जायेगा। लेकिन यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा कि नक़ल सबाल के लिए जो फोलियो दाखिल किये जाते है वह दस्तावेजों के लिए विहित न्यायशुल्क की परिधि में नहीं आते हैं। दस्तावेजों पर कितना न्यायशुल्क देय होगा इस हेतु न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-4 व 6 के साथ-साथ अनुसूची-I & II की सुसंगत प्रविष्टियों की स्पष्ट उल्लेख नीचे किया जा रहा है -

4. Fees on documents filed, etc., in High Courts in their ordinary or Extraordinary Jurisdiction.—

No document of any of the kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fees, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by, any of the said High Court of judicature of Allahabad in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction; or in the exercise of its ordinary extraordinary original civil & criminal jurisdiction; In their appellate jurisdiction.—or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the 1[judgments (other than judgments passed in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court) or one] or more Judges of the said Court, or of a Division Court;—or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the 2[judgments (other than judgments passed in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court) or one] or more Judges of the said Court, or of a Division Court;" or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendence; as Courts of reference and revision.—or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a Court of reference or revision and writs jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction; unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document.

Fees on documents filed etc., in Mufassil Courts or in Public Office.- (1) Except in the Courts herein before mentioned, no document of any kinds specified as chargeable in the first or second Schedule to this Act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document:

Provided that where such document relates to any suit, appeal or other proceeding under [any law relating to land tenures or land revenue] the fee payable shall be three-quarters of the fee indicated in either of the said Schedules except where the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit, appeal or proceeding to which it relates exceeds Rs. 500 :

Provided further that the fee payable in respect of any such document as is mentioned in the foregoing proviso shall not be less than one and one-fourth of that indicated by either of the said Schedules before the first day of May, 1936.

[Explanation. - Where the amount of fee prescribed in the Schedules contain any fraction of a rupee below [twenty-five naye paise] or above [twenty-five naye paise] but below [fifty naye paise] or above [fifty naye paise] but below [seventy-five naye paise] or above [seventy-five naye paise] but below one rupee, the proper fee shall be an amount rounded off to the next higher quarter of a rupee as hereinafter appearing in the said Schedules.]

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1), a court may receive plaint or memorandum of appeal in respect of which an insufficient fee has been paid, but no such plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be acted upon unless the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, makes good the deficiency in court fee within such time as may from time to time be fixed by the court.

(3) If a question of deficiency in court fee in respect of any plaint or memorandum of appeal is raised by an officer mentioned in Section 24-A the court shall, before proceeding further with the suit or appeal, record a finding whether the court fee paid is sufficient or not. If the court finds that the court fee paid is insufficient, it shall call upon the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, to make good the deficiency within such time as it may fix, and in case of default shall reject the plaint or memorandum of appeal :

Provided that the Court may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded, proceed with the suit or appeal if the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be. gives security, to the satisfaction of the court, for payment of the deficiency in court lee within such further time as the court may allow. In no case, however, shall judgement be delivered unless the deficiency in court fee has been made good, and if the deficiency is not made good within such time as the court may from time to time allow, the court may dismiss, the suit or

(4) Whenever a question of the proper amount of court fee payable is raised otherwise than under sub-section (3), the court shall decide such question before proceeding with any other issue.

(5) In case the deficiency in court fee is made good within the time allowed by the Court, the date of the institution of the suit or appeal shall be deemed to be the date on which the suit was filed or the appeal presented.

(6) In all cases in which the report of the officer referred to in sub-section (3) is not accepted by the Court, a copy of the findings of the court together with a copy of the plaint shall forthwith be sent to the [Commissioner of Stamps]

Schedule-1st, court fees payable on Documents-

6- Copy or translation of a judgement or order not being, or having the force of a decree.When such judgement or order is passed by any Civil Court other than a High Court or by the presiding officer of any Revenue Court or officer, or by any other Judicial or Executive Authority-

(a) If the amount or value of the subject-matter is fifty or less than fifty rupees. [Seventy-five naye paise].

(b) If such amount or value exceeds fifty rupees.[One rupee and fifty naye paise].

When such judgment or order is passed by a High Court. [Three rupees]

7- Copy of a decree or order having the force of a decree.When such decree or order is made by any Civil Court other than a High Court or by any Revenue Court-

(a) If the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit wherein such decree or order is made is fifty or less than fifty rupees.

One rupee and fifty naye paise.

(b) If such amount or value exceeds fifty rupees.-Three rupees

When such decree or order is made by a High Court.-Seven rupees and fifty naye paise.

8-.Copy of any document liable to stamp-duty under the [Indian Stamp Act, 1879]when left by any party to a suit or proceeding in place of the original withdrawn.

(a) When the stamp-duty chargeable on the original does not exceed [one rupee]The amount of the duty chargeable on the original.

(b) In any other case -[One rupee and fifty naye paise].

8-A.- A copy of a power of attorney when filed in any suit or proceedings. One rupee and fifty naye paise].

9.Copy of any revenue or judicial proceeding or order not otherwise provided for by this Act, or copy of any account, statement, report or the like, taken out of any Civil or Criminal or Revenue Court or Office, or from the office of any chief officer charged with the executive administration of a division.

For every three hundred and sixty words or fraction of three hundred and sixty words.

[One rupee]10.[Repealed by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act No. VIII of 1890)].

Schedule-IInd,court fees payable on Documents

Article-6 Furnishing of Bail bond or other instrument under Cr. PC by court order- One Rupee

Article-7 Undertaking under sec-49 of the Indian Divorce Act-One rupee.

Article-10- When any mukhtarnama, vakalatnama, or any paper signed by , an Advocate, Attorney or Pleader for conduct of any one case to signifying or intimating that he is retained by a party. The document required fee as mentioned below-

1- If such document filed any civil or criminal or revenue courts other than High court , the court fee one Rupee and Fifty naye paise would be pay.

2- If such document has been filed before commissioner of Revenue etc than three Rupees shall be pay.

3- If such document has filed before High court than Five Rupees fees shall be pay.

2- प्रार्थनापत्र/याचिकाएं -

दूसरे प्रकार के वे दस्तावेज हैं जिनपर न्यायशुल्क देय होता है। इन दस्तावेजों में प्रकीर्ण प्रार्थनापत्र तथा नाना प्रकार की याचिकाएं(writs ) व पिटीशन आतीं हैं। इन पर न्यायशुल्क अनुसूची-२ के अनुसार देय है। सुविधा के के लिए इन्हें निम्नवत दिया जा रहा है -

Fees on Applications and petitions ( schedule-IInd)

Article-1 Application or petition

(a) When presented to any officer of the Customs or Excise Department or to any Magistrate by any person having dealings with the Government, and when the subject-matter of such application relates exclusively to those dealings;

Or when presented to any officer of land revenue by any person holding temporarily settled land under direct engagement with Government, and when the subject-matter of the application or petition relates exclusively to such engagement;

Or when presented to the District Magistrate or any other officer for the correction of an electoral roll;

Or when presented to any Civil Court other than a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction;

Or to any Court of Small Causes constituted under Act No. XI of 1865 or under Act No. XVI of 1868, section 20 or to a Collector or other officer of revenue in relation to any suit or case in which the amount or value of the subject-matter is less than fifty rupees ;

Or when presented to any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, or to any Board or executive officer for the purpose of obtaining a copy of translation of any judgement, decree or order passed by such Court, Board or officer, or of any other document on record in such Court or office [Fifty naye Paise]

1(b) Application/petition

Application/petition containing a complaint or charge of any offence and presented to any criminal court.

Application/petition under Arms Act, Poison Act, Explosive Act, State Carriage Act, Indian Cinematography Act or any other enactment unless is specifically exempted from payment of court fee.

To deposit in Revenue and Rent

For determination by a court of the amount of the compensation to be paid by a land lord is tenant

One rupee and twenty five naye paise

1(c) When any application or petition presented betfore Chief Commissioner or other Chief Controlling revenue or Executive Authority then fee would three rupees.

1(d) When such application or petition presented before Board of Revenue for revision or a judgment or order then fee would be paid five rupees.

1(e) When any application or petition below mentioned presented before Hon’ble High Court:-

(1) Under the Companies Act, 1956 for the winding up of the company. (One hundred rupees)

(2) Under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution (One hundred rupees)

(3) Special appeal against the judgment or order including a judgment or order passed on a petition before the comments of the Court Fees (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1970 passed by a single judge of the High Court thereon. (One hundred rupees)

(4) For probate or letter of administration to have effect throughout India (Twenty five rupees)

(5) Under Sec. 115 of C.P.C. for revision of an order (Ten rupees)

(6) Under Sec. 11 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 for revision of an order (Two hundred and fifty rupees)

(7) In other case note otherwise provided (Five rupees)

Provided that no Court Fee shall be payable under Cl. (e) on an application or petition under Sec. 491 of the Cr.P.C. or under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the writs in the nature of habeas corpus or in relation to any proceeding relating thereto.

Provided that the Court Fee payable on an application or petition for adjournment of hearing of any case shall be double the court fee payable on an ordinary application or petition under cl. (b), (c), (d) or sub. Cl. (f) of Cl. (e).

Article-1-A Application to any civil court that records may be called for from another court – One rupee and fifty naye paise in addition to any fee levied on the application under clause (a)(b)(c) of the Article-1 of this schedule.

Article-2 Application for leave to sue as a pauper- seventy five naye paise.

Article-3 Application for leave to appeal as a pauper if-

- Before District court- One Rupee and twenty five naye paise

- Before Commissioner or High court – Two Rupees and fifty naye paise

Article-12 Court fees on caveat when the amount or value of the property in respect of which the caveat is lodged-

(a) Does not exceed five thousand rupees- Six rupee and twenty five naye paise.

(b) Exceed five thousand rupee-Twenty rupee and fifty naye paise

Article- 14 Petition in a suit under the converts marriage Dissolution Act, 1866- Nine rupee and fifty naye paise

Article-20 Every petition under Indian Divorce act except sec-44 and every memorandum of appeal under sec 55 same act – Thirty seven rupee and fifty naye paise

Article- 21-A Application petition or memorandum under the special marriage act, 1954 or Hindu marriage act, 1955- Thirty seven rupee and fifty naye paise.

Article-22 Election petition questioning the election of any person-

(a) As a president, vice president of Adhyaksha, upadhyaksha, Nagar pramukh, or upnagar pramukh of a municipal board, Zila parishad or Nagar mahapalika or any other local body except those mentioned in clause (c).- TWO HUNDRED RUPEES

(b) As a sadasya or vishisht sadasay of a nagar mahapalika or as a member of a municipal board or zila parishad or any other local body except those mentioned in clause (d)- ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY RUPEES

(d) As a member of a Notified or Town Area.- TWENTY FIVE RUPEES.

3- वाद -

तीसरी और सबसे महत्वपूर्ण कोटि वादों की है। यहाँ ध्यान रहे वादों के अंतर्गत प्रतिदावा, मुजरा, प्रथम अपील, द्वितीय अपील, लेटर्स पेटेंट अपील तथा माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आलोक में प्रतिआपत्ति (cross objection) समाहित होती हैं। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि कुछ परिस्थियों में बयान तहरीरी अथवा प्रार्थनपत्र भी वाद की प्रकृति में सम्मलित हो जाते है। जैसे - विभाजन के वाद में कोई प्रतिवादी प्रार्थनापत्र प्रस्तुत कर अथवा बयान तहरीरी (written statement) प्रस्तुत कर अपने हिस्से को पृथक करने की प्रार्थना करता है तो उसे वाद अथवा counterclaim के समतुल्य न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होगा। इस हेतु न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की अनुसूची-1 के अनुच्छेद-2A को देखें। सुविधा के लिए तालिका निम्नवत है -

वादों का प्रकृतिवार मूल्यांकन व देय न्यायशुल्क की गणना

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-7 व 8 तथा अनुसूची-I & II तथा वादों के मूल्याङ्कन अधिनियम की धारा-4, 3 व 8 तथा उत्तर प्रदेश वादों के मूल्यांकन नियमावली-1942 के नियम-3 लगायत 6 का अपने संज्ञान में रखना होगा। वादों का मूल्यांकन व न्यायशुल्क की गणना प्रकृतिवार इस प्रकार है -

1-sec-7(i)-Money suits- In suits for money includes suit for damages or compensation or arrears of maintenance or annuities or of other sums payable periodically. according to amount claimed.

2-sec-7(ii-a)- suits for maintenance and annuities – in suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically, according to the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year.

3-sec-7(ii-b)- suits for reduction or enhancement of maintenance and annuities – in suits for reduction and enhancement of maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically, according to the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount sought to be reduced or enhanced for one year.

4-sec-7(iii)- suits for other movable property having a market value - In suits for movable property other than money, where the subject matter has a market value according to such value at the date presenting the plaint.

5-sec-7(iv)(a)- suits for Declaratory Decree with consequential relief- In suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief other than relief specified in sub section IV-A is prayed.

Provided that in suits falling under clause (a) where the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, such amount shall be the value of the consequential relief and if such relief is incapable of valuation, then the value of the immovable property computed in accordance with sub- section (V), (V-A) and (V-B) of this section as the case may be .

Provided further that in all suits falling under clause (a) such amount in no case be less than Rs. 300.

6-sec-7(iv)(b)- suits for Account- In a suit for account – according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

Provided that in suits falling under clause (b) such amount shall be the approximate sum due to the plaintiff and the said sum shall form the basis for calculating or determining the valuation of an appeal from a preliminary decree passed in a suit.

7-sec-7(iv-A)- suits for cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees-In suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value or an instrument securing money or other property having such value-

(1)- where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject matter and

(2)- where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the one fifth of the value of the subject matter and such value shall deemed to be-

If the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a party of the decree or instrument involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates.

Explanation- The value of the property for the purpose of this sub sec, shall be the market value, which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub section (V), (V-A) & (V-B) as the case may be

9-sec-7(iv-B) (a) & (b)- suits for Easement or Injunction- In suit for Easementry rights to some benefit to arise out of land or to obtain Injunction valuation for the purpose of court fees shall be according to amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint.

Provided that such amount shall not be less than one fifth of the market value of the property involved in or effected by the relief sought or Rs. 200 whichever is greater.

Provided further that in the case of suits falling under clause (a) and (b), the amount of the court fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs.500

Explanation- If property is immovable upon which relief sought then market value shall be computed accordance with sub sec- (V), (V-A) AND (V-B) of sec-7 of court fees act.

9-sec-7(iv-B) (c), (d) & (e)- suits for to establish an adoption, to set aside an adoption and to set aside an award other than award mentioned in sec-8- According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint.

Provided that such amount shall not be less than one fifth of the market value of the property involved in or effected by the relief sought or Rs. 200 whichever is greater.

Explanation-1 If property is immovable upon which relief sought then market value shall be computed accordance with sub sec- (V), (V-A) AND (V-B) of sec-7 of court fees act.

Explanation-2 In the case of suits-

(ii) falling under clause (c) & (d) the property to which title by succession or otherwise may be diverted or affected by the alleged adoption.

(iii) falling under clause (e) the property which forms the subject matter of the award

10-sec-7(iv-C) (a), (b) & (c)- suits for restitution of conjugal rights or for marital rights for establishing or annulling or dissolving a marriage or for guardianship for establishing a right to the custody or guardianship of any person such as a minor, including guardianship for the purpose of marriage- According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, but in no case shall such amount be less than Rs. 200.

11-sec-7(V)- suits for possession of lands,buildings and gardens-

1- In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens—according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be—" where the subject-matter is land-

(a) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government," or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue; or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue;" and such revenue is permanently settled—ten times the revenue so payable; and such revenue is permanently settled—thirty times the revenue so payable;"

(b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid;" and such revenue is settled, but not permanently— and such revenue is settled, but not permanently—" five times the revenue so payable; ten times the revenue so payable;

(c) where the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue," and net profits have arisen from the land during the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint - twenty times the annual average of such profits but when no such net profits have arisen therefrom the market value which shall determined by multiplying by the twenty the annual average net profits of similar land for the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue ot Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and does not come under clause (a),(b) or(c) above the market value of the land which shall be determined by multiplying by fifteen the rental value of the land including assumed rent on proprietary cultivation if any.

2- Where the subject matter is building or garden – according to the market value of the building or garden as the case may be.

12-sec-7(V-A)- suits for possession of superior proprietary rights and under proprietary rights- In suits for possession -

(1)- of superior proprietary rights where where under proprietary or sub proprietary rights exist in the land- according to the market value of the subject matter and such value shall be determined by multiplying by fifteen the annual net profits of the superior proprietor.

(2) of under proprietary or sub proprietary land as such- according to the value of the subject matter and such value shall be determines by multiplying by ten the annual under proprietary or sub proprietary rent as the case may be recorded in the collector’s register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint .

If no such rent is recorded in the collector’s register the value shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of the sub section (V) of this section save that the multiple will be ten.

Explanation- Land held by any permanent lessees shall be treated for the purpose of the sub section as under proprietary or sub proprietary land.

13-sec-7(V-B)- Possessory suits between tenants – In suits for possession of land between rival tenants and by tenants against trespasser- according to the value of the subject matter and such value shall be determined if the such land is the land of-

(1)- a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate tenant-by multiplying by twenty the annual rent recorded in the collector’s register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint.

(2)- an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenants- by multiplying by two such rent in case of suits for possession of land between rival tenants and by annual rent in suits by tenants against trespassers.

(3)-any other tenants – by annual rent.

If no such rent is recorded in the collector’s register the value shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of sub sec (v) of this section save that the multiple shall be that entered in clauses (a)(b) and (c) of this sub section according as the class of tenancy affected is govern by clause (a)(b) or (c) of this sub section

14-sec-7(VI)- Suit to enforce a right of pre-emption- In suit of pre-emption according to the value computed in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section of land building or garden in respect of which the right is claimed .

15-sec-7(VI-A)- Suits for partition- In suits for partition according to one quarter of the value of the plaintiff’s share of the property.

And according to full value of such share if on the date of the presenting the plaint the plaintiff is out of possession of the property of which he claims to be a co-parcener or co-owner on such date is denied.

Explanation- the value of the property for the purpose of this sub-section shall be the market value which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub section (V) (V-A) (V-B) as the case may be.

16-sec-7(VII)- Suits for interest of assignee of land revenue-In suit for interest of an assignee of land revenue- fifteen time his net profits as such for the year next before the date of the presenting the plaint.

17-sec-7(VIII)- Suits for to set aside or restore an attachment- In Suits for to set aside or restore an attachment including suits to set aside an order passed under order 21 rule-60,61 or 62 of the CPC- according to half of the amount for which attachment was made or according to half of the value of the property or interest attached whichever is less.

Explanation- the value of the property or interest for the purpose of this sub-section shall be the market value which in the case of immovable property or interest in such property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (V)(V-A) or (V-B) as the case may be.

17-sec-7(IX) Suits to redeem- In suits against mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged- according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the instrument of mortgage.

18-sec-7(IX-A)- Suits to foreclose- In suits by mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage or where the mortgage is made by condition sale, to have the sale declared absolute- according to the total amount claimed by way of principal and interest.

19-sec-7(x)Suits for specific performance - In the suits for specific performance
(a) of a contract of a sale-according to the amount of the consideration.
(b) of contract of mortgage-according to the amount agreed to be secured.
(c) of a contract of a lease- according to the aggregate amount of the fine or premium and of the rent agreed to be paid during the first year of the term.

19-sec-7(x) (d) - Suits for specific performance- In the suits for specific performance-

(d) of an award- according to the amount or value of the property in dispute and such value shall be the market value which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-sec (V), (V-A) or (V-B) as the case may be.

20-sec-7(XI)Suits between landlord and tenant- In the following suits between landlord and tenant-

(a) for the delivery by a tenant of the counterpart of the lease.

(b) to enhance the rent of the tenant having a right of occupancy.

(cc) for the recovery of the immovable property from the tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy.

(d) to contest a notice of ejectment .

(e) to recover the occupancy of immovable property from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord

(f) for abatement of rent

(g) for determination of rent and

(h) for determination of rent.

According to the amount of the rent of immovable property to which the suit refers , payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint,except in the case suits falling under clause (h) in which according to twice the amount claimed by the plaintiff to be the annual rent.

वादों का मूल्यांकन व न्यायशुल्क की गणना धारा-७ से इतर-

Section 8 in the Court-fees Act, 1870-

8. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation.—The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes, or against an award made by a tribunal constituted under the united provinces town improvement act or any other similar statute shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the plaintiff.

1- suits in respect of Article-1 of the first schedule – court fee ad-valorem according to mentioned in the first schedule of court fee act .

2- suit mentioned in article - 11 of the first schedule in respect of probate and letter of administration – fees shall be paid ad-valorem accordingly.

3- suit mentioned in article - 12 of the first schedule in respect of succession certificate – fees shall be paid ad-valorem accordingly.

4- suits under article- 17 clause (iii) suit for declaratory decree without consequential relief (vi) suit u/s 14 of religious Endowment Act,1863 and u/s 91 or 92 CPC (vii) every other suit not otherwise provided for by this act.

Section 17 of the Court-fees Act, 1870

17. Multifarious suits.—

(1) Where any in which two or more separate and distinct cause of action are joined , the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which the plaints or memorandum of appeal would be chargeable under this act if separate suit were instituted in respect of each such cause of action.

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect any power conferred by or under the CPC to order separate trials.

(2) - Alternative relief- when more reliefs than based on the same cause of action are sought in alternative the fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in-respect of which the largest fee is payable.

अपील, रेफ़्रेन्स व निगरानी से सम्बंधित उपबंध -

अब अगला विचारणीय प्रश्न यह है कि वाद मूल्यांकन तथा न्यायशुल्क के सम्बन्ध अपील व निगरानी से सम्बंधित क्या प्रावधान हैं तथा हमें वाद मूल्याङ्कन तथा न्यायशुल्क के सम्बंधित वाद बिंदुओं की विरचना के समय व उनके निस्तारण के समय क्या-क्या सावधानियां बरतनी चाहिए। अपील व निगरानी के बावत विवेचना से पहले इस तथ्य पर प्रकाश डालना आवश्यक है कि वाद बिंदुओं की विरचना करते समय न्यायालय को क्या सावधानी बरतनी चाहिए ? इस सम्बन्ध में न्यायालय को यह ध्यान रखना होगा कि न्यायशुल्क व मूल्यांकन से सम्बंधित वाद बिंदुओं की विरचना पृथक-पृथक करनी होगी तथा उनका निस्तारण भी अलग-अलग करना चहिये। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि वाद के मूल्यांकन तथा न्यायशुल्क के बावत वाद बिंदुओं की विरचना व निस्तारण साथ-साथ नहीं करनी चाहिए क्योंकि दोनो वाद बिंदुओं से सम्बंधित अधिनियम अलग-अलग हैं और दोनों के परिणाम भी अलग-अलग है। । ये वाद बिंदु इस प्रकार विरचित किये जाये यथा- क्या वादी का वाद अल्पमूल्यांकित है ? क्या प्रदत्त न्यायशुल्क अपर्याप्त है ?

अपील, रेफरेन्स व निगरानी के प्रश्न का विश्लेषण तीन आधारों पर किया जा सकता है। जो इस प्रकार हैं -

1- न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के आलोक में।

2- न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के आलोक में वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत।

3- न्यायशुल्क की गणना के प्रकाश में वाद का मूल्यांकन के बावत।

1- न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के आलोक में-

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-5, 6, 6A, 6B और 6C में प्रावधान किये गए हैं। इन धाराओं के अवलोकन से यह परिलक्षित होता है कि इन उपबंधों की परिधि में तीन प्रकार के न्यायालय आते है। प्रथम- माननीय उच्च न्यायालय , द्वितीय- लघुवाद न्यायालय तथा तृतीय-अन्य न्यायलय जो उच्च न्यायालय से इत्तर हैं।

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-5 में माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आलोक में न्यायशुल्क के बावत स्टाम्प रिपोटर की रिपोर्ट के विरूद्व आपत्ति का प्रावधान किया गया है। इस धारा के अनुसार यदि न्यायशुल्क पर आपत्ति की जाती है तो उक्त प्रकरण माननीय मुख्य न्यायाधीश द्वारा नामित टैक्सिंग ऑफिसर के समक्ष प्रस्तुत किया जाये और उक्त टैक्सिंग ऑफिसर का अभिनिश्चय अंतिम होगा शिवाय जब तक टैक्सिंग अधिकारी की राय में उक्त प्रश्न सामान्य महत्त्व का न हो। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि टैक्सिंग अधिकारी के मत से न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी से सम्बंधित प्रश्न सामान्य महत्व का है तो उक्त प्रकरण अंतिम विनिश्चय के लिए माननीय मुख्य न्यायधीश को संदर्भित कर दिया जायेगा , जिसे या तो माननीय मुख्य न्यायाधीश के द्वारा अथवा उनके द्वारा इस हेतु नियुक्त किसी अन्य न्यायाधीश द्वारा निर्णीत किया जायेगा। इस धारा के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि यहाँ पर किसी अपील,निगरानी के प्रावधान आकर्षित नहीं होते है। इस धारा में referred शब्दावली का प्रयोग किया गया है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की माननीय उच्च न्यायालय में संस्थित किये जाने वाले प्रकरणों के आलोक में न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के सम्बन्ध में टैक्सिंग ऑफिसर का निर्णय अंतिम होता है जिसके विरुद कोई अपील व निगरानी पोषणीय नहीं होती है।

जहाँ तक लघुवाद न्यायालय का प्रश्न है तो इसके बावत भी न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-5 में ही प्रावधान किया गया है। यह धारा प्रावधानित करती है न्याशुल्क के बावत यदि कोई आक्षेप उठाया जाता है तो वह लघुवाद न्यायालय के लिपिक को संदर्भित किया जायेगा और उक्त लिपिक का विनिश्चय अंतिम होगा। लेकिन उक्त लिपिक के मत से यदि न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के सम्बन्ध में प्रश्न सामान्य महत्व का है तो ऐसे प्रश्न का अवधारण न्यायालय लघुवाद न्यायालय के प्रथम जज के द्वारा किया जायेगा। इस धारा के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि यहाँ पर किसी अपील,निगरानी के प्रावधान आकर्षित नहीं होते है। इस धारा में referred शब्दावली का प्रयोग किया गया है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की लघुवाद में संस्थित किये जाने वाले प्रकरणों के आलोक में न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के सम्बन्ध में लिपिक का निर्णय अंतिम होता है जिसके विरुद कोई अपील व निगरानी पोषणीय नहीं होती है। लेखक के विचार से धारा-न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम का यहाँ पर उल्लेख किया जाना उचित प्रतीत होता है -

5. Procedure in case of difference as to necessity or amount of fee.—When any difference arises between the officer whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this Chapter and any suitor or attorney, as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof, the question shall, when the difference arises in any of said High Courts, be referred to the taxing-officer, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in this behalf.

When any such difference arises in any of the said Courts of Small Causes, the question shall be referred to the Clerk of the Court, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the first Judge of such Court.

The Chief Justice shall declare who shall be taxing-officer within the meaning of the first paragraph of this section.

अन्य न्यायालयों के परिपेक्ष्य में न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के धारा-6A में उपबंध किये गए हैं। आइये सबसे पहले यह देखते है की धारा-6A में क्या प्रावधान किये गए हैं -

6-A Appeal against order to pay court fee- (1) Any person called upon to make good deficiency in court fee may appeal against such order as if it were an order appealable under section-104 CPC.

The party appealing shall file with the memorandum of appeal, a certified copy of the plaint together with that of the order appealed against.

(2) In case an appeal is filed under sub section (1) and the plaintiff does not make good the deficiency, all proceedings in suit shall be stayed and all interim orders made, including an order granting an injunction or appointing a receiver, shall be discharged.

(3) A copy of memorandum of appeal together with a copy of plaint and the order appealed against shall be sent forthwith by the appellate court to the commissioner of stamps.

(4) If such order is varied or reversed in appeal, the appellate court shall if deficiency has been made good before the appeal is decided, grant to the appellant a certificate authorizing him to receive back from the collector such amount as is determined by the appellate court to have been paid in excess of the proper court fee.

(5) The court may make such order for the payment of the costs of such appeal as it deems fit and such costs are payable to the government they shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

इस धारा के अनुसार कोई भी पक्षकार सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा-104 में वर्णित आदेशों के विरुद अपील की भांति न्यायशुल्क की कमी के बावत अपील कर सकेगा। अपील के लिए यह आवश्यक है कि अपील के मेमोरेंडम के साथ-साथ आक्षेपित आदेश व वादपत्र की प्रमाणित प्रतियां भी अपीलकर्ता को दाखिल करनी पड़ेगी। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि जिस प्रकरण में न्यायशुल्क की कमी के बावत अपील योजित की गयी और वादी न्यायालय द्वारा निर्धारित न्यायशुल्क की कमी को पूरा नहीं करता है तो उसके वाद की कार्यवाही स्थगित हो जाएगी और सभी अंतरिम आदेश उन्मोचित हो जायेंगे यहाँ तक कि अस्थायी निषेधाज्ञा का आदेश स्वतः उन्मोचित हो जायेगा। न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-6 (5 ) के अनुसार यदि न्यायशुल्क की कमी को न्यायालय द्वारा दिए गए समय के अंतर्गत पूर्ति कर दी जाती है तो वाद या अपील की तिथि वह मानी जाएगी जिस तिथि को ऐसा वाद या अपील प्रतुत किये गए थे।

जैसा कि विदित है कि धारा-6 (2 ) न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के प्रावधान माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आलोक में लागू नहीं होते है। माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने एस वाजिद अली इसार बानो -AIR 1938 All. 64 में उक्त तथ्य की पुष्टि की है।

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा- 6B में निगरानी का प्रावधान किया गया है। लेकिन धयान रहे निगरानी का यह प्रावधान सामान्य सिद्धांत नहीं है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है की इस धारा के अधीन निगरानी केवल चीफ इंस्पेक्टर स्टाम्प के द्वारा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-6 (3 ) के अधीन पारित आदेश के विरुद की जा सकती है।

इसी प्रकार न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा- 6C चीफ कंट्रोलिंग रेवेन्यू अथॉरिटी को यह अधिकारिता प्रदान की गयी है यदि न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-6B के अधीन निगरानी नहीं की गयी है और न्यायशुल्क का प्रकरण सामान्य महत्व का है तो उसके विरुद उक्त प्राधिकारी माननीय उच्च न्यायालय में Reference योजित कर सकेगा।

2- न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के आलोक में वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत -

वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-11 में इस बावत प्रावधान किये गए हैं कि कब अपीलीय व निगरानी न्यायालय क्षेत्राधिकार के परिपेक्ष्य में वादों के अल्पमूल्यांकन व अधिमूल्यांकन पर आपत्ति को विचार में ले सकेगा। इस हेतु सर्वप्रथम धारा-११ का उल्लेख आवश्यक आवश्यक हो जाता है -

11. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal on revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882), an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless—

(a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or

(b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits.

(2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeals as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court.

(3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal.

(4) The provisions of the section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882) or other enactment for the time being in force.

(5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July, 1887.

वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-11 के अधीन यह सामान्य सिद्धांत प्रतिपादित किया गया है कि न्यायालय के क्षेत्राधिकार के परिपेक्ष्य में अपीलीय अथवा निगरानी न्यायालय के द्वारा वाद के अल्पमूल्यांकन व अधिमूल्यांकन पर की गयी आपत्ति पर सामान्यतः विचार नहीं किया जायेगा जब तक कि -

(1 ) ऐसी आपत्ति प्रथम स्तर के न्यायालय के समक्ष वाद बिन्दुओं की प्रथम बार विरचना या अंकन के समय न उठाया गया हो अथवा प्रथम अपीलीय न्यायालय के मेमोरेंडम में न उठाया गया हो।

(2 ) यदि अपीलीय अथवा निगरानी न्यायालय लिखित कारणों के आधार पर संतुष्ट है कि ऐसे वाद या अपील का अल्पमूल्यांकन व अधिमूल्यांकन ऐसे वाद या अपील के गुण-दोष पर प्रभाव डालने वाला है।

यहाँ यह ध्यान रखना होगा कि यदि अपीलीय न्यायालय अथवा निगरानी न्यायालय को विश्वास है कि की गयी आपत्ति निराधार है तो वह अपील का निष्तारण इस प्रकार से करेगा जैसा प्रथम स्तर के न्यायालय अथवा प्रथम अपीलीय न्यायालय के क्षेत्राधिका में कोई दोष अथवा अनियमितता न हो।

दूसरी तरफ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि यदि अपीलीय न्यायालय को ऐसा लगता है कि वाद के अल्पमूल्यांकन अथवा अधिमूल्यांकन के सम्बन्ध में की गयी आपत्ति उचित है तो वह अधीनस्थ न्यायालय को उस बिंदु के निस्तारण के लिए पत्रावली को रिमांड कर देगा। यहाँ यह भी धयान रखना होगा कि इस स्तर पर विचारण न्यायालय अथवा प्रथम अपीलीय न्यायालय पक्षकारों के साक्ष्य भी ले सकता है।

3- न्यायशुल्क की गणना के प्रकाश में वाद का मूल्यांकन के बावत -

न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-12 यह प्रावधानित करती है कि न्ययायशुल्क की अदायगी के बावत किये गए वाद तथा अपील के मूल्यांकन के सम्बन्ध में न्यायालय का विनिश्चय अंतिम होगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के बावत किये गए किसी वाद अथवा अपील के मेमोरेंडम के मूल्यांकन के विरुद कोई अपील, निगरानी तथा रेफरेन्स पोषणीय नहीं होता है।

लेकिन यहाँ यह विचारणीय प्रश्न है कि ऐसा वाद किसी अपीलीय, रेफरेन्स अथवा निगरानी न्यायालय के समक्ष आता है तो वहां पर ऐसा न्यायालय इस तथ्य पर विचार कर सकेगा कि कथित प्रश्न गलत तरीके से निर्णीत किया गया है। इसका अभिप्राय यह कि न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के सम्बन्ध में किये गए वाद के मूल्यांकन के विरुद कोई अपील रेफरेन्स अथवा निगरानी योजित नहीं की जा सकती है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि विधि का यह सामान्य सिद्धांत है कि न्यायशुल्क की गणना के बावत किये गए वाद के मूल्याङ्कन के सम्बन्ध में सिपलसिटर यदि कोई आदेश पारित किया गया है तो ऐसे आदेश के विरुद कोई अपील, निगरानी या रेफरेन्स पोषणीय नहीं होता है। लेकिन यदि किसी डिक्री के विरुद कोई अपील योजित की गयी है तो न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-12 के अधीन रहते हुए न्यायशुल्क की गणना के बावत किये गए वाद के मूल्यांकन के विरुद की गयी आपत्ति पर ऐसा अपीलीय न्यायालय विचार कर सकता है। इसी प्रकार के प्रावधान निगरानी या रेफरेन्स के सम्बन्ध में भी लागू होते हैं। लेखक के विचार से यहाँ पर न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-12 का उल्लेख आवश्यक हो जाता है। जो इस प्रकार है-

12- Decision of questions as to valuation.—

(i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this Chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal, shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit.

(ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a Court of appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided, to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay within such time as may be fixed by it, so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided. If such additional fee is not paid within the time fixed and the defaulter is the appellant, the appeal shall be dismissed, but if the defaulter is the respondent the court shall inform the collector who shall recover the deficiency as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

उपर्युक्त धारा के अवलोकन से यह स्पष्ट है कि साधारणतया न्यायशुल्क की गणना के बावत किये गए वाद के मूल्यांकन के सम्बन्ध में पारित आदेश के विरुद्ध कोई भी अपील, निगरानी तथा रिफरेन्स पोषणीय नहीं होता है, लेकिन यदि कथित आदेश साधारणतया से अधिक है अर्थात न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के अन्य प्रावधनों को भी स्पर्श करता है तो ऐसा आदेश निगरानी योग्य हो जाता है। जैसा कि यह स्थापित सिद्धांत है कि अपील का अधिकार किसी संविधि द्वारा प्रदत्त होता है। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि न्यायिक निर्वचन के आधार पर अपील का अधिकार प्रदान नहीं किया जा सकता है। यहाँ पर एक भ्रम पाठकों के समक्ष यह उत्पन हो जाता है कि जब वाद के अल्पमूल्यांकन के आधार पर कोई वादपत्र ख़ारिज कर दिया जाता है तो ऐसा आदेश अपीलीय होता है क्योंकि सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा - २(२) के तहत ऐसा आदेश डीम्ड डिक्री की कोटि में आता है। इससे यह भ्रान्ति उत्पन्न हो जाती है कि न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-१२ तथा सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश-७ नियम-११ में अंतर्विरोध है।इस अंतर्विरोध को माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने अधोलिखित नज़ीर में दूर कर दिया है और यह भी स्पस्ट कर दिया है कि न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-१२ के अधीन पारित आदेश कब अंतिम माना जायेगा और कब रिवीजन व अपील योजित की जा सकेगी।

Nemi chand and another vs The Edward Mills company Limited and another AIR 1953 SC 28 -

1. That it be declared that the appointment of defendant No. 2 is illegal, invalid and ultra vires and that he has no right to act as chairman, managing director etc. of defendant No. 1;

2. That a receiver be appointed to take charge of the management of the company, until a properly qualified chairman managing director etc. are duly appointed as required by the memorandum and articles of the company. The plaint bore a court-fee stamp of Rs. 10 only, but the objection of the respondents that court-fee was payable relief No. 2 the appellants paid ad valorem fee Rs. 51,000 which was the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction.

The Additional District Judge dismissed the suit the preliminary ground that it was not maintainable as it related to the internal management of the company and that the, appellants had no right to bring it without impleading the directors who were necessary parties to it.

Aggrieved by this decision of the trials Judge, the appellants preferred an appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara, at Ajmer. The memorandum of appeal was Stamped with a court fee stamp of Rs. 10 and it was expressly stated therein that relief No. 2 of the plaint was given up. An objection was raised regarding the amount of court fee paid the memorandum of appeal. The Judicial Commissioner ordered that proper court-fees be paid thereon in a month. In this order no reasons were given for this decision. The additional fee demanded was not paid, and the Judicial Commissioner dismissed the appeal with costs 22nd March, 1945. An application was made for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against this order but, it was refused. In the order refusing leave it was said as follows:- " appeal to this court, the memorandum was again stamped with a ten rupee stamp only and the respondents therefore objected. It having been conceded by plaintiffs earlier that the relief for the receivership was consequential to the relief for the declaration, the appellants were directed to pay the same stamp as had been -paid in the trial Court. They objected stating that they had expunged from their memorandum of appeal the request that the court should appoint a receiver and that they were not, therefore, liable to pay the same amount this a notice was issued and counsel were beard.

It being clearly set out in section 42 of the Specific Relief Act that no court shall grant a declaration only where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so, the appellants were directed to pay as earlier ordered the same amount as bad ultimately been paid the plaint. They had earlier sought a consequential relief and the court 'was, therefore, entirely unable to hold that the plaintiffs were unable to seek a further relief, they having sought the relief in the lower court and it having been refused to them. The amount of-the stamp was not paid and the appeal was therefore dis- missed with costs."

The reasons for demanding additional court-fee, though not mentioned in the original order, are stated in this order. The question for determination in this appeal is whether the order of the Judicial Commissioner demanding additional court-fee can be sustained in law. A memorandum of appeal, as provided in article 1 of Schedule I of the Court-Fees Act, has to be stamped according to the value of the subject-matter in dispute in appeal; in other words, the relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal determines the value of the appeal for purposes of court-fee. The only relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal was the first one mentioned in the plaint. This relief being purely of a declaratory character, the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped under article 17 of Schedule II It is always open to the appellant in appeal to give up a portion of his claim and to restrict it. It is further open to him; unless the relief is of such a nature that it cannot be split up, to relinquish a part of the claim and to bring it within the amount of court-fee already paid: Brahnmnandam v. Secretary of State for India(1); Ram Prasad v. Bhiman(2); Karam Chand v. Jullundur Bank Ltd(1); Neelachalam v. Nara- singha Das(4); Sah Bamehand v. Pannalal(5); Chuni Lal v. Sheo Charanlat Lalman(1). The plaintiffs in express terms relinquished the second relief,they had claimed in the plaint, in their memorandum of appeal. For the purpose of deciding whether the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped according to the subject matter of the appeal, it was not open to the Judicial Commissioner to canvass the question whether the suit with the second prayer eliminated from it fell within the mischief of the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. That was a question which related to the merits of the appeal and did not concern its proper institution this ground, therefore, the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction to demand (I) (1930) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 48 (2) (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 151.

(3) A.I.R. 1927 Leh. 543.

(4) A.R. 1931 Mad 716.

(5) A.I.R. 1929 All. 308.

(6) (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 756.

additional fee from the plaintiffs and the appeal could not be dismissed for failure to meet it. We are thus of the opinion that the order demanding additional court-fee the memorandum of appeal as it stood,' that is, minus the second prayer, was erroneous and we hold that the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped, as the subject-matter of the appeal was purely of a declaratory character. Mr. Setalvad for the respondents contended that the first relief claimed in the plaint, and which was the subject- matter of the appeal included within it consequential relief and was not purely declaratory in nature and therefore the Judicial Commissioner was right in demanding additional court-fee the value of the consequential relief. It was said that the words that respondent No. 2 "had no right to act as chairman and managing director" amounted to a claim for consequential relief. We are unable to agree. The claim contained in the first relief of the plaint is to the effect that it be declared that defendant No. 2 has no right to act as chairman an managing director because of his appointment being illegal, invalid, and ultra virus. The declaration claimed is in negative form that defendant No. 2 has no right to act as chairman and managing director. No claim for a consequential relief can be read within this prayer. The words "that defendant 2 has no right to act as chairman.......'' are mere repetition and reiteration of what is contained in the opening sentence of the paragraph. This contention of Mr. Setalvad, therefore, cannot be sustained.

It was next contended that in view of the provisions of section 12 of the Court-Fees Act it should be held that the decision of the Judicial Commissioner' was final, and could not be challenged in appeal. Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act enacts as follows:

"Every question relating to Situation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties 'to the suit."

The provisions of this section have to be read and construed keeping in view the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VII, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, provides as follows:-

"The plaint shall be rejected-

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff, being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time- to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;......

(d) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so."

An order rejecting a plaint is a decree as defined in section 2; sub-section (ii), and is appealable as such. There is an apparent conflict between the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of section 12 which make the order relating to valuation final and efforts to reconcile the provisions of the Court-Fees Act and the Code have resulted in some divergence of judicial opinion the construction of the section. In a number of decisions the Calcutta High Court took the view that the finality declared by section 12 of the Court-Fees Act had been taken away by the relevant provisions of the Code, as the order rejecting a plaint was appealable as a decree, no matter whether the dispute related to the category under which the same falls for purposes of court-fee or only to valuation pure and simple under a particular category: Vide In re Omrao Mirza v. Mary Jones(,) and Tara Prasanna Chongdar v. Nrisingha Moorari Pal(1). This extreme view has not been maintained in later decisions and it has been held that the finality declared by section 12 is limited only to the question (1883) 12 C.L.R. 148.

(2) (1924) I.L..R. 51 Cal. 216.

of valuation pure and simple and does not relate to the category under which a certain suit falls: Tariman Khatun v. Secretary o State for India in Council(1). The Allahabad High Court in its earlier decisions took the extreme view: Vide Muhammad Sadik v. Muhammad Jan(2). Later that -court veered round to the view that the finality declared by section 12 only related to matters of, appraisement. The High Court of Lahore has placed a similar construction the meaning of the expression "valuation" in section 12 and has held that the finality attaches only to a decision which concerns valuation simpliciter and no finality attaches when a court decides a question whether a case falls within one or other category of the cases mentioned in the different sections and schedule of the Court Fees Act: Vide Mahna Singh v. Bahadur Singh(1); Mst. Parmeshri v. PannaLal(1). Thisviewhasconsistentlybeenheldin thatcourt. The Madras High Court took the same view in Lakshmi Amma v. Janamajayam Nambiar(5); Annamalai Chetty V. Cloete(6); and Narasimhalu Chetty v. Bamayya Naidu(7). Mr. Setalvad drew our attention to the recent Full Bench decision of that court in Madana Mohana Naiko v. Krupasindhu Naiko(1). That case, however, concerned the second part of section 12 and was not concerned directly with the construction to be placed the first part of the section. It, however, contains certain observations indicating that in the opinion of the judges there was no ground for this restricted construction of the word " valuation " in section 12 and that the finality declared by section 12 attached not only to valuation pure and simple but also attached to decisions relating to category under which a suit or appeal falls for purposes of court-fee. These obiter observations, however, cannot be said to ,,overrule the earlier Full Beach decision of that court in Lakshmi Amma v. Janamajayam Nambiar(5). In a

(1) I.I.R.(1940) 2 Cal. 166.

(2) (1889) I.L.R. II All. 91, F.B.

(3) 1919 Punjab Record 16.

(4) A I.R. 1931 Lah. 378.

(5) (1894) 4 M.L.J. 183, F.B.

(6) (1882) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 204.

(7) A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 502.

(8) A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 81.

later decision in Narasimhalu Chetty v. Bamayya Naidu(1), the decision of the Full Bench was explained as not in any way overruling the decision in Lakshmi Amma v. Janamajayam Nambiar(2). All recent decisions of the Bombay High Court have taken the same view: Vide Dada v. Nagesh(3); Krishnaji Bari Dhandhere v. Gopal Narain Dhandhere(4). Mr. Setalvad drew our attention to an earlier decision of the Bombay High Court in Vithal Krishna v. Balakrishna Janardan(5). In that case the court undoubtedly held that no appeal lay and the finality declared by section 12 was comprehensive enough to include all questions whether relating to category or valuation pure and simple. It was, however, held that the High Court could correct an erroneous decision in the exercise of its revisional powers. Thus the finality declared by section 12 was destroyed by the exercise of powers of appeal under the guise of exercising revisional jurisdiction. In Patna and Oudh the game view has been taken as in Lahore. Vide Chandramoni Koer v. Basdeo Narain Singh (6); Gumani v. Banwari(7). It thus appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is against the construction suggested by Mr. Setalvad. We think that the construction given to the language in section 12 in these decisions is right, and our reasons for saying so are these: The difference in the phraseology employed in sections 5 and 12 of the Court-Fees Act indicates that the scope of section 12 is narrower than that of section 5. Section 5 which declares decisions questions of court-fee whenever they arise in the chartered High Courts as final makes a decision as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof final. Whereas section 12 makes a decision every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee payable under chapter 3 a plaint or memorandum of appeal final. Had section 12 been drafted somewhat as follows

(i) A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 502.(5) (1886) I.L.R. lo Bom. 610, F.B, (2) (1894) 4 M.L.J. 183 F.B.(6) (1921) 4 P.L.J. 57. (3) (1899) I.L.R. 23 Bom. 486.(7) (1920) 54 I.C. 733. (4) A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 166.

"If any dispute arises as to the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter a plaint or memorandum of appeal, it shall be decided by the court in which such plaint or memorandum is filed and such decision shall be final as between the parties, then the construction contended for by Mr. Setalvad might have been upheld. When the two sections in the same Act relating to the same subject matter have been drafted in different language, it is not unreasonable to infer that they were enacted with a different intention and that in one case the intention was to give finality to all decisions of the taxing officer or the taxing judge, as the case may be, while in the other case it was only intended to give finality to questions of fact that are decided by a court but not to questions of law. Whether a case falls under one particular section of the Act or another is a pure question of law and does not directly determine the valuation of the suit for 'purposes of court-fee. The question of determination of valuation or appraisement only arises after it is settled in what class or category it falls. It has been argued in some decisions that it is absolutely necessary to decide the category in which a case falls before assessing its value and therefore the determination of the question of category is necessarily involved in the determination of the valuation of the suit for purposes of court fee. This argument, though plausible, does not seem sound. The actual assessment of the value depends either arithmetical calculations or upon a valuation by an expert and the evidence led in the case, while the decision of the question of category is one of law and may well be said to be an independent question antecedent but not relating to valuation. The expression " valuation" interpreted in its ordinary meaning Of "appraisement", cannot be said to necessarily include within its ambit the question of category which is a matter of law. The construction placed this section by a long course of decisions is one which reconciles the provisions of the Court-Fees Act with that of the Code of Civil Procedure and does not make those provisions nugatory and is therefore more acceptable than the other constructions which would make the provisions of either one or the other of these statutes nugatory. Perhaps it may be possible to reconcile the provisions of the two statutes by holding that the finality declared by section 12 of the Court-Fees Act means that the parties cannot impugn such a decision by preferring an appeal but that it does not confer such decisions a complete immunity from examination in a higher court. In other words section 12 when it says that such a decision shall be final between the parties only makes the decision of the court a question of court-fee nonappealable and places it the same footing as other interlocutory non-appealable orders under the Code and it does no more than that. If a decision under section 12 is reached by assuming jurisdiction which the court does not possess or without observing the formalities which are prescribed for reaching such a) decision, the order obviously would be revisable by the High Court in the exercise of revisional powers. Similarly, when a party thinking that a decision under section 12 is palpably wrong takes the risk of his plaint being rejected or suit dismissed and then appeals from the order rejecting the plaint or from the decree dismissing the suit but not from the decision the question of court-fee, then it is open to him to challenge the interlocutory order even the question of court-fee made in the suit or apppeal. The word "finality" construed in the limited sense in which it is often used in statutes means that no appeal lies from an order of this character as such and it means no more than that.

Conceding for the sake of argument but not admitting-that Mr. Setalvad is right in his contention that section 12 is comprehensive enough to include within its ambit all questions relating to court-fee whether they involve a decision as to question of category or as to valuation simpliciter, in the present case the Judicial Commissioner decided none of these questions and: his decision cannot be said to be one falling within the ambit of section 12. All that the Judicial Commissioner decided was that as the suit could not be maintained without asking for relief No. 2, the same fee was payable the memorandum of appeal as the plaint. In substance the court decided an issue regarding the maintainability of the appeal without first deciding whether the appeal had been properly instituted in that court. No finality can attach to such a decision by the provisions of section 12, as in reality it decides no question within, the ambit of section 12 of the Court-Fees Act.

For the reasons given above the second objection raised by Mr. Setalvad that no appeal lies from the order of the Judicial Commissioner by special leave is without force and is overruled.

The result, is, that the appeal is allowed, the decision of the Judicial 'Commissioner dismissing the appeal is set aside and the case remanded to him for decision in accordance with law the basis that the memorandum of appeal presented to him was properly stamped. The appellants' costs of this appeal will be costs in the appeal in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Appeal allowed.

अधोलिखित नज़ीर भी उपर्युक्त मत का समर्थन करती है। इस प्रकरण में माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने यह अभिकथित किया है कि यदि सिम्पल सिटर प्रकरण न्यायशुल्क की गणना के बावत वाद के मूल्यांकन से सम्बंधित है तो ऐसा अभिनिश्चय अंतिम होगा तथा यदि प्रकरण न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के प्रावधानों की भिन्न-भिन्न कोटियों से सम्बंधित है तो रिवीजन पोषणीय होगा लेकिन यदि आदेश न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के बावत है तो इस अधिनियम की धारा-6A के तहत अपीलीय होगा। उक्त नजीर व प्रतिपादित सिद्धांत इस प्रकार है -

१. Smt. Shail Agarwal vs. State of U.P., 2007(102) RD 9 ALL.-

1. The plaintiff presented a suit praying that the three sale deeds dated 1-11-2004 and 17-2-2006 be declared null and void and further prayed that the defendants be restrained from transferring the property on the basis of the sale deeds. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the plaintiff disclosed the valuation of the sale deeds and on that basis, paid a sum of Rs. 1300.00 as Court-fee. The Munsarim submitted a report dated 19-7-2006 stating therein that as per the valuation given by the plaintiff, the total amount of Court-fee payable as per Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act is Rs. 62,792.50, whereas the plaintiff has only paid a sum of Rs. 1300.00 towards Court-fee. Consequently, the Munsarim reported that the remaining Court-fee was required to be paid by the plaintiff.

2. Pursuant to the aforesaid report, the plaintiff filed an objection dated 31-7-2006. which was registered as Misc. Case No. 136 of 2006. The plaintiff submitted that the Court-fee was not payable as per Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and, in fact, the Court-fee was payable as per Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act, and therefore, the Court-fee paid by the plaintiff was correct and was in accordance with the provisions of Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. The plaintiff therefore prayed that the report of the Munsarim be set aside.

3. The Civil Judge by an order dated 14-8-2006 rejected the objection raised by the plaintiff and upheld the report of the Munsarim and directed the plaintiff to clear the deficiency of the Court-fee so that the suit could be registered. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for the quashing of the order of the Civil Judge dated 14-8-2006.

4. Heard Sri B. B. Paul, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.K. Khanna, the learned Standing Counsel.

5. A preliminary objection was raised by the Court with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition in view of Section 6-A of the Court-fees Act as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was one under Section 12 of the Court-fees Act which had attained finality and that no appeal or revision lay against the said order. Consequently, the writ petition was the only forum for the redressal of the grievance of the petitioner. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of Full Bench of this Court in Messrs. Gupta & Co. v. Kripa Ram Brothers AIR 1934 All 620, in which it was held that a decision given by a Court in the trial of a suit under Section 12 of the Court-fees Act does not amount to a "case decided" as contemplated under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, no revision lies against the said order.

7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further laid stress on a division bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Krishana Dhandhania v. Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kanpur Nagar , wherein the Court held-

Section 12 of the Act, 1870 deals with the decision of question as to valuation and it provides that such an issue shall be decided by the Court in which the plaint is filed and such decision shall be final between the parties to the suit. Thus, it is evident from the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, 1870 that the decision taken by the Court on such an issue shall be final between the parties but in case the superior Court while exercising the appellate or revisional jurisdiction comes to the conclusion that the issue has wrongly been decided to the detriment of the revenue, it can direct the party to make the deficiency good for the reasons that the object of the Act is not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality but to secure the revenue.

8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further placed various judgments to show that the report of the Munsarim was incorrect, and that the Court-fee was only payable under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act.

9. In my opinion, the writ petition is not maintainable at this stage.

10. Paragraph No. 35 of the General Rules Civil states as under:

35. Munsarim's duty in respect of plaints.- A Munsarim of a civil Court appointed to receive plaints shall examine each plaint presented to him, and shall report thereon whether the provisions of the Code and the Court-fees Act, have been observed. Whether the claim is within the jurisdiction of the Court, constitutes a cause of action, and has been presented within the period prescribed for the institution of such a suit, and whether the plaint is otherwise in proper form including that in a suit whether a notice under Section 80, C.P.C., necessary, such a notice has been given.

The Munsarim shall see that the actual date of the presentation of the plaint is entered upon the impressed stamp and adhesive label, if any, below the date of purchase endorsed on them.

On the back of all plaints the Munsarim shall note-

(a) date of presentation of the plaint,

(b) name of presenter,

(c) classification of suit, and

(d) court-fee paid.

11. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the Munsarim was required to report as to whether the provision of the Court-fees Act had been observed or not and whether proper Court-fee had been paid or not. In the present case, I find that the Munsarim has submitted a report as per paragraph No. 35 of the General Rules Civil, stating therein, that the Court-fee as per Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act was required to be paid and that the plaintiff had only paid a certain amount and had not paid the entire amount of the Court-fee. The Civil Judge, rejected the objection of the plaintiff, holding that the Court-fee was required to be paid under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and that Article 17(iii) of the Schedule II of the Court-fees Act had no application.

12. The question now is, whether the order passed by the Civil Judge is an order passed under Section 12 of the Court-fees Act or not ?

13. Sections 5 and 12 of the Court-fees Act confers finality on decision of matters effecting the valuation and Court-fee payable thereon. Section 5 of the Act has no application to the decision of the Civil Judge, and therefore, the said provision is not being considered.

14. Section 12 of the Court-fees Act reads as under:

12. Decision of question as to valuation.- (i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shrill be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit.

(ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a Court of appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid, to pay within such time as may be fixed by it, so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided. If such additional fee is not paid within the time fixed and the defaulter is the appellant, the appeal shall be dismissed, but if the defaulter is the respondent the Court shall inform the Collector who shall recover the deficiency as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

15. From the aforesaid, it is clear that this Section is confined to such decision on a question relating to the valuation for the purpose of determining the Court-fee.

16. The Supreme Court in Nemi Chand v. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. held that the finality under Section 12 of the Court-Fees Act attaches only to a decision which concerns valuation simpliciter and that no finality attaches when a Court decides a question whether a case falls within one or the other category of the cases mentioned in the different sections and schedule of the Court-Fees Act.

17. In Lala Ram Babu v. Lala Ramesh Chandra 1957 ALJ 53, this Court held that a decision of the trial Court relating to the valuation of the subject-matter of the suit for the purpose of determining the amount of Court-fee payable is final between the parties and cannot be challenged in an appeal under Section 6-A of the Court-fees Act.

18. In Smt. Bibbi v. Shugan Chand , a Full Bench of this Court held that Section 12 of the Court-fees Act only attaches finality to the question of valuation and not to the category under which the suit falls. The Full Bench further held that the decision of the Civil Judge on the issue relating to Court-fee had not become final.

19. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that Section 12 of the Court-fees Act is not applicable in the present case. In the present case, the Civil Judge held that the Court-fee is payable under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and that Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act has no application. A decision on the question whether the suit falls under Section 7(v-A) or Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act is not a decision on a question relating to the valuation but on a question relating to the basis or the mode of computation of the Court-fee. Keeping this in mind, the Supreme Court in Nemi Chand case (supra) held that the finality declared by Section 12 is limited only to the question of valuation pure and simple and does not relate to the category under which a certain suit falls.

20. In Ram Krishna Dhindhania's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court also held the finality is, however, with respect to arithmetical calculation and not with respect to classification, i.e., category under which the suit falls.

21. In view of the aforesaid, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, that the order of the Civil Judge was one under Section 12 of the Court-fees Act and had become final is patently erroneous.

22. Section 6-A of the Court-fees Act as applicable in the State of U.P. reads as under:

6-A. Appeal against order to pay Court-fee.- (1) Any person called upon to make good a deficiency in Court-fee may appeal against such order as if it were an order appealable under Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The party appearing shall file with the memorandum of appeal, a certified copy of the plaint together with that of the order appealed against.

(2) In case an appeal is filed under subsection (1), and the plaintiff does not make good the deficiency, all proceedings in the suit shall be stayed and all interim orders made, including an order granting an injunction or appointing a receiver, shall be discharged.

(3) A copy of the memorandum of appeal together with a copy of the plaint and of the order appealed against shall be sent forthwith by the appellate Court to the (Commissioner of Stamps).

(4) If such order is varied or reversed in appeal, the appellate Court shall if the deficiency has been made good before the appeal is decided grant to the appellant a certificate, authorising him to receive back from the Collector such amount as is determined by the appellate Court to have been paid in excess of the proper Court-fee.

(5) The Court may make such order for the payment of costs of such appeal as it deems fit, and where such costs are payable to the Government, they shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

23. In my view, the order of the Civil Judge is an order which is appealable under Section 6-A of the Act. The question as to whether the Court-fee payable should be under Section 7(iv-A) or under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act can be questioned by the plaintiff by filing an appeal under Section 6-A of the Court-fees Act.

24. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner has a statutory remedy of filing an appeal under Section 6-A of the Court-fees Act as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The writ petition is therefore dismissed on the ground of an alternative remedy.

इसप्रकार उपयुक्त विधि व्यवस्थाओं से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि न्यायशुल्क की गणना के बावत किये गए वाद के मूल्यांकन के आलोक में पारित आदेश अंतिम होता लेकिन यदि न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी का आदेश भी उक्त आक्षेपित आदेश में समाहित है तो ऐसा आदेश न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-5 से इतर अपीलीय होगा जिसकी अपील का उपबंध इसी अधिनियम की धारा-6A में किया गया है। दूसरी तरफ यदि वाद के मुल्यांकन के आलोक में किये गए न्यायालय द्वारा पारित आदेश की परिधि में अन्य प्रावधानों को विचार में लेकर आदेश पारित किया गया है तो ऐसा आदेश निगरानी योग्य हो जायेगा।

व्यावहारिक समस्याएं -

अब यहाँ पर यह विचारणीय है कि वे व्यावहारिक समस्याएं जो एक विधि व्यवसायी के समक्ष आतीं हैं उन पर पृथक-पृथक तरीके से दृष्टिपात किया जाये। ये समस्याएं इस प्रकार है -

1- न्यायशुल्क के निर्धारण के लिए क्या देखा जाना है -

अगला विचारणीय प्रश्न यह है कि न्यायशुल्क के निर्धारण के लिए क्या देखा जाना है। न्यायशुल्क के उद्देश्य से न्यायालय को वादपत्र में याचित अनुतोष को देखना होगा और दावाकृत वास्तविक अनुतोष के निर्धारण के लिए वादपत्र के सार को विचार में लेना होगा। यहाँ यह भी ध्यान में रखना होगा कि वादपत्र का सार सदैव वादपत्र के सम्पूर्ण पठन पर आधारित होना चाहिए। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि वादपत्र को खंड-खंड में पढ़कर निष्कर्ष नहीं निकला जायेगा। इस सम्बन्ध में देखें अधोलिखित नजीरें -

1-Chief Inspector of Stamps UP, Allahabad vs Mahanth Laxmi Narain, 1970 ALJ 119 Allhabad (7 JUDGES).

2-Smt Shefali Roy vs Hero Jaswant Dass, AIR 1992 All. 154 (DB).

यहाँ पर यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि न्यायशुल्क के प्रश्न का निर्धारण वादपत्र के अभिकथनो के आधार पर किया जायेगा। इसका अभिप्राय यह है इस स्तर पर बयान तहरीरी को विचार में नहीं लिया जा सकता है। माननीय उच्च न्यायालय ने Suresh And Ors. vs Chand And Ors. AIR 2007 All 113, के प्रकरण में प्रस्तर - 11 में यह अभिधारित किया है -

11. It is well settled law that the payment of court fee is dependent entirely upon the averments made in the plaint and relief claimed. The averments made in the written statement is not required to be examined. In the present case, the plaintiffs have prayed for two reliefs, namely, that they should be declared to be the half owners of the property in question on the basis of a registered Will left by their mother and the second relief is for the cancellation of the sale deed executed by the defendant in respect of their alleged share of the property.

यहाँ यह भी ध्यान रखना होगा कि इस स्तर पर वादपत्र को सही माना जायेगा जबतक कि वादपत्र की विरचना चालाकी से न्यायशुल्क के बचाने के आशय से न की गयी हो। इसका अभिप्राय यह है कि यदि वादपत्र व उसके अनुतोष की ड्राफ्टिंग कोलरेबल है तो न्यायालय परदे को हटा सकता है। माननीय उच्चत्तम न्यायालय ने कमलेश्वर किशोर सिंह बनाम पारस नाथ सिंह ,AIR 2002 SC 233 में उपर्युक्त तथ्यों की पुष्टि की है।

माननीय इलहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने कालू राम बनाम बाबू लाल- AIR, 1932 Allhabad 485, के प्रस्तर-9 में अभिकथित किया है कि

9. The Court has to see what is the nature of the suit and of the reliefs claimed having regard to the provisions of Section 7, Court-fees Act. If a substantive relief is claimed though clothed in the garb of a declaratory decree with a consequential relief, the Court is entitled to see what is the real nature of the relief and if satisfied that it is not a mere consequential relief but a substantive relief it can demand the proper court-fee on that relief irrespective of the arbitrary valuation put by the plaintiff in the plaint on the ostensible consequential relief. Suppose a plaintiff asks for a declaration that the defendant is liable to pay him money due under a certain bond and also asks for recovery of that amount; or suppose that he asks for a declaration that he is the owner of certain property and is entitled to its possession and asks for recovery of its possession : surely the reliefs for the recovery of money or for the recovery of possession cannot be treated as a mere consequential relief which can be arbitrarily valued at any low figure and court-fees paid on that arbitrary valuation only. In our opinion where a suit is for the cancellation of an instrument under the provisions of Section 39, Specific Belief Act the relief is not a declaratory one. It falls neither under Section 7(4)(c) nor under Schedule 2, Article 17(3), but, under the residuary article, Schedule 1, Article 1, Court-fees Act. We hold therefore that the court-fee payable on the first relief is governed by Schedule 1, Article 1.

2-क्या बाजारी मूल्य का निर्धारण शर्किल रेट के आधार पर किया जा सकता है -

अगला विचारणीय प्रश्न यह है कि क्या शर्किल रेट विवादित संपत्ति के बाजारी मूल्य के निर्धारण का आधार न्यायशुल्क अदा करने के उद्देश्य से हो सकता है। इस सम्बन्ध में लेखक का मत है की शर्किल रेट बाजारी मूल्य के निर्धारण का आधार नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि शर्किल रेट का मूल उद्देश्य केवल guiding factor के रूप में काम करना होता है। दूसरा कारण यह भी है कि मार्केट वैल्यू शर्किल रेट से कम भी हो सकती है तथा ज्यादा भी हो सकती है। माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने अमित कुमार त्यागी बनाम उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य, AIR 2014 All. 40 के प्रस्तर-6 में यह प्रतिपादित किया है -

6. It is rightly contended that under the provisions of Act, 1899 stamp duty is payable on the market value of property in transaction of sale deed. It is also true that market value does not mean circle rate itself but it is only a guiding factor. The Collector has to determine market value taking into account various factors. In the case in hand the Additional Collector has simply referred to circle rate and in a mechanical way, passed impugned order enhancing even circle rate by 25%.

जैसा कि विदित है कि विवादित संपत्ति के बाजारी मूल्य की गणना वादपत्र संस्थित होने वाली तिथि से की जाएगी। पाठकगण के समक्ष यह दुविधा होगी की हम मार्केट वैल्यू की गणना कैसे करें। इस सम्बन्ध में लेखक का मत है की जब सम्पत्ति किसी सरकारी राजस्व के अधीन है तो उसकी गणना के सम्बन्ध में कोई परेशानी नहीं है उसका विस्तार से विवरण व विश्लेषण आलेख के ऊपरी भाग में किया जा चुका है। यदि संपत्ति आबादी भूमि, भवन या बाग है तो उसकी मार्केट वैल्यू का निर्धारण आस- पास की संपत्ति के बावत निष्पादित बैनामों में आधार पर किया जा सकता है। दूसरी तरफ न्यायलाय शुल्क अधिनियम की धारा-९ सहपठित धारा-75 व आदेश-२६ नियम-9 जा० दी० के तहत विशेषज्ञ को भी न्यायालय द्वारा इस हेतु नियुक्त किया जा सकता है और ऐसे विशेषज्ञ कमिश्नर की रिपोर्ट के आधार पर सम्पत्ति के बाजारी मूल्य की गणना की जा सकती है।

वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत न्यायालय साक्ष्य कब ले सकता है -

जैसा की विदित है की वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम की धारा-11 (3 ) यह प्रावधानित करती है कि जब किसी वाद में अपीलीय न्यायालय यह पाता है कि वाद के मूल्याङ्कन के विरुद आपत्ति प्रथम स्तर पर उठायी गयी थी अथवा वाद के मूल्यांकन पर की गयी आपत्ति प्रकरण को गुण-दोष पर प्रभावित करने वाली है तो ऐसा अपीलीय या निगरानी न्यायालय वाद को रिमांड करते हुए साक्ष्य लिए जाने का आदेश दे सकता है और वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत वाद बिंदु को विरचित कर निस्तारण का आदेश विचारण न्यायालय को देगा।

दूसरी तरफ यदि दौरान वाद विवादित संपत्ति में प्रतिवादी द्वारा निर्माण किये जाने का अभिकथन करते हुए वादपत्र में संशोधन करते हुए अनुतोष की याचना वादी द्वारा की गयी है तो न्यायालय इस बावत कि कितना निर्माण पहले का है तथा कितना दौरान वाद किया गया है इस बावत पक्षकारों से साक्ष्य की अपेक्षा कर सकता है। माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने चंद्रपति त्रिपाठी बनाम सूर्यमणि -AIR, 1975 Allhabad 430 के प्रस्तर-7 में अधोलिखित प्रकार से इसे अवधारित किया है-

7. While disposing of the two issues the Court below had observed that the value of the building and other machinery etc. on the Land belonging to the defendants shall not be taken into consideration in determining the question of jurisdiction and court-fees. This view is erroneous and not correct. In his plaint the plaintiff was claiming permanent injunction, a prohibitory injunction, possession and demolition of the constructions already made by the defendants or which they might make during the pendency of the suit. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement disclosed certain constructions which he had already made. The Court below should have found out by taking evidence of the parties what construction had already taken place before the filing of suit and what constructions had been made by the contesting defendant after the filing of the suit and regarding which there is a prayer for demolition. After valuing these constructions etc., the Court should then proceed with the decision of the question of jurisdiction and court-fees. This has not been done. This Court in the ruling reported in Shanti Prasad v. Mahabir Singh, 1957 All LJ 431 = (AIR 1957 All 402) (FB) has laid down guidelines while disposing of the questions of the valuation and the court-fees.

माननीय उच्च न्यायालय में रिट अधिकारिता के आलोक में देय न्यायशुल्क की गणना कैसे की जाएगी -

जैसा कि विदित है न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम की अनुसूची-2 के अनुच्छेद - 1 में रिट के बावत मु०-100 रूपये न्यायशुल्क का प्रावधान किया गया है। इस सम्बन्ध में कोई मतभेद नहीं है लेकिन समस्या वहाँ उत्पन्न हो जाती है जहाँ पर एक ही याचिका में एक से अधिक याची होते है।

इस सम्बन्ध में सर्वप्रथम माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने Mota Singh And Ors. vs State Of Haryana And Ors. AIR 1981 SC 484, 1980 Supp (1) SCC 600, 1980 (12) UJ 913 SC.

1. We nave carefully gone through the office report prepared pursuant to the directions given by us. We are prima facie satisfied that the petitioners have not paid Court fees legally payable and that the petitioner have so modeled the title clause of the petitions as may indicate that the payment of the legally payable Court fee could be evaded. Having to the mature of these cases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action. A firm as understood under the Partnership Act or company as understood under t is Indian Companies Act, if it is entitled in law to commence action either in the firm name or in the Company's name, can do so by filing a petition for the benefit of the company or the partnership and in such a case Court fee would be payable depending upon the legal status of the petitioner. But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners of any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of Court fee simply because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the libility to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay legally payable Court fee on his pettion. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses high way, be has common cause of action with the rest oi truck pliers.

2. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the office should scrutinizes fresh each one of the cases referred to in the office report and ascertain whether requisite Court fee has been paid in each of them. In ascertaining this fact, the office should ascertain whether there are number of petitioners who are combined in one petition the petition of each qua the co-petitioners, and the relief claimed, and determine the liability of each such petitioner to pay Court-fee for the relief sought by him. If one such ascertainment and determination Court-fee is shown to be payable by different petitioners who have joined together in one petition learned advocates appearing for them should be called upon to nuke good the deficit Court fee by or before October 31, 1980.

3. In the deficit Court-fee is not paid to any case by the learned advocate appearing for such party, in order to avoid any hardship and injustice to the innocent parties the office should bring the matter to the notice of the Court and seek a direction whether a notice be issued to each of such petitioner in respect of whom deficit Court-fee it not paid intimating to him that he should pay up the deficit Court fee within the time to be specified in the notice and giving further intimation that if the deficit Court fee is not made on or before the specified date the petition will be posted for further orders before the Court on November 4, 1980.

4. We also hereby direct that all cases shown in the office report in any event be posted before the Court on November 4, 1980, with a report whether the deficit Court fee in each case has been paid or not.

इस उपर्युक्त प्रकरण में माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय ने यह स्पष्ट कर दिया की यदि वाद हेतुक भिन्न-भिन्न है और व्यक्तियों के संघ में कोई विधिक सम्बन्ध नहीं है और ऐसे व्यक्तियों द्वारा एक साथ याचिका योजित की जाती है तो ऐसे प्रत्येक व्यक्ति के पृथक- पृथक न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होगा।

Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar And Ors. vs Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti And ... : AIR 1984 All 46

1. A Division Bench of our Court has referred five questions of law to a larger Bench. The questions are--

1. Whether an association of persons, registered or unregistered can maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights?

2. Whether a single writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable on behalf of more than one petitioners, not connected with each other as partners or those who have no other legally subsisting jural relationship, where the questions of law and fact, Involved in the petition, are common?

3. In case the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether only one set of court-fees would be payable on such petition or each such individual petitioner has to pay court-fees separately?

4. In case answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, whether the defect of misjoinder of several petitioners in the writ petition can be cured by requiring each such petitioner to pay separate court-fees?

5. Whether the petition is maintainable for questioning similar actions taken by different Mandi Samitis independently of each other in cases where the aggrieved party seeks relief against each such committee on identical grounds?

2. These questions arise out of writ petitions filed by a large number of persons jointly. For instance, in Writ Petition No. 13367 of 1981 36 partnership firms have filed a single writ petition. Each such firm carries on business independently and under a licence granted to it separately by the Mandi Samiti.

3. In Writ Petition No. 6886 of 1980 there are 22 petitioners. Petitioners 1 to 21 are traders who carry on business of commission agent in finished tobacco. Petitioner No. 2 is a registered association of which petitioners Nos. 1 to 21 are members.

4. In each writ petition the petitioners claim that the Mandi Samiti is not entitled to charge market fee. They pray that the Mandi Samiti be directed not to demand payment of market fee. In some cases they have prayed for quashing of the notices issued by the Mandi Samiti for filing returns and paying the market fee.

5. In each writ petition the ground of attack is common to all various petitioners. For instance, in Writ Petition No. 6886 of 1980 all the 22 petitioners claim that tobacco is not a specified agricultural produce. The Mandi Samiti is hence not entitled to charge any market fee in respect of transactions of manufactured tobacco. In Writ Petition No. 133/67 of 1981 all the 36 petitioners state that since the Mandi Samiti does not render any service, it is not entitled to charge market fee from the traders.

6. At the hearing of the writ petitions the respondents raised a preliminary objection. It was submitted that an association of traders had no locus standi to file a writ petition on behalf of the traders when no right of the association as such was being adversely affected by the impugned action of the Mandi Samiti It was also urged that the various traders have an independent cause of action in respect of their liability to pay market fee. They cannot validly join in a single writ petition. In any event they must pay separate sets of court-fees.

7. It has also urged that in some cases several Mandi Samitis have been made defendants. They may have different defences. This will lead to confusion and multifariousness. Such a writ petition is not maintainable.

8. The Division Bench felt that the questions raised by these preliminary objections should more properly engage the attention of a larger Bench. Accordingly the Bench has referred the aforesaid questions of law for decision by a larger Bench, That is how the matter has come before this Full Bench.

9. We shall deal with the questions seriatim. Question No. 1 : "Whether an association of persons, registered or unregistered can maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the rights of its members at distinguished, from the enforcement of its own rights?

10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers very wide power on the High Courts for enforcement of rights. It is implicit that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right.

11. In Madan Gopal's case AIR 1952 SC 12 it was held that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

12. Charanjit Lal's case AIR 1951 SC 41 decided that the legal right that can be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of puch right. Calcutta Gas Co. AIR 1962 SC 1044, holds that the same principle applies to a petition under Article 226. The Supreme Court reiterated these principles in Venkateswara's case AIR 1966 SC 828.

13. In the Bank Nationalisation case AIR 1970 SC 564 the Supreme Court held that a shareholder, a depositor or & director of a company registered under the Companies Act may not be entitled to move a petition for infringement of the right of the Company unless by the action impugned by him his rights are also infringed. In other words, the petitioner may seek relief in respect of his own rights and not of others.

14. In Indian Sugar Mills Association case AIR 1951 All 1 a Full Bench of our Court held that a registered trade union is a distinct and separate person from the various members and it may not sue cm behalf of its members if its own interests are not affected unless by the rules and regulations of an association provision has been made giving to the association the right to represent the members in any legal proceedings before the Court. The reason being that without any such express autrorisation it cannot be held that the association had a right to move the court on behalf of its members because any order passed in these proceedings will not bind the mills.

15. In Fertilizer Corporation's case AIR 1981 SC 344 Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for the majority ruled that the question whether a person has the locus to file a proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. (Para 23)

16. Krishna Iyer, J. dealt with the question of access to justice elaborately. In paragraph 44, He observed :

"Public interest litigation is part of the process of participative justice and "standing" in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial door-steps."

The concept of locus standi in public interest litigation was further explained by his Lordship in paragraph 48 where he observed:

"If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered. I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Article 226."

See judgments of Krishna Iyer J. in (1975) 2 SCC 703 : (AIR 1975 SC 2092) and (1976) 2 SCC 291: (AIR 1976 SC 242).

17. The question of "standing" was the subject of a passing observation by Krishna Iyer, J. in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh's case AIR 1981 SC 298 (to which the other two learned Judges constituting the Bench did not advert to). His Lordship observed (para 63):--

"A technical point is taken in the counter-affidavit that the 1st petitioner is an unrecognised association and that, therefore, the petition to that extent, is not sustainable. It has to be overruled. Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Article 32. Our current processual jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-oriented and envisions access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognized association maintaining the writ petitions."

According to these observations the concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' has become obsolescent in some jurisdictions, like 'public interest litigation' by little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts. In such a case alone an association of little Indians may be permitted to sue on their behalf. These observations graft an exception to the traditional rule of locus standi. They will not cover the case of an association suing on behalf of its members where its own interests are not affected and where its members do not answer the description of little Indians.

17A. Another exception to the traditional rule of locus standi was discussed in People's Union for Democratic Rights case AIR 1982 SC 1473 at p. 1483 :

"Where judicial redress is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong suffered by a person or class of persons who by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court and the court is moved for this pro-pose by a member of a public by addressing a letter drawing the attention of the Court to such legal injury or legal wrong, Court would cast aside all mechanical rules of procedure and entertain the letter as a writ petition on the judicial fide and take action upon it."

18. It appears that the little Indian mentioned by Krishna Iyer, J. is this person, that is, who by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position is un-able to approach the Court. The legal injury or wrong sufferred by such a person can be brought to the notice of the Court by any other person, be it an association of such persons or a member of the public.

19. The question of locus standi was elaborately dealt with in the Judges case AIR 1982 SC 149. The law laid down by the majority decision in that case was affirmed in Nakara's case AIR 1983 SC 130. There it was observed (at Pp. 149-50)--

"The majority decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 149 at page 194) rules that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and the observance of such constitutional or legal provision."

Accordingly a public interest litigation can be initiated for judicial redress for public injury by a person not personally hurt. This principle will not apply where an association or organisation seeks to enforce a personal or private right of another, as distinguished from public injury.

20. To summarise, the position appears to be that an association of persons, registered or unregistered, can file a petition under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement at its own rights--

(1) In case members of such an association are themselves unable to approach the court by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position "little Indians").

(2) In case of a public injury leading to public interest litigation provided the association has some concern deeper than that of a way-farer or a busybody i.e. it has a special interest in the subject-matter.

(3) Where the rules or regulations of the association specifically authorise it to take legal proceedings on behalf of its members, so that any order passed by the court in such proceedings will be binding on the members.

21. In other cases an association whether registered or unregistered cannot maintain a petition under Article 226 for the enforcement or protection of the rights of its members, as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights.

22. This is our answer to question No. 1. Question No. 2: Whether a single writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable on behalf of more than one petitioner not connected with each other as partners or those who have no other legal subsisting jural relationship where the questions of law and facts involved in the petitions axe common?

23. It will be seen that this question raises the issue of maintainability on ground of joinder or misjoindier of petitioners. Question No. 1, on the other hand, raised the point about locus standi or standing. The concept of locus standi is different and distinct from the question of joinder of parties. The former relates to the right of a person to approach the Court; the latter to join with others in approaching the Court. One may not be confused with the other.

24. The question of joinder came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Mall Singh's case 1968 All LJ 210. The Full Bench decided that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction, Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure was attracted. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings under Article 226 in so far as the provisions of the Code can be made applicable. The majority view was:

"The joinder of more than one person under Article 226 can be permitted only where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action."

This view was based on a combined reading of Order 1, Rule 2, and Order 2, Rule 3 C. P. C. The Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976 added an Explanation to Section 141, stating that in this section the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order 9, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The result is that now the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not, of their own force, applicable to writ petitions.

25. The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mota Singh's case AIR 1981 SC 484. In that case several truck operators filed a single writ petition challenging the liability of each one of them to pay tax. The Court observed (at p. 485)--

"Having regard to the nature of these cases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action. A firm as understood under the Partnership Act or a Company as understood under the Indian Companies Act, if it is entitled in a law to commence action either in the firm name or in the Company's name can do so by filing a petition for the benefit of the Company or the partnership and in such a case court-fee would be payable depending upon the legal status of the petitioner. But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court-fee simply because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay legally payable court-fee on his petition. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses high way, he was common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers".

26. The relevant part of the observations relating to joinder of parties is--

"Having regard to the nature of these eases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action .....

Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition ....."

27. It was further held:

"It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses highway, he has common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers''.

28. It appears to us that according to this decision a joint writ petition would be validly maintainable if there is legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons between them or if they have the same cause of action. In substance, this decision applies the same principle of procedure as was enunciated by the Full Bench of our Court in Mall Singh's case (1968 All LJ 210), namely, generally joinder of more than one person can be permitted in a proceeding under Article 226 where the right to relief arises out of the same act or transaction or where the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause of action and a common question of law or fact arises. In other words, joinder of more than one person is permissible when the cause of action is the same. Such joinder may not be permissible if the cause of action is similar.

29. Our attention was invited, to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Manzoor Ahmad Khan v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1254 of 1981). In that case it was held that the petitioners had separate causes of action and so they were liable to pay separate court-fee. To that extent the decision is correct.

30. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Mota Singh's case (AIR 1981 SC 484) was not applicable because it related to petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.

31. In Calcutta Gas Company's case (AIR 1962 SC 1044) the Supreme Court held that the same procedure applied to a petition under Article 226 as they applied, to a petition under Article 32.

32. Similarly, in Fertilizer Corporation's case (AIR 1981 SC 344) the Supreme Court reiterated that the same principle governs the question of locus standi. be it a proceeding under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. In our opinion on the question of joinder of parties or causes of action the same principle would govern proceedings under Article 32 as well as Article 226. The decision in Mota Singh's case (AIR 1981 SC 484) will be equally applicable to a proceeding under Article 226.

33. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Soshit Karamchari Sangh's case (AIR 1981 SC 298). Those observations related to locus standi. They had no bearing on the question of joinder of petitioners. The passing observation of Krishna Iyer, J. (to which the other two learned Judges constituting the Bench did not advert to) related to to technical point taken in the counter-affidavit (though not argued at the hearing) that the "first petitioner is a non-recognised association and that therefore, the petition to that extent is not sustuinable". This objection related to locus standi of the first petitioner. It had nothing to do with the question whether more than one person can validly join in a single writ petition.

34. Our answer to the second question is that a single writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by more than one petitioner, not connected with each other as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship, is maintainable where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction; and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction, the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action.

35. The third and the fourth questions are--

(3) In case the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether only one set of court-fees would be payable on such petition or each such individual petitioner has to pay court-fees separately?

(4) In case answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, whether the defect of misjoinder of several petitioners in the writ petition can be cured by requiring each such petitioner to pay separate court-fees?

36. Where a single writ petition by an association or by more than one person is maintainable as mentioned above, only one set of court-fees would be payable. The levy of court-fee will not depend on the number of persons who have joined in the writ petition. But, where a single writ petition is not validly maintainable, but nontheless several persons join in it, then the principle laid down in Mota Singh's case (AIR 1981 SC 484) will apply; namely, each petitioner will have to pay court-fee separately as if he had filed a separate writ petition. In such cases the writ petition may not, in the discretion of the Court, be dismissed outright. The defect of misjoinder of petitioners can be cured by requiring each petitioner to pay separate court-fees.

37. Our answer to the third question is that where a single writ petition by an association or by more than one person is maintainable, then a single set of court-fees would be payable. Else, each petitioner is liable to pay separate court-fees.

38. Our answer to the fourth question is that the technical defect of mis-joinder of petitioners can, in the discretion of the Court, be cured, by each petitioner paying separate court-fees.

39. In the present group of writ petitions the position is that the petitioners are businessmen carrying on business in foodgrains etc. under licences granted to each one of them separately. They are, in effect, seeking enforcement of their individual rights. Their grievance is against the levy of market fee on each of them by the Mandi Samiti. The Mandi Samiti has issued notices to individual traders who are the petitioners requiring them to file returns as provided in the Rules and to pay market fee. They want the quashing of these notices issued to individual petitioners. In some of the writ petitions a direction has been sought that the Mandi Samiti is not entitled to levy market fee.

40. It is true that the principal question raised in these petitions is the same, but nonetheless each petitioner has an Independent cause of action because each petitioner has been made liable to pay market fee. The cause of action is not joint. Under these circumstances the petitioners cannot validly maintain a joint writ petition.

41. The petitioners may not, however, be dismissed on this ground, provided the petitioners pay separate court-fee for each one of them.

42. Question No. 5: "Whether one petition is maintainable for questioning similar actions taken by different Mandi Samitis independently of each other in cases whore the aggrieved party seeks relief against each such Committee on identical grounds?"

43. This question arises in writ petition No. 6886 of 1980. In that case the petitioners deal in manufactured tobacco. Their case is that tobacco is manufactured in various parts of the country outside the jurisdiction of Mandi Samiti, Kanpur, within whose jurisdiction they carry on trade. They import such tobacco in Kanpur or take it out of Kanpur, and this tobacco has to pass the territories of various other Mandi Samitis on the way. These other Samitis have fixed barriers on the road like octroi barrier of Municipal Boards, and they require the petitioners to pay market fees on the tobacco as soon as it enters within their respective jurisdictions. Such Committees have been arrayed as respondents 3 to 7 in the writ petition. The petitioners' case is that the demand of market fees by these several Mandi Samitis on the basis of entry of the tobacco within their respective territories is absolutely unauthorised. Their prayor is that these Mandi Samitis be restrained from demanding market fees from the petitioners on manufactured tobacco.

44. In view of the averments made in the writ petition there appears to be no legal obstacle to the impleadment of these various Mandi Samitis. If, of course, these Mandi Samitis raise different defences and the Court finds that it is not convenient or proper to adjudicate upon the cases of the various defendant in the same writ petition, it may order the petitioners to file separate writ petitions against each Mandi Samiti.

45. Our answer to the referred questions is as follows:--

Q. 1 Whether an association of persons, registered or unregistered, can maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights?

A. 1 The position appears to be that an association of persons, registered or unregistered, can file a petition under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights (1) In case members of such an association are themselves unable to approach the court by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position (Title Indians").

(2) In case of a public injury leading to public interest litigation; provided the association has some concern deeper than that of a wayfarer or a busybody, i.e., it has a special interest in the subject-matter.

In other cases an association, whether registered or unregistered, cannot maintain a petition under Article 226 for the enforcement or protection of the fights of its members, as distinguished from the enforcement at its own rights.

Q. 2 Whether a single writ petition under Article 226 at the Constitution is maintainable on behalf of more than one petitioner, not connected with each other as partners of those who have no other legally subsisting jural relationship where the questions of law and fact, involved in the petition, are common?

A. 2 A single writ petition under Art 226 of the Constitution by more than one petitioner, not connected with each other as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship, is maintainable where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact or where though the right of claim does not arise from the same act or transaction the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action.

Q. 3 In case the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether only one set of court-fees would be payable on such petition or each such individual petitioner has to pay court-fees separately?

A. 3 Where a single writ petition by by an association or by more than one person is maintainable, then a single set of court-fees would be payable; Else, each petitioner is liable to pay separate court-fees.

Q. 4 In case answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, whether the defect of misjoinder of several petitioners in the writ petition can be cured by requiring each such petitioner to pay separate court-fees?

A. 4 The technical defect of misJoinder of petitioners can, in the discretion of the Court, be cured by each petitioner paying separate court-fees.

Q. 5 Whether the petition is maintainable for questioning similar actions taken by different Mandi Samitis Independently 0* each other in cases where the aggrievedi party seeks relief against each such Committee on identical grounds?

A. 5 Our answer to this question is in the affirmative.

46. Let the papers be laid before the concerned Bench with this opinion and answers

इस उपर्युक्त प्रकरण में माननीय इलहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने मोटा सिंह वाले प्रकरण को आधार बनाते हुए पांच प्रश्नों का उत्तर देते हुए स्थिति को और स्पष्ट किया है।

SALIK Vs. REGIONAL P F COMMISSIONER LAWS (ALL) - 2013-4-165

- (1.) Sri Salik and 137 other ex-employees of the erstwhile U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. Churk Sonebhadra have filed the present writ petition collectively praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the Regional Provident Commissioner-II, Varanasi and Official Liquidator to update their Provident Fund Accounts and pay the entire Provident Fund dues including pension. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition is, that the petitioners contend that they are members of the Employees Provident Fund Trust created by the then management of the U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. under the Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952, which trust was approved by the Provident Fund Department. In this trust, the provident fund contribution was regularly being deducted from the salary of the petitioners. The Churk Unit of the U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. was wound up by an order of the Company Judge dated 08.12.1999, and the Official Liquidator was appointed as the liquidator of the Company. From time to time, the Company Judge has been passing various orders directing the Official Liquidator to provide the correct status of the Provident Fund Trust. The accounts of this trust are also being audited through an Auditor recommended by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. It has been stated that accounts of this trust has now been transferred to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Varanasi by the Secretary of the erstwhile Trust, and after the receipt of the audited accounts, some of the employees were paid their dues, but now the Provident Fund dues are not been released. It has been alleged that more than five years have passed and the provident fund accounts have not been updated nor the dues of the petitioners have been released. It has also been stated that the petitioners are entitled for pension under the provision of Employees Pension Scheme 1995 and, in this regard, representations have been made to the Official Liquidator, which has remained pending. It is contended that neither the representation has been decided nor the pension is being released. Consequently, the present writ petition was filed by the 137 ex employees of the erstwhile U.P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. for a writ of mandamus against the respondents.

(2.) At the time of the presentation of the writ petition, the stamp reporter made an endorsement that there is a deficiency of court fee by Rs. 14,280/-. The petitioners made an objection below the report of the stamp reporter objecting to the levy of the court fee contending that the petitioners are the members of the Employees Provident Fund Trust and have a jural relationship and that the relief claimed by them in the writ petition is one and the same for all the petitioners, and consequently, a single writ petition for their joint cause of action was maintainable and one set of Court fee was payable in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar Vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1984 AIR(All) 46 as well as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Saroja Nand Jha and others Vs. M/s. Hari Fertilizers, Varanasi and others,1994 2 UPLBEC 1228 as well the decision of the learned Single Judge in Track Parts of India Mazdoor Sabha Vs. State of U.P. And others, 2005 AIR(All) 77.

(3.) The objection placed by the petitioner was duly considered by the Taxing Officer who by its order dated 09th April, 2013 rejected the contention of the petitioner and upheld the deficiency of court fee as reported by the stamp reporter. The Taxing Officer held that each of the petitioner has an independent and separate cause of action and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mota Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1981 AIR(SC) 484 all the petitioners are liable to pay separate court fee, and consequently, directed the petitioners to make good the deficiency of court fee. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order of the Taxing Officer, has preferred a separate application dated 11.04.2013 in the present writ petition objecting to the order of the Taxing Officer and praying that the order the Taxing Officer and the report of the stamp reporter be set aside and the writ petition be held to be maintainable on payment of one set of Court fee.;

इस उपर्युक्त प्रकरण में भी माननीय उच्त्तम न्यायालय द्वारा मोटा सिंह के प्रकरण में व्यक्त अभिमत का समर्थन किया गया है।

उपसंहार -

वादों के मूल्यांकन अधिनियम तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम व नियमावली के सुसंगत प्रावधानों का उल्लेख व सम्यक विश्लेषण का प्रयास लेखकगण के द्वारा किया गया है। आवश्यकता पड़ने पर रेखाचित्रों का सहारा लिया गया है। इतना ही नहीं माननीय उच्त्तम व माननीय उच्च न्यायालय की सुसंगत नजीरों का उल्लेख किया गया है। सभी प्रावधानों को बहुत ही सरल भाषा में विश्लेषित करने का प्रयास किया गया है तथा समय- समय पर उक्त आलेख को अद्यतन करने का प्रयास भी किया जायेगा।

सन्दर्भ -

1- Bare act court fees act,1870.

2- Suits valuation act,1887

3- The uttar prades suits valuation rules,1942.

4- Law of court fees and suits valuation by MN Basu.

5-AIR Journal.

6- Indian kanoon.com

7- lawhelpline by SS Upadhyaya.

.......................................................................................................................

Saturday, December 12, 2020

Practice of warrant B and law relating to production warrant

Practice of warrant B and law relating to production warrant

Introduction-

Meaning of confined or detained and prison-

Which Court is empowered to require the attendance of prisoners and for what purpose -

Power of State Government to exclude certain person from the operation of production Warrant.

Duty of the Jail Authority -

Whether mere issuance of production warrant is deemed to be judicial custody-

What happened if the production warrant expired-

Whether for the purpose of investigation warrant B can be issued-

the answer is affirmative because warrant B can be issued for the purpose of answering the charge or for the purpose of any proceeding or for the purpose of examination as a witness. Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Caterina of judgments. see the case laws given below-

Whether the time of custody during the issuance of warrant B and actual production of accused can be set off in the imprisonment awarded -

Whether Bail application is maintainable mere issuance of production warrant -

What is the distinction between sec- 267 and 167, 209 and 309 Cr.P.C.-

Relevant provisions in respect of production of warrant and handcuffing etc.-

CHAPTER XXII Cr.P.C.ATTENDANCE OF PERSONS CONFINED OR DETAINED IN PRISONS-

Prisoners [Attendance In Courts] Act [1955]

U.P. Prisoners Attendance in Courts Rules, 1956

Conclusion-

Saturday, November 28, 2020

suit valuation and court fees act: a comprehensive approach

Suits valuation and court fees act: a comprehensive approach

प्रस्तावना -

विधिक प्रावधान -

संपत्ति का वर्गीकरण -

वादों के मूल्यांकन का उद्देश्य -

क्या वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम तथा न्यायशुल्क अधिनियम के प्रावधान माननीय उच्च न्यायालय पर लागू होंगे -

वाद मूल्यांकन अधिनियम के सुसंगत प्रावधान -

Sec-4 Valuation of certain suits for the purposes of jurisdiction -

3- Power for State Government to make rules determining value of land for jurisdictional purposes.—

Uttar pradesh suits valuation rules, 1942-

3-Suits for possession of land, buildings and gardens. -

4. Suits for possession of superior proprietary, under-proprietary and sub-proprietary rights in land. -

5. Suits between rival tenants and by tenants against trespasser-

6. Suits for possession of rent free grants. -

Conclusion on sec- 4 of the suit valuation act-

8-Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits-

Suits comes within the purview of sec-8 of suit valuation act, 1887

Conclusion on sec-8 of suit valuation act,1887

वादों के प्रकार :-

१- वे वाद जिनमें निर्धारित (fixed) न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है-

२- वे वाद जिनमें Ad-valorem न्यायशुल्क अदा करना होता है-

3- मिश्रित प्रकृति के वाद-

न्यायशुल्क किन-किन दस्तावेजों पर देय है -

१- दस्तावेज -

4. Fees on documents filed, etc., in High Courts in their ordinary or Extraordinary Jurisdiction.—

Schedule-1st, court fees payable on Documents-

Schedule-IInd,court fees payable on Documents

2- प्रार्थनापत्र/याचिकाएं -

Fees on Applications and petitions ( schedule-IInd)

3- वाद -

वादों का प्रकृतिवार मूल्यांकन व देय न्यायशुल्क की गणना

वादों का मूल्यांकन व न्यायशुल्क की गणना धारा-७ से इतर-

Section 8 in the Court-fees Act, 1870-

Section 17 of the Court-fees Act, 1870

अपील, रेफ़्रेन्स व निगरानी से सम्बंधित उपबंध -

1- न्यायशुल्क की अदायगी के आलोक में-

2- न्यायालय के आर्थिक क्षेत्राधिकार के आलोक में वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत -

3- न्यायशुल्क की गणना के प्रकाश में वाद का मूल्यांकन के बावत -

व्यावहारिक समस्याएं -

1- न्यायशुल्क के निर्धारण के लिए क्या देखा जाना है -

2-क्या बाजारी मूल्य का निर्धारण शर्किल रेट के आधार पर किया जा सकता है -

वाद के मूल्यांकन के बावत न्यायालय साक्ष्य कब ले सकता है -

माननीय उच्च न्यायालय में रिट अधिकारिता के आलोक में देय न्यायशुल्क की गणना कैसे की जाएगी -

उपसंहार -

Law of adverse possession

Book Review

CHAPTER XXII Cr.P.C.
ATTENDANCE OF PERSONS CONFINED OR DETAINED IN PRISONS-